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**A Critical Assessment of the Standard, Traditional, Residential  
Real Estate Broker Commission Rate Structure**

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## **Executive Summary**

While real estate brokers have long set their fee as a straight percentage of a home's sale price, this formula is an anomaly and a primary reason why such fees may be inflated by more than \$30 billion annually. Although competitive pressures ordinarily produce a fee structure reflecting costs, real estate broker commissions are strangely unrelated to either the quantity or quality of the service rendered or even to the value provided. Rather, this fee has been based solely on the price of the home. (It is as if tax preparers set their fee as a flat percentage of a client's gross income, irrespective of how difficult the return was to prepare or how much their efforts saved the taxpayer). Oddly, not only is there no evidence that it is any more costly to sell higher-priced homes than median-priced properties, but it is possible that the opposite may be true! Furthermore, the straight percentage fee formula creates little incentive for real estate agents to provide home buyers or sellers with additional value.

The article analyzes five elements of the traditional residential real estate broker rate structure, the most important of which are: 1) setting fees as a percentage-of-sale-price, 2) letting the seller's broker set the fee received by the buyer's broker, and 3) refusing to unbundle the price of a full package of services. After explaining the conditions under which such rate elements would be justified, this article finds that those conditions do not generally exist in the real estate brokerage market. Moreover, it identifies more than a half dozen harms that the rate elements cause to home buyers and sellers. For example, buyers are often not alerted to attractive homes because the rate structure leads traditional agents to intentionally avoid showing them. Meanwhile, many buyers do not even consider negotiating the fee paid to their broker because the rate structure causes them to believe their brokers' services cost them nothing.

After this criticism, the article suggests that consumers would benefit most from a fee-for-service approach – combining flat fees, hourly fees, and bonuses, including percentages of extra value created – and it identifies currently available examples of some of these options. After reviewing eight reasons why incumbents are able to protect the current structure, the article suggests six new disclosures that might undermine the industry's protectionist practices.

## A Critical Assessment of the Standard, Traditional, Residential Real Estate Broker Commission Rate Structure

Mark S. Nadel

### **1. Introduction**

Residential real estate brokers and salespersons (agents of brokers)<sup>1</sup> have long quoted their fees as a straight percentage of a home's sale price. This traditional formula, however, ill serves the interests of both home buyers and sellers, and is a primary reason why such fees may be inflated by, on average, more than 100 percent or \$30 billion annually. Although competitive pressures in an industry ordinarily force competitors to adopt fee structures that reflect their costs, this has not occurred for real estate broker fees. Despite the intensely competitive local real estate brokerage markets, broker fees are usually set without regard to either the quantity or quality of service rendered. Rather, fees are based solely on the price of the home. It is as if tax preparers set their fee as a flat percentage of a client's gross income, irrespective of how difficult the return was to prepare or how much their efforts saved the taxpayer. This occurs although there is no evidence that higher-priced homes are any more costly to sell than median-priced properties, and it is possible that the reverse is true! Furthermore, the fee formula creates very little incentive for agents to provide consumers with the full value-enhancing services that many could offer.

A traditional seller's (or listing) broker will typically charge the owner of a \$200,000 residence a six percent commission to provide "full service." This generally includes helping to price the home, to "stage" it effectively, showing it, and negotiating with potential buyers, as well as handling the closing. Yet the listing broker usually retains only half of that fee (three percent) for providing those services and generally offers the other three percent to the broker of the agent who finds a buyer.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, both brokers split their fees with their agents and the

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<sup>1</sup> A real estate agent is someone who has passed a state real estate licensing exam and works as an agent for a state-licensed real estate "broker." The latter, who set the fee structure and level, must meet higher educational standards or have more experience than a salesperson or both. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE: FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT PRICE COMPETITION 6 (2005) [hereinafter GAO 2005 Rep.]. Agents are not necessarily legal agents of (and with fiduciary duties to) home buyers and sellers. National Assoc. of Realtors, Structure, Conduct, and Performance of the Real Estate Brokerage Industry 5-6 (Nov. 2005) <http://www.realtor.org/Research.nsf/files/Structure%20Paper%20FINAL%2011-28-5.pdf>. Also, the National Association of Realtors (NAR) has trademarked the term Realtor® for its members.

<sup>2</sup> Adverse splits are addressed *infra* note 178 and accompanying text.

agents may end up with anywhere from about 40 to 100 percent of the commission.<sup>3</sup> With a 70-30 split, the traditional listing agent will receive about \$4,200 of the \$12,000 commission on a \$200,000 home.

Brokers justify using a percentage-of-sale-price formula with the claim that it aligns incentives of brokers with those of sellers; yet given the splits just indicated, the listing agent will earn only 2.1 percent of any additional value he or she can create by increasing the sale price of the home. This is a very weak motivator. For example, if the investment of 20 hours of extra effort by the agent would increase the selling price by \$10,000, the potential for only 2.1 percent of that (\$210) in additional net commission (\$10.50/hour) is unlikely to yield a sufficient incentive for the agent.<sup>4</sup> In addition, the formula induces buyers' brokers' agents to encourage their clients to make higher bids rather than trying to negotiate a lower purchase price.

Meanwhile, despite being willing and economically able to provide full service for an average \$12,000 total commission, listing brokers commonly seek and receive many times that amount even when they expect to expend significantly less than the average level of effort and resources (and have a lower risk of failure). Thus, a seller's broker for a \$1 million dollar home is apt to charge a five percent fee (\$50,000),<sup>5</sup> even when a hot market suggests that it will be easy to obtain the asking price or more, and the sale will require less than ten hours of work. Moreover, such brokers' agents commonly disparage brokers offering to provide full service for only a four percent (\$40,000) commission, implying that such discount brokers will have to skimp on service because it is economically impractical to provide "full service" for only \$40,000.

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<sup>3</sup> Splits between brokers and agents vary widely. Brokers typically pay new agents 50 percent of the commissions on their transactions and successful agents may collect as much as 90 or even 100 percent. See INMAN NEWS, THE STATE OF REAL ESTATE COMMISSIONS: 2006 4, 21 (2006) (Inman Commissions 2006); Jamie Baylis, *The Big Split*, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2000, at G1. Under an "agent service bureau" model agents retain their full commissions and pay their brokers only a monthly fee for desk costs or other overhead. See NAT'L ASSOC. OF REALTORS, THE FUTURE OF REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE 37 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 NAR Report].

<sup>4</sup> Many scholars have recognized that a six percent commission gives an agent little incentive to invest in generating incremental value. See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS 8-9, 72-73 (2005); Saul Levmore, *Commissions and Conflicts in Agency Arrangements: Lawyers, Real Estate Brokers, Underwriters, and Other Agents' Rewards*, 36 J. L. & ECON. 503, 506 n.7 (1993). Furthermore, other data indicates that agents splitting their commission with a broker generate the same results as those who keep the entire amount. See Henry J. Munneke & Abdullah Yavas, *Incentives and Performance in Real Estate Brokerage*, 22 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 5 (2001). See also *infra* note 43.

<sup>5</sup> See, Damon Darlin, *The 6 Percent Solution: Skip Real Estate Agents*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at C1 (To sell their \$1 million home, "[t]hey tried to negotiate a lower [than 6 percent] commission with prospective agents . . . , but the best they could get was 4.5 percent – and 5.5 percent if the agent had to share the commission with a buyer's

The situation is even odder for the agents who assist buyers. Certainly an agent with 30 years of knowledge regarding all aspects of the neighborhoods in a community may be worth \$500 an hour or more to help buyers find the home best able to satisfy all their future desires. Yet in other cases, astronomical fees are paid with little if any justification. For example, even where buyers did all the searching on their own and called the listing broker, clearly stating that they did not want the assistance of a buyer's agent, if the listing agent's colleague answered their call and provided services normally provided by the listing broker, that agent's broker may demand and receive half of the six percent commission.<sup>6</sup> Even when prospective buyers at an open house merely chat with the listing broker's associate (who may be one of the hundreds of thousands of novices, who have recently passed the state licensing exam after only 25 to 60 hours of study<sup>7</sup>), that agent's broker may be entitled to receive a full three percent commission.<sup>8</sup> Finally, although a buyer discharged her Nantucket buyer's broker after he refused to accept a \$200,000 cap on his fee, and then used her lawyers to purchase a \$15.5 million home, the broker (who had introduced the property to her) still sued the listing broker for his half of the \$620,000 commission.<sup>9</sup>

In many ways, the residential real estate brokerage industry resembles the American funeral industry that Jessica Mitford expertly exposed in 1963 in *The American Way of Death*:<sup>10</sup> Families arranging for funerals were regularly asked to pay a single price for a bundle of

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agent.”).

<sup>6</sup> See Blanche Evans, *Buyers Mad They Can't Cut Threshold Agent Out of the Deal*, REALTY TIMES.COM, Aug. 24, 2005 (contending that an agent deserves to receive the standard buyer's agent portion of the commission even after the buyer called the listing agent to view a home and the buyers expressly stated that they did not want to pay for, i.e., employ, a buyer's agent, but the listing agent's colleague still enabled the buyers to view the home and provided additional information).

<sup>7</sup> See Tracy McNamara, *A Hot Housing Market Leads to Agent Burnout*, REALESTATEJOURNAL.COM, July 14, 2005, <http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/agentsandbrokers/20050714-mcnamara.html> (most states require only 30 to 60 hours of classroom instruction to earn a general real-estate sales license); James R. Hagerty, *Feet in the Door: As Home Sales Cool, Ranks of Realtors Grow Crowded*, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2004, at A1. See also JULIE GARTON-GOOD, *REAL ESTATE A LA CARTE: SELECTING THE SERVICES YOU NEED, PAYING WHAT THEY'RE WORTH* 11 (2001) (“entry level education requirements to obtain a real estate license in most states are only a fraction of the hours demanded of barbers and cosmetologists.”). It is important to note, however, that the industry has strongly resisted the entry of banks into real estate brokerage. See Lew Sichelman, *Bill Would Allow Banks in Real Estate*, REALTY TIMES, June 8, 2005; Patrick Barta, *Realtors Organize to Stop a Threat from Banks*, Jan. 25, 2001, at A2. See also *infra* note 357, on support for such entry.

<sup>8</sup> See James R. Hagerty, *When Realtors Fight About Commissions, Things Can Get Ugly*, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2005, at A1.

<sup>9</sup> See Hagerty, *supra* note 8 (discussing the sale of a home on Nantucket in 2005). In the industry, if an agent set the wheels in motion for the buyer then the agent would be a procuring cause and be able to claim a commission.

<sup>10</sup> See JESSICA MITFORD, *THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEATH REVISITED* (1998) (updating original 1963 version).

services, many of which they did not need or want.<sup>11</sup> The words of the 1983 Federal Trade Commission (FTC)'s multi-year study of the residential real estate brokerage industry still stand: "the market for real estate brokerage service does not accord with the customary model of competitively functioning markets."<sup>12</sup>

In fact, the strange nature of the fee structure has led the industry and press to report that average commission rates have "fallen" from about 6 percent to 5.1 percent between 1991 and 2004. Those figures, however, are somewhat suspect<sup>13</sup> and misleading. Even accepting them, the average commission has still *increased in dollars* over that period, even after adjusting for inflation.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, any decrease in the *rate* appears to be primarily due to brokers' willingness to charge somewhat lower rates for the increasing number of much higher-priced listings.<sup>15</sup> One would have expected that an information and communication-based industry, like

<sup>11</sup> Id. In response, the FTC adopted its "Funeral Rule," which required funeral homes to provide consumers with itemized price lists and other data to help them to purchase only the specific services they desired. *See Funeral Industry Practices*, 47 Fed. Reg. 42260 (1982).

<sup>12</sup> From 1978 through 1981 the Los Angeles Regional Office of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), working in conjunction with the Seattle Regional Office and the FTC's Bureau of Economics, conducted a nationwide investigation of the residential real estate brokerage industry. The investigation was coordinated with the FTC's Bureaus of Competition and Consumer Protection, under their general sponsorship. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, THE RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY (1983) Vol. I (hereinafter FTC 1983 Report), at 11, available at <http://www.ftc.gov/bc/realestate/workshop/index.htm#ftcstaffreport1983>.

<sup>13</sup> See John C. Weicher, *The Price of Residential Real Estate Brokerage Services: A Review of the Evidence, Such As It Is*, 35 REAL EST. L.J. 119, 122-24 (2006), questioning whether the 5.1% figure may be too low. The data may also include the commissions paid on new homes, which include the fee paid to buyers' agents, but not any amounts that builders pay to their own marketing departments, which serve as listing agents. Then again, those data do not appear to take into account commission rebates, closing cost assistance, and other in-kind rebates, like free moving truck services. See Lawrence Yun, Real Estate Brokerage Industry: Structure-Conduct-Performance, Oct. 25, 2005, at 11, <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/comprealestate/yun.pdf> (Yun NAR report). It would also likely omit rebates that agents prefer to hide. See Glenn Roberts, Jr., 'Secret Agents' Quietly Offer Real Estate Rebates, INMAN NEWS, Mar. 7, 2006.

<sup>14</sup> Net increase in fees appears to be somewhat greater than inflation, *See GAO 2005 Rep.*, *supra* note 1, at 10-11; Weicher, *supra* note 13, at 124 (11 percent increase between 1991 and 2004 after adjusting for inflation); Robert W. Hahn, et al, *Bringing More Competition to Real Estate Brokerage*, 35 REAL EST. L.J. 86, 94 n.28 (2006). *See also* Inman Commissions 2006, *supra* note 3, at 5. For a comparison of home price increases and the change in the consumer price index in the hottest housing markets, *see American Bankers Assoc.*, Lack of Competition in Real Estate Commissions, spring 2005, <http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/realestatecompetition/518795-00400.pdf>, at 5.

<sup>15</sup> See GAO 2005 Rep., *supra* note 1, at 12; Weicher, *supra* note 13, at 133-37, citing C.F. Sirmans & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, *Brokerage Pricing Under Competition*, 41 J. URB. ECON. 102 (1997); Michael Carney, *Costs and Pricing of Home Brokerage Services*, 10 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS'N 331, 335-36 (1982) (reporting that tapered commission rates, e.g., 6 percent of the first \$25,000, 5 percent of the next \$75,000, and 2½ percent of the rest, were common in the U.S.); *Do Real-Estate Agents Help?*, 55 CONSUM. REP. 460, 462 (July 1990) (hereinafter *Consumer Rep.*); *Why Does it Cost So Much to Sell a House?*, FORBES, Oct. 15, 1972, at 35 (hereinafter 1972 Forbes Cover Story). This also probably explains why a 2000 survey by Gomez Advisors of 4,000 brokers, found that about 30 percent said they discounted fees "on a regular basis." *See Motoko Rich, Residential Brokers Cope with Threats Online*, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2000, at B12. *See also infra* note 64 (higher rates for lower-priced properties). Yet there is often resistance to rate reductions.

real estate brokerage, would enjoy tremendous cost efficiencies from the development of the Internet, databases, and other communication technologies.<sup>16</sup> Yet it appears that traditional brokers generally have not passed on their cost savings to consumers in the form of lower fees.<sup>17</sup>

Rather, until quite recently, an upward trend and downward inflexibility in traditional broker commission rates has been the norm.<sup>18</sup> For example, in the spring of 1998, the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area's largest brokerage firm, Long & Foster, actually raised its commission rate from six to seven percent, although that increase was retracted when competitors did not match it.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, brokers willing to charge less than the standard rate often only agree to do so subject to a confidentiality agreement, out of fear of retaliation.<sup>20</sup>

The 1983 FTC study focused on the apparent lack of price competition in the industry, which still continues despite fierce non-price competition.<sup>21</sup> As an illuminating 2003 article by

<sup>16</sup> See *infra* note 202, and accompanying text; U.S. v. NAR, Civil Action No. 05C-5140, Amended Complaint, Oct. 10, 2005 (DOJ 2005 Amended Complaint), <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f211700/211751.htm>, at ¶ 3, 27 (referencing multiple admissions by NAR members of lower cost structures of brokers who use the Internet). In addition a number of studies have found that that the use of computer technology and the Internet have improved the productivity and profit margins of brokers. See John D. Benjamin et al, *Technology and Real Estate Brokerage Firm Financial Performance*, 27 J. REAL EST. RES. 409 (2004). See also Steve Sawyer, et al, *Redefining Access: Uses and Roles of Information and Communication Technologies in the Residential Real Estate Industry from 1995-2005*, 20 J. INFO. TECH. 213, 217-19 (2005). But see Geoff Lewis, Competition in the Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry (Oct. 6, 2005 draft), [http://img.realtytimes.com/rtimages/article\\_20051010\\_blanche/\\$file/remaxposition.pdf](http://img.realtytimes.com/rtimages/article_20051010_blanche/$file/remaxposition.pdf) at 7 (claiming broker costs are increasing dramatically).

<sup>17</sup> Some traditional brokers have, however, matched lower priced brokers on an ad hoc basis and more. For example, Century 21 created Century 21 Clickit, which started in Georgia in 2000 and had expanded to five states by 2005. See Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Flat-Fee Century 21 Brokerage Clicks with Consumers*, INMAN NEWS, June 30, 2005. Also, Coldwell Banker started a discount brokerage division called Blue Edge Realty that offers to list properties for a 2 percent commission. See Lewis, *supra* note 16 at 10; Blanche Evans, *Everybody Discounts, Grumbles New Agent*, REALTY TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005. As far back as 2000, Century 21 was already showing agents how to offer an à la carte menu of options to meet their competition. See Rich, *supra* note 15. See also *Real Estate Commission Under Pressure*, INMAN NEWS, April 12, 2005 (4 part series). Others resist adopting most new technologies. See also *infra* note 202, and accompanying text.

<sup>18</sup> It appears that the prevailing rate in the 1920s was on the order of two to three percent commissions, while five percent appears to have been the prevailing rate in the 1950s. See John H. Crockett, *Competition and Efficiency in Transacting: The Case of Residential Real Estate Brokerage*, 10 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS'N 209, 210 (1982). Studies in the 1970s and 1980s found that communities generally settled on a rate of either six or seven percent. See GAO 2005 Rep., *supra* note 1, at 9 n.11. In fact, one antitrust enforcement official observed in 1980 that, despite "rapidly increasing home values, commission percentages remain stable and are even inching up to 7 percent, 7½ percent, and even 8 percent." William L. Trombetta, *Using Antitrust Law to Control Anticompetitive Real Estate Industry Practices*, 14 J. CONSUMER AFF. 142, 146 (1980).

<sup>19</sup> See Baylis, *supra* note 3. Cf. United States v. Foley 598 F.2d 1323 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1979).

<sup>20</sup> See Roberts, *supra* note 13. Rebates made by a buyer's broker or third party, e.g. credit union, are generally not disclosed on the standard HUD-1 form used at closing.

<sup>21</sup> For evidence of fierce competition, see Steve Sawyer, Local Real Estate Market Competition: Evidence and Insight from an Analysis of 12 Local Markets, 17 August 2005, at 8, [http://www.realtor.org/publicaffairsweb.nsf/files/SawyerStudy.pdf/\\$File/SawyerStudy.pdf](http://www.realtor.org/publicaffairsweb.nsf/files/SawyerStudy.pdf/$File/SawyerStudy.pdf).

Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti<sup>22</sup> explained, the industry has channeled competition towards providing consumers with two, dubious benefits: 1) a surplus of new, inexperienced agents (leading to a record high of more than 2.6 million licensed, and as many as 1.3 million active, agents),<sup>23</sup> and 2) free promotional gifts, such as Halloween pumpkins or refrigerator magnets and the like, personalized with agents' names.<sup>24</sup> Estimates of how much of the approximately \$65 billion (in 2005)<sup>25</sup> of annual broker fees consumers might save if there was effective price competition suggests as much as \$30 billion or more annually.<sup>26</sup>

This article, however, is only indirectly concerned about commission levels in the

<sup>22</sup> See Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, *Can Free Entry be Inefficient? Fixed Commissions and Social Waste in the Real Estate Industry*, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1076 (2003).

<sup>23</sup> See Blanche Evans, *ARELLO Announces Number Of Licensees For 2005*, REALTY TIMES, Jan. 12, 2006 (reporting 2.6 million licensees); DAVID BARRY, *NINE PILLARS OF THE CITADEL* 13-33 (2005) <http://www.barryfirm.com/dnld/Nine-Pillars-Citadel.pdf> (about 97 percent of active real estate agents join the NAR, usually to obtain access to local MLSs); Yun NAR report, *supra* note 13, at 3 (1.3 million NAR members); GAO 2005 Rep., *supra* note 11, at 8; David Streitfeld, *A Glut in the Market for Homes*, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 2005, at A1; Nadine Brozan, *So Few Properties, So Many Brokers*, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, §11, at 1. A large number of agents, however, are either part-time or obtained their licenses solely to work in mortgage brokerage. Also, experts estimate that an average agent works from about 28 hours per week (*see* Norm Miller, *The US Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry's Resistance to Commission Rate Competition with some Speculating on the Future of the Industry*, presented at AAI, Washington, D.C., Nov. 8, 2005, <http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/464f.pdf> at slide 8) to about five hours per week on successful sales (*see* BARRY, *supra* at 1. *But see* Blanche Evans, *NAR Member Survey Shows Commissions Haven't Gone Down*, REALTY TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005 (reporting that an NAR survey found that members work an average of 46 hours per week)).

<sup>24</sup> These marketing efforts are called "farming" or "prospecting" for clients. *See* Hsieh & Moretti, *supra* note 22, at 1088-89; FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 63-64; Geoffrey K. Turnbull, *Real Estate Brokers, Nonprice Competition and the Housing Market*, 24 REAL EST. ECON. 293 (1996); Streitfeld, *supra* note 23; Brozan, *supra* note 23. An environment with lottery-like payoffs for successes generally leads to rent seeking behavior, whereby competitive marketing efforts dissipate any surplus value associated with a success. Cf. Mark S. Nadel, *How Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: The Overlooked Impact of Marketing*, 19 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 785, 797-803 (2004) (*Financing Creative Output*).

<sup>25</sup> See Testimony of David Wood, GAO, to Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity, House Comm. on Financial Services, July 25, 2006, <http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/072506dgw.pdf> at 1. *See also* GAO 2005 Rep, *supra* note 1, at 6; Hahn, et al, *supra* note 14, at 87 n.3; James R. Hagerty, *Discount Real-Estate Brokers Spark a War Over Commissions*, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2005, at A1.

<sup>26</sup> Hsieh & Moretti estimated that the social loss represented more than half of the total commissions earned in 1990, Hsieh & Moretti, *supra* note 22, at 1116, suggesting that more than half of current commissions might be eliminated by competition. One 2003 study estimated the total *excess* charges to home buyers for brokerage mortgage, and related services at \$39 billion annually, about \$14 billion for real estate agents services. *See* Shane Ham & Robert D. Atkinson, *Modernizing Home Buying: How IT Can Empower Individuals, Slash Costs, and Transform the Real Estate Industry*, Mar. 2003, PPI, at 2, available at [http://www.pponline.org/documents/Real\\_Estate\\_0303.pdf](http://www.pponline.org/documents/Real_Estate_0303.pdf). Natalya Delcoure & Norm G. Miller, *International Residential Real Estate Brokerage Fees and Implications for the U.S. Brokerage Industry*, 5 INT'L REAL EST. REV. 12, 29 (2002) found that U.S. broker fees should equal something closer to three percent versus six to seven percent, implying excess fees of as much as \$30 billion or more annually. *See also* Daniel Kadlec, *The Commission Squeeze*, TIME, Jan. 31, 2005, at 50 (quoting University of California, Berkeley professor Peter Sealey's prediction that commissions will ultimately be cut in half); Elizabeth Lesly, *How Your Realtor Rips You Off*, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1990 (reporting that an FTC official reported being told by a former president of the California Board of Realtors that "2 percent is closer to what a competitive rate would be if

industry. It focuses primarily on why the traditional fee *structure* sets prices based solely on the sale price of the home, without consideration of either the quantity or quality of service desired. It views the industry's traditional one-dimensional fee structure as very similar to the illogical, inefficient formula previously used by travel agents and stock brokers through the early 1970s – setting a fixed rate, which did not vary with the size of a sale (whether in dollars or shares of stock).<sup>27</sup>

The more recent transformation of travel agent commissions on air travel is probably most suggestive of the future for agents even though good real estate agents play a much greater and important role interpreting data for clients. That revolution in the travel industry was also significantly triggered by easier customer access to the information in databases via the Internet. Through the mid-1990s, airlines generally paid travel agencies ten percent commissions on the airline tickets they sold, but in the late 1990s the airlines began eliminating these payments.<sup>28</sup> As a result, today most travel agents are forced to bill clients separately and explicitly for the research and ticketing services they provide,<sup>29</sup> and travelers have dramatically decreased their use of agents.<sup>30</sup>

This Article addresses five separate elements of the traditional residential real estate broker rate structure in sections II through VI:

- (II) the use of a percentage-of-sale-price metric
- (III) the setting of the buyer's broker's fee by the seller's broker
- (IV) the refusal to offer unbundled services
- (V) the lack of any price difference based on agent expertise or the difficulty of a task

there were not these artificial structures in the real estate industry").

<sup>27</sup> Stock broker commissions, however, began to be priced competitively in 1975, when the Securities and Exchange Commission ended its protection of fixed commissions and permitted order processing to be unbundled from research. Customers who did their own research increasingly opted for the dramatically lower prices offered for "no frills" service. *See generally* Lawrence J. White, *The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry: What Would More Vigorous Competition Look Like?*, 35 REAL EST. L.J. 11, 20-26 (2006).

<sup>28</sup> Airlines began by capping domestic commissions at \$50 (Feb. 1995), cutting rates to eight percent (Sept. 1997), then five percent (Oct. 1999) and then eliminating them.(Mar. 2002). *See* <http://www.astanet.com/about/faq.asp#12>.

<sup>29</sup> *See* <http://www.astanet.com/about/faq.asp#13>; Martha Brannigan & Jesse Drucker, *Travel Agents Change Fee Structure*, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2002, at D5.

<sup>30</sup> Medicare is also moving in that direction: recognizing that doctors should be compensated directly for the services they provide, rather than indirectly as a share of inflated drug prices. *See* Reed Abelson, *Pay Method Said to Sway Drug Choices of Oncologists*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at C3. One would also expect a flat fee pricing model to emerge for independent insurance brokers.

(VI) prohibitions against rebates (in some states).

Each section considers where else in the economy that aspect of the rate structure exists, why it may be efficient and socially valuable in those contexts, and why the rate element does not appear appropriate for the residential real estate brokerage market. Each section also explains significant harms that each element of the rate structure can cause to a competitive real estate brokerage market. For example, leaving buyer brokers' fees up to selling agents often leads traditional agents to steer away from homes not represented by other traditional brokers.

Section VII then reviews the services that home buyers and sellers desire and how they are now being priced or would likely be priced in a competitive market. It predicts that competitive pressures should lead brokers to set hourly or flat fees (for individual or bundles or services) based on the level and type of their skills and on whether market conditions favor buyers or sellers. The single price charged by traditional brokers for providing a "full service" bundle of services, but at average quality, also conceals the fact that it often greatly exceeds the total price of purchasing the same bundle of services à la carte from experts at each task. Section VIII attempts to explain why the proposed rate structure has not displaced the status quo. It reviews the many conditions exposed by the 1983 FTC Report and explains how traditional residential real estate brokers are able to maintain their dominant standard rate structures and rate levels against the rate structures of non-traditional entrants. Most significant among these is denying newcomers the full cooperation they need to function effectively.

Section IX then suggests six disclosures that might educate home buyers and sellers in a manner apt to shift the industry's standard rate structure to the one discussed in section VII. Before engaging a broker, buyers should be told the amount of the commission the broker expects to receive as well as whether the broker's agent intends to show them all of the homes meeting their search criteria (or whether the agent's personal financial interests might lead the agent to ignore some of the latter). Sellers should also be made aware that more than 20 percent of purchasers have no brokers and that other buyers have engaged brokers who have agreed to accept less than the standard fee ("cooperating broker" or "co-op" fee) listing brokers allocate to pay them. Sellers should also be informed about whether the listing broker will seek to limit the dissemination of their listing by competing brokers. Sellers should be able to decide how to address those situations before they sign listing contracts.

## **2. Charging a Percentage of the Sale Price of a Related Item**

Most professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, set their fees based on the quantity and quality of their efforts. They charge hourly rates, although for many routine tasks, which normally require a fixed duration to complete, they quote a flat fee. This serves administrative convenience as well as buyer preference for certainty.

Under some conditions, however, service providers receive compensation based on other formulas, such as a percentage of the sale price of items sold or of funds recovered. In fact, about 90 percent of real estate brokers, including most buyers' brokers, are paid based on the sale price of a home.<sup>31</sup> Even non-traditional brokers, like eRealty, zipRealty, and Foxton's, set their fees as a percentage of a home's sale price.<sup>32</sup> While some scholars have offered detailed economic explanations for percentage rate commissions; most have focused on how the structure encouraged agents with scarce time to favor the highest-value sales.<sup>33</sup> The careful analysis below of the six justifications offered for a percentage-of-sale-price rate element, however, finds that none of the explanations presented by the scholars or exhibited in other industry markets are generally applicable to residential real estate agents.

### **Offering a share of incremental value produced motivates providers**

Many employers seek to obtain optimal performance by offering their salespeople

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<sup>31</sup> 2003 NAR Report, *supra* note 3, at 6.

<sup>32</sup> The former two both began at 4.5 percent, see David Wessel, *Web May Soon Work Magic in Real Estate*, WALL ST. J. , Oct. 31, 2002, at A2, but in 2003, eRealty moved to individually negotiated fees and zipRealty commissions went up to about 4.75 percent. See James R. Hagerty, *Real-Estate Sites Raise Commissions*, WALL ST. J. ,Dec. 24, 2003, at D1.

<sup>33</sup> See Michael S. Knoll, *Uncertainty, Efficiency, and the Brokerage Industry*, 31 J. L. & ECON. 249, 251 (1988); John R. Schroeter, *Competition and Value-of-Service Pricing in the Residential Real Estate Brokerage Market*, 27 Q. REV. ECON. & BUS. 29 (1987); Levmore, *supra* note 4, at 506; Alan O. Sykes, *Some Thoughts on the Real Estate Puzzle, Comment on Levmore*, 36 J. L. & ECON. 541 (1993); Wayne Carroll, *Fixed-Percentage Commissions and Moral Hazard in Residential Real Estate Brokerage*, 2 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 349 (1989). Schroeter and Knoll offer formal mathematical analyses of why a uniform percentage rate structure is not necessarily anticompetitive, but they both assume that brokers are using the mechanism to efficiently allocate their time among competing customers (favoring the higher-priced homes where their service provides higher value). Given the apparent excess capacity of brokers, as discussed *supra* notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text, however, agents appear to spend most of their time prospecting for new clients rather than juggling their time to handle competing customer demands. Levmore suggests that the rate structure is a compromise “between the need to solve conflicts [among sellers of real estate competing for an agent’s attention] and the advantage of aligning the interests of agents and principals,” Levmore, *supra* at 508. Yet Levmore acknowledges that low commission rates fail to provide much alignment of interests, *see supra* note 4 and accompanying text, and, as just noted, most agents have excess time. The analyses of these scholars is relevant, however, to fees for allocating truly scarce elite agents, as discussed *infra* section II.B.

commissions: a specific percentage of their total sales revenues. They are happy to pay a salesperson twice as much in commissions for generating twice as much in total sales, because they have generated twice as much profit for the firm. It is important to recognize, however, that although salespeople are generally paid a percentage of the *sale price*, employers set commission rates based on the *incremental value* the firms gain from the sales.<sup>34</sup> Thus, firms with very large gross profit margins (gross incremental value, before accounting for the salesperson's fee) generally offer salespeople a relatively large percentage of the sale price. On the other hand, if profit margins are razor thin, employers are apt to offer commissions of only a small percentage of the sale price. (That may still be a strong motivator if total sales revenues are correspondingly high.) Employers will rarely offer to pay salespeople more than the incremental value that they create.

In many cases, however, it is impossible to compute a commission rate on total sales that represents a set percentage of the incremental value produced. This is due to difficulties with: 1) quantifying the incremental value generated, 2) deciding what share of that added value to offer to salesperson, and 3) expressing that share of value as a percentage commission. The major difficulty with quantifying the incremental value produced is setting an appropriate *baseline* against which to measure results. Sometimes a reasonable one is available, as when the cost of an item is relatively fixed and the value or gross profit is the difference between that cost and the selling price. Similarly, if an accident victim has been offered a reasonable settlement before retaining a lawyer, a personal injury attorney's incremental value would be any increase the attorney could obtain above that offer. Sometimes there are creative ways to set such baselines,<sup>35</sup> but often, as for chief executive officers, a performance baseline is very difficult to estimate, frustrating efforts to estimate the incremental value produced.<sup>36</sup>

The second issue is what share of incremental value should be offered to employees to

<sup>34</sup> See, e.g., Levmore, *supra* note 4, at 534 ("automobile sales commissions are usually figured on the basis of a percentage of the dealer's net revenue").

<sup>35</sup> See, e.g., Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, 197 F.R.D. 71, 83-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (where attorneys bid the recovery amount that they would treat as the benchmark, below which they would receive no fee and above which they would collect one quarter of the incremental value they helped obtain).

<sup>36</sup> Usually it is quite difficult to establish a baseline for measuring some minimally satisfactory level of performance of a senior executive. A companies stock price appears to be the most common metric, although this is terribly flawed unless adjustments are made to offset factors unrelated to the executive's performance. Cf, Gretchen Morgenson, *Rising Prices Lift All Bonuses*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, §3, at 1. It is probably best to compare an executive's performance to benchmarks that reflect average or superior performance of similarly situated executives.

achieve optimal results. This is generally discussed by economists as the principal-agent issue: What is the minimum fee level(s) an employer (principal) can offer to align the interests of a service provider (agent) with the employer's interests?<sup>37</sup>

Even when one can calculate the incremental value provided by an employee, and decide what share to give the salesperson, say 50 percent, there is the third matter of translating share of incremental value into a commission rate. This is easy when salespeople sell items at fixed unit prices with uniform profit margins. Otherwise, however, this may be impossible. For example, if a client desired to motivate a personal injury attorney by offering a fee equal to half of the incremental value produced, it would not be possible to phrase that offer in terms of a straight percentage of the settlement amount. That is, suppose there had been an initial, reasonable settlement offer of \$750,000 and the attorney incurred \$50,000 in outside expenses to secure the result. A \$888,000 award would represent \$88,000 in incremental value, half of that amount would be \$44,000, which would represent about five percent of the total settlement. On the other hand, if the settlement yielded \$1.2 million (\$400,000 in incremental value), the attorney's \$200,000 share of the incremental value would represent almost seventeen percent of the total settlement. Further, a \$3.2 million award would translate into a fee of almost thirty-eight percent of the settlement to cover the attorney's share of incremental value. Therefore, to motivate a service provider to generate higher revenues when there is no fixed price, it makes more sense to offer a fee set as a share of incremental value, not a commission on total revenues.

Despite these three challenges, it seems reasonable to motivate real estate listing agents by offering them a share of the incremental value that they can obtain for sellers.<sup>38</sup> Incremental value would come in two forms: a net increase in the sale proceeds and a faster sale (if that was desired). In a stable market, incremental value might be measured from a baseline based on an average of some set of comparative market analyses; it would be harder to measure in a volatile market. Rewards for quick sales might be measured against a benchmark of the average time comparable homes have taken to sell in the previous few months.

Sellers would generally want agents to take three actions to increase the net sale price of the property. First, they would want agents to make all cost-effective efforts to "stage" their

<sup>37</sup> See *infra* note 43.

<sup>38</sup> See Hsieh & Moretti, *supra* note 24, at 1087 n.17; *infra* note 44. Cf Brickman, *infra* note 54, at 659-60 n.12.

homes to increase their attractiveness and lead potential buyers to offer higher prices.<sup>39</sup> Second, they would desire optimal efforts to reach the maximum number of bona fide potential buyers via all cost effective media.<sup>40</sup> Third, sellers want an expert's advice as to what price to set and whether to accept a given bid or to wait in hopes of a better offer.<sup>41</sup> Although all three matter, most commentators have ignored the first when evaluating how well the interests of sellers and agents are aligned (the principal-agent issue).<sup>42</sup>

When considering this third element of service – recommending that the seller accept or reject an offer – agents are apt to consider two factors. First, they would estimate the incremental value that might be gained by waiting – the probabilities of the higher bids available (or lower bids that might have to be accepted) multiplied by the incremental values of each, discounted by the additional time before the bids would be accepted. Second there would be the cost to the agent in terms of additional time and expense required in the interim and the opportunity cost of earlier access to his or her fee by accepting the bid offered. A flat fee gives agents no incentive to recommend against accepting a bid that might be less than optimal, but even a net three percent commission on the sale price seems unlikely to create a sufficient benefit to outweigh the value to the agent of receiving a large fee without any further work.<sup>43</sup> The value

<sup>39</sup> Staging is discussed *infra* sections VII.A.6.

<sup>40</sup> This would include being available to show the home to all interested potential buyers. Special marketing efforts are discussed *infra* sections VII.A.5, 7 & 8. See also *infra* note 272 and accompanying text (discussing following up leads even when callers may not leave a message!).

<sup>41</sup> See *infra* sections VII.A.8.

<sup>42</sup> See scholars referenced *infra* note 43.

<sup>43</sup> See *supra* text accompanying note 4. There does not appear to be any scholarly research that demonstrates that the pricing structure motivates agents to obtain higher prices. See Ron C. Rutherford et al, *Conflicts Between Principals and Agents: Evidence from Residential Real Brokerage*, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 627 (2005) (finding that agent-owned houses sell no faster than client-owned homes, but at about a 4.5 percent higher price); Steven D. Levitt & Chad Syverson, Market Distortions When Agents are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions, NBER Working Paper #11053, Jan. 2005, available at <http://www.nber.org/papers/w11053>; Thomas S. Zorn & James E. Larsen, *The Incentive Effects of Flat-Fee and Percentage Commissions for Real Estate Brokers*, 14 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS'N 24 (1986) (finding that a flat fee and percentage fee provide equivalent incentives); Glenn Roberts, Jr., 'Freaky' Side of Real Estate Economics, INMAN NEWS, June 23, 2006 (ditto, based on unpublished research by Steven Levitt); Munneke & Yavas, *supra* note 4 (finding that effectively doubling agents' net percentage commissions did not seem to have any effect on agent performance). But see Michael A. Arnold, *The Principal-Agent Relationship in Real Estate Brokerage Services*, 20 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS'N 89 (1992) (concluding that, unlike a fixed-price fee, a percentage fee may lead a broker considering serial bids to wait for the best for the seller, although the latter fee structure does not guarantee that result); Joseph T. Williams, *Agency and Brokerage of Real Assets in Competitive Equilibrium*, 11 REV. FIN. ECON. 239 (1998) (contending that agent and seller interests are aligned); Lynn M. Fisher & Abdullah Yavas, A Case for Percentage Commission Contracts: The Impact of a "Race" Among Agents, (Aug. 2006 draft) (concluding that percentage fees align interests of agents and principals where there is no listing broker and the broker who delivers the buyer is working for the seller).

of quick receipt of a relatively large fee is likely to override the incentive to earn an additional small amount. To obtain more useful advice, a seller might offer the listing broker's agent (alone, not split with any others), a substantial portion, e.g., 20 to 50 percent, of any increase in the sale price above some benchmark. The difficulty of setting that baseline, however, leads some to reject this approach.<sup>44</sup> Yet it may be the least undesirable alternative.<sup>45</sup>

Even a full three percent commission appears much too small to align the incentives of listing agents with sellers with respect to the seller's first two goals: investing optimal effort to maximize the value of the home and to market it. Consider a home with an estimated fair market value of \$500,000. Assume an agent expects that by doing a standard, satisfactory job she can obtain a \$500,000 offer. She also estimates that after spending 40 more hours on staging, on carefully targeted marketing, and other enhancements, she will be able to obtain a bid of \$540,000. Given the seller's strong interest in obtaining the highest price, one would expect the fee structure to strongly encourage the latter effort. Yet, under the traditional fee structure, the effort indicated would only increase the typical broker commission by \$2,400 and thus her net pay by no more than \$1,200, translating into \$30 per hour – a relatively weak incentive for an effort that generates \$1,000 per hour for the seller.

To motivate agents to create incremental value, they should be paid more like 30 percent of any net price increase they can produce, and the percentage should go to the agent without any splits. In the example just mentioned, even if there were \$20,000 in expenses to deduct, this would still yield the agent \$6,000 or \$150 per hour for producing a \$20,000 price increase net of expenses. Granted, it would often be difficult to set a baseline with any precision, particularly in

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<sup>44</sup> In fact, although Levmore, *supra* note 4, at 504, recognizes the benefit of progressive rates, he rejects them due to the difficulty of setting the relevant benchmark, because “[i]n the absence of focal points for triggers, a trigger of zero with a low (6 percent) percentage commission above zero may be an equilibrium arrangement.” Id. at 517. In fact, so far, scholars have been unable to identify any fee structure that would 1) align the interests of both the buyer and buyer's agent and the seller and seller's agent and 2) permit the seller to expect an optimal sale price. See, e.g., id. at 512-14 (discussing two-dimensional auctions); Abdullah Yavas & Peter Colwell, *Buyer Brokerage: Incentive and Efficiency Implications*, 18 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 259 (1999) (suggesting the use of a fixed fee based on the assessed price of a home divided among agents based on the sale price of the home); Timothy E. Jares et al, *An Optimal Incentive System for Real Estate Agents*, 20 J. REAL EST. RES. 49 (2000) (proposing that the listing agent purchase the home with an option to resell it back to the current seller at the original price). See also Steve Perlstein, Real Estate Commissions, Washingtonpost.com transcript, May 18, 2005, at 2005 WLNR 8383582 (“in Washington . . . my experience is that when you try to suggest something less [than 5 percent], or a more creative structure with a base of 4 and some add-on incentives, [agents] just won't talk to you.”).

<sup>45</sup> One expert suggests that agents compile statistics to demonstrate their production of incremental value, see, e.g., BERNICE L. ROSS, WAGING WAR ON REAL ESTATE'S DISCOUNTERS 169-79, 194 (2005), but that approach appears too susceptible to distortion. See, e.g. Comments on *What's Reduced*, WALK-THROUGH, June 16, 2006, 7:49pm, <http://walkthrough.nytimes.com/?p=609#comments> (noting how agents can retroactively reduce the asking price).

volatile markets. Still, good agents may be willing to accept slightly excessive baselines if they would receive a large share of the incremental value generated and they had a plan that they expected to substantially raise the selling price. Meanwhile, buyers eager could motivate their negotiators by offering them a bonus of as much as half of any additional savings secured below some benchmark price they set for the home.<sup>46</sup>

On the other hand, agents deserve no percentage, but merely a minimal flat fee, for a poor performance. Certainly, an agent who is responsible for allowing a \$3 million home to go for what buyers view as a “steal” at \$2.9 million, does not deserve a reward at all, not to mention at least five times the fee of an agent who performed well: one who enabled a seller to collect \$10,000 more than any comparables, albeit, *only* \$300,000 for a home.

Clients should not pay any percentage on the portion of revenues obtained that should be “easy” to secure. Rather, if a \$12,000 commission payout is sufficient to cover the standard costs to brokers and agents – including their time – to sell a \$200,000 home, it should be a sufficient incentive to motivate them to sell a \$400,000 or even an \$800,000 home, if they do not make any special efforts that produce incremental value. That would not apply to agents if other sellers were bidding higher for their services (as discussed in II.B, below), but given the surplus of agents and the ability of good agents to provide excellent service while working simultaneously with multiple sellers, it would seem to represent a reasonable norm. Agents working with buyers should also receive only basic flat fees or hourly rates – but no bonuses – for efforts that produced no extra value, although “extra value” may be hard to measure in a sellers’ market.

In conclusion, then, the most appropriate fee structure for motivating agents to best serve home sellers would appear to consist of as many as three parts: 1) a base lump sum fee, based on the degree of difficulty given the state of the market, for selling the home at an agreed upon minimum price; 2) a substantial percentage, e.g, 20 to 50 percent (for the agent alone), of any incremental value created in terms of securing a higher price for a seller (or a lower price for a buyer); 3) a specific bonus for securing a suitable deal by a deadline.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Currently, some entities offer to help homeowners obtain reductions in their property tax assessments in return for a share of the tax savings; others offer to review rents for those in rent regulated buildings for a share of any savings.

<sup>47</sup> Bonuses could include vacations, cars, etc., like those mentioned *infra* note 111. *But see* D. Geltner, B. Kluger & N. G. Miller, *Incentive Commissions in Residential Real Estate Brokerage*, 2 J. HOUSING ECON. 139 (1992) (finding that time incentive contracts are not superior to fixed percentage commissions); Perlstein, *supra* note 44.

### **Provider's special ability and effort justify an equity stake**

Some service providers have rare abilities that enable them to add great value to a customer's project. They can convert an economic "rent" on their talents into an equity stake. Service providers in this group would include top sports or entertainment agents, whose credibility and relationships enable them to negotiate contracts for their clients with higher pay levels and special terms unobtainable by others. The top plaintiff tort litigators are in this class – probably viewing their cases as personal projects.<sup>48</sup> Talents specially recruited for new Internet ventures often demand equity stakes. And the matter may be as much psychological as financial.<sup>49</sup>

This rationale for commissions would only appear applicable to real estate agents to the extent that it overlapped with their ability to produce significant incremental value. Those eligible would include listing agents with extensive files of (and relationships with) wealthy clientele apt to be interested in purchasing prime properties and less likely to consider the home if it were marketed by most other agents.<sup>50</sup> It could also include agents who had a special plan likely to significantly increase the sale price of the home or any agent with more customers than time.<sup>51</sup>

On the other side, buyers might offer large hourly fees or even percentage fees to bid for the scarce services of agents with such detailed knowledge of individual neighborhoods and residents that they would be uniquely able to help buyers identify the streets on which they would be most comfortable or know of relevant homes not yet on the market.<sup>52</sup> This group might also include agents perceptive enough to quickly and accurately diagnose the buyer's

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<sup>48</sup> Noting that the top tier (about one percent) of contingent-fee lawyers appear to earn substantially higher effective hourly rates due to their expertise and ability to select the most profitable cases to pursue. See Herbert M. Kritzer, *Advocacy and Rhetoric v. Scholarship and Evidence in the Debate Over Contingency Fees: A Reply to Professor Brickman*, 82 WASH. U.L.Q. 477, 486-88 (2004).

<sup>49</sup> Behavioral economists have shown that many individuals will veto a payout scheme – even at the cost to themselves – if they view it as unfairly enriching others at their expense. See Nina Mazar & Dan Ariely, Dishonesty in Everyday Life and its Policy Implications, Jan. 2006 at 7-8 (draft available at [www.ssrn.com/abstract=887529](http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=887529)) (discussing the research of economists Ernst Fehr and James Andreoni and the ultimatum game). Similarly, when Leverage Buy Out (LBO) firms sought to motivate the top executives they sought to employ, they treated them as peers with equity positions rather than merely offering high salaries.

<sup>50</sup> See Mimi Swartz, *The Matchmaker*, N.Y. TIMES, [Key Magazine, fall 2006], Sept 10, 2006, at 90 (discussing Janie Miller); Kenneth R. Harney, *Let's Get Real on Sales Agent Commission Rates*, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2002, at H1 (reporting that "one East Coast-based company that specializes in exotic, high-end properties that require lavish advertising outlays to reach small numbers of wealthy target purchasers averages . . . 11.8 percent [commission]").

<sup>51</sup> The latter agents appear to be those implicitly the subject of the analyses discussed *supra* note 33.

<sup>52</sup> These valuable services are discussed in more detail *infra* section VII.B.3 & 4.

needs and desires and thus the most relevant criteria for identifying the buyer's ideal home.<sup>53</sup> While these providers might be able to demand a percentage fee, one would expect most of them to be equally comfortable with a very high hourly wage reflecting the value of their knowledge.

### **Provider is also asked to make a substantial high-risk investment**

In some cases, individuals are asked to provide a valued service even though their employers are unwilling or unable to pay them their regular price for those services. Service providers asked to make a substantial, high risk investment in the customer's venture, can demand an equity stake.

This is the situation faced by high-risk tort litigation firms, like those portrayed in the films "Erin Brokovich" and "A Civil Action."<sup>54</sup> While the former succeeded and earned a large percentage of the recovery to compensate for its high risk investment, the latter lost its entire investment of time and expenses. Other similarly situated service providers are those highly talented people hired by start-up companies with limited capital who offer compensation in the form of equity or stock options that may become either tremendously valuable or worthless. Book publishers, film studios, and music recording firms are also in this situation due to the likelihood that their investment in production and marketing of a creative work will lose a large amount of money.<sup>55</sup>

Certainly some home buyers and sellers will fail to complete a transaction – and therefore produce no fee – but that does not give real estate agents the same status as those mentioned above who take high risks on large investments. Competent agents should be able to quickly identify and avoid sellers who are seeking unreasonably high prices and resistant to appropriate price reductions.<sup>56</sup> Similarly, agents should have little difficulty identifying buyers too picky or unrealistic about the market to represent worthwhile clients in less than 10 hours, and thus

<sup>53</sup> See Swartz, *supra* note 50.

<sup>54</sup> Since all but the elite tort litigators are generally willing to work for their standard hourly fees, the equity share appears to reflect the real risk of underpayment they assume, although the specific level of the payout, i.e., what percentage should be due the service provider, is a different question. See Herbert M. Kritzer, *Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees*, 80 WASH. U.L.Q. 739 (2002); Lester Brickman, *Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees*, 81 WASH. U.L.Q. 653 (2003); Kritzer, *supra* note 48.

<sup>55</sup> See Nadel, *Financing Creative Output*, *supra* note 24, at 821-22.

<sup>56</sup> Cf Brickman, *supra* note 54, at 696-97 n.149. The situation is very different from the "nobody knows anything" difficulty faced in many media markets. See Nadel, *Financing Creative Output*, *supra* note 24, at 817-18.

terminate the relationship before making any large investment of time.<sup>57</sup> Meanwhile, those compelled to move by a particular date – and thus almost certain to close – should also be easy to recognize. Clients who appear reasonable, but indecisive and apt to take a long time, even years, to make a bid might represent a medium risk in that they will require substantial time over a long period for an uncertain payoff. Yet real estate agents would seem capable of limiting their investments in those clients to periods when they had no more promising prospects to focus on.

Real estate agents do face a risk of non-payment by customers who, after milking them for lots of useful information, terminate their relationships before making a purchase.<sup>58</sup> Yet a percentage fee does not deter such free riding. The best way to address this problem might be for brokers to charge buyers and sellers some nominal flat retainer or hourly fee, or at least pre-payment of expenses,<sup>59</sup> which would not be due until purchase or sale, but which would survive termination of the relationship. Clients of lawyers and psychiatrists who become dissatisfied with the relationship must still pay for the unsatisfactory services already delivered before moving on.

### **Proxy for provider's costs or efforts**

Basing a service provider's compensation on sale price also makes sense if that sale price is highly correlated with the quantity or quality of service provided. For example, tips based on restaurant bills make some economic sense because higher bills generally reflect a greater quantity or higher quality of service or both.<sup>60</sup> Similarly, the higher nominal fees received by the agents of entertainers and athletes may compensate for greater demands for both financial

<sup>57</sup> See Susan M. Wachter, *Residential Real Estate Brokerage: Rate Uniformity and Moral Hazard* in 10 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF URBAN PROPERTY RIGHTS 189, 197 (Austin J. Jaffe ed. 1987) (Jaffe) (buyer agents extend implicit insurance to prospective buyers).

<sup>58</sup> A buyer can now work with an agent for many hours, identifying the neighborhoods and types of homes of most interest, but then avoid a fee by terminating or simply not renewing the broker agreement, before seeking to purchase the next suitable new home on the market. See Wachter, *supra* note 57, at 190, 198-200. Agents working with buyers now rely on buyers' sense of fairness, time pressures, or that the buyer has already invested substantial time educating the agent about their needs, desires, and tastes.

<sup>59</sup> See *id.* at 190. [Wachter, *supra* note 57]. For example, one broker charged sellers a monthly advertising fee, see Rick Maylone, (Letter), INMAN NEWS, May 2, 2005, and some high-end brokers have charged sellers a one percent fee up front to cover extensive marketing expenses. Conversation with Bill Wendel, Sept. 12, 2006.

<sup>60</sup> Competition to work at more expensive restaurants generally enables them to employ superior quality servers. Research indicates, however, that the reason that diners and the highest paid entertainers pay their service providers a percentage fee may be more out of a sense of generosity to lower-income food servers and gratitude to faithful agent/partners. See Ofer H. Azar, *Who Do We Tip and Why? An Empirical Investigation*, 37 APP. ECON 1871, 1876-77 (2005). See generally Nadel, *Financing Creative Output*, *supra* note 24, at 839 & 841.

negotiations and responses to requests from the press, charities, and others. The greater the recovery sought by a tort lawyer, the greater the likely resistance. Yet while the costs to the service provider may increase on average as the revenues involved grow, that increase does not appear to be proportional to the revenues.<sup>61</sup>

So what about the correlation between a home's sale price and a broker's costs in assisting the sale? Some believe that a three percent commission is reasonable for the typical amount that a broker and agent invest on a transaction,<sup>62</sup> at least for low to median-level-priced homes,<sup>63</sup> although maybe not for the lowest priced homes.<sup>64</sup> Still, it appears that most of the costs entailed in effectively selling a home are unrelated to the sale price and the remainder are as likely to be *inversely* as directly correlated to the price, at least for homes priced above the local median.<sup>65</sup>

Brokers for sellers may assert that higher priced homes require more extensive advertising, more expensive staging, or the like, but this position is hard to defend. For example, consider the relative value of special advertisements or agent open houses to the sale of homes priced at the mean for a community as compared to those substantially above the mean. The higher a home is priced above the community average, the fewer its likely "competitors," and the more likely that home buyers (or the agents aiding them) will consider, if not visit, *all* relevant options as long as the homes are listed in the MLS.<sup>66</sup> On the other hand, there will likely be many more homes available around the mean. Thus, buyers of average-priced homes are more likely to make a bid before carefully viewing all their options. Therefore, it is more important

<sup>61</sup> For example, the burdens on an agent for athletes or entertainers is likely to vary more based on their maturity rather than their salaries, and much of it is likely to require only the attention of an agent's lower-cost assistant.

<sup>62</sup> See RAY WILSON, BOUGHT, NOT SOLD: SINGLE AGENCY, BUYERS' BROKERS, FLAT FEES, AND THE CONSUMER REVOLUTION IN REAL ESTATE 99-100 (1998). See also *supra* note 26; Paul Anglin & Richard Arnott, *Are Broker Commission Rates on Home Sales Too High? A Conceptual Analysis*, 27 REAL EST. ECON. 719, 736 (1999) (2.8 percent).

<sup>63</sup> See KIPLINGER STAFF, KIPLINGER'S GUIDE TO BUYING & SELLING A HOME 95 (1996).

<sup>64</sup> See Harney, *supra* note 50 (reporting that an agent who generally charges six percent will ask seven percent for lower-cost homes); Mary McAleer Vizard, *For Brokers' Commissions, It's Not Just a 6 Percent Solution*, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, §9 at 1 (reporting that for Manhattan homes in the mid-1990s, one broker made it company policy to charge commissions higher than 6 percent on all properties with sale prices of less than \$150,000).

<sup>65</sup> Inman Commissions 2006, *supra* note 3, at 48 (one agent explained "I find it easier to sell a \$500,000 home than one for \$225,000, which is entry level in our area."). This might not apply for the very highest-priced homes in a community, since few if any potential buyers might even think to look for them there. Those homes would require more extensive, marketing efforts. See *supra* note 50 and *infra* text accompanying note 258.

<sup>66</sup> Still, owners of the very highest priced homes would need to spend more 1) to tempt individuals who were not actively shopping for a home by presenting them with something exceptional that they might feel they wanted to

for agents representing average-priced homes to attract early attention from such buyers. Furthermore, a 2006 *Inman News* survey of brokers found that the amount brokers “spen[d] to market listings doesn’t generally increase” with the price of the home.<sup>67</sup>

On average, the need for staging also appears to decrease as the price of a home increases. Wealthier owners are more likely to have used decorators, made necessary repairs, and to use house cleaners on a regular basis than those with lower-priced homes. And even if the “out of pocket” cost of desirable staging correlated with the price of a home, that cost would not justify a higher broker fee because it does not ordinarily come out of the broker’s pocket. Rather agents advise sellers to make such investments, irrespective of the home’s price.<sup>68</sup> Some agents might offer to pay a portion of the staging costs, but only if they were embarrassed to ask the seller to pay more on top of an otherwise excessive fee.<sup>69</sup>

Three counter-arguments on this point also deserve a response. First, the higher priced homes will attract the most skilled and experienced (and implicitly expensive) agents. Yet those buyers or sellers might not need or want to pay high rates for expert advice. Second, higher-priced homes might remain on the market significantly longer than lower-priced homes, requiring more advertising, if not other effort, although the limited empirical data reported on such timing does not reach this conclusion.<sup>70</sup> Third, a relative scarcity of buyers for the highest priced homes might create a greater risk to agents of losing the listing to another agent or a “for sale by owner” (“FSBO”) before it sells.<sup>71</sup> Brokers might claim that this higher risk justifies a higher fee, but a shift among brokers is as likely to help as to hurt them and wealthier owners appear least likely to shift from a broker to a FSBO.

In conclusion, then, there appears to be little evidence that the cost of marketing higher-priced homes justifies higher broker commissions. The cost of effectively marketing a home

have or 2) to reach home shoppers who were looking to buy, but without a focus on any particular location.

<sup>67</sup> See Inman Commissions 2006, *supra* note 3, at 7.

<sup>68</sup> Thus, the \$7,500 cost of repairs to and the staging of a \$2 million property in Orange County was paid by the seller, not the agent. See Blanche Evans, *Provide Make Ready Services to Maximize Seller’s Take*, Says Realtor, REALTY TIMES, Mar. 6, 2006.

<sup>69</sup> Many agents had this reaction when their brokers asked them to assess administrative fees on top of commissions. See Kenneth R. Harney, *New Brokerage Fees Coming Under Fire*, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2002, at H1 (quoting one broker as reporting “How can we possibly explain to our customers that a 6 percent commission isn’t enough?”).

<sup>70</sup> See Hsieh & Moretti, *supra* note 22, at 1111. Buyer agents appeared to spend more time aiding buyer searches for higher priced homes, although the relationship between price and search time appeared to be small. Id. at 1113.

<sup>71</sup> For an review of the share of homes that FSBOs represent see *infra* note 141 and accompanying text.

appears no more likely to correlate with the price of the home than the costs that travel agents incur to ticket air travelers correlates with the price of their airline tickets or the effort that a doctor expends in a physical exam is related to the total price of any prescriptions prescribed. Instead, it seems that brokers and their agents may spend more for marketing higher priced homes *because* they feel the need to justify the higher fee they will earn.

### **Setting fees based on wealth or income**

Income and property taxes and other fees to finance government services are generally set as a percentage of an individual's or household's income or wealth, but this approach is based on the political view that those with the highest incomes or most wealth should contribute to the cost of government in proportion (if not in greater proportion) to that income or wealth. It is also supported by the view that the marginal utility of income diminishes as it increases. While public policies might justify a cross-subsidy from those most advantaged to those most disadvantaged, there is no reason to expect private entities to mimic these practices, absent price or profit regulation. In particular, there is no reason to believe that real estate brokers use the percentage-of-sale-price rate element to overcharge buyers and sellers of higher-priced homes so that they can undercharge buyers and sellers of lower-priced homes. Rather, such a pricing mechanism merely appears to confirm the market power that permits such value-based pricing.<sup>72</sup>

### **Avoiding some harmful effects of hourly rates**

Basing compensation on a percentage-of-sales-price also avoids some drawbacks of paying fees based on hours of input, particularly that the latter creates a perverse incentive – employees are encouraged to spend more time than necessary on a project and to overstate the time spent. Hourly rates may also deter customers from communicating freely because they feel that they are “on the meter.” Many sellers may be reluctant to pay for time to fully explain an important matter out of a false belief that it was not worth the cost of discussing it. Whatever the disadvantage of hourly rates, however, it is important to recognize that they can be avoided by employing any one of multiple alternatives, including flat fees.

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<sup>72</sup> See John Yinger, *A Search Model for Real Estate Broker Behavior*, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 591, 603 (1981).

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Although a percentage-of-sale-price fee leads a listing agent to share a seller's desire to obtain the highest price possible for a home, the rate element gives agents aiding buyers an incentive, albeit quite small, to act opposite to their client's interests: to coax buyers to bid higher than justified.<sup>73</sup> This adds to the agent's general bias toward a quick sale,<sup>74</sup> and against discouraging offers based on an apparent irrational infatuation likely to fade in the long run.<sup>75</sup> Still, this may be offset by the agent's desire to gain referral business. The current percentage rate also probably deters agents from advising sellers to seriously consider remodeling instead of selling.<sup>76</sup>

### **3. Seller Sets the Fee and Pays for Agents Assisting Buyers**

#### **General Justifications**

The norm in retailing is for buyers to be advised by salespeople loyal to sellers. While the salespeople typically help buyers find suitable choices, they are often biased by the potential for a raise, higher commissions, or a free trip associated with sales of particular items. Thus, salespeople will generally not inform a customer that her best choice is something that the seller does not carry, unless the seller has no suitable alternative. The Macy's Santa Claus in the

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<sup>73</sup> Some data indicates that when listing brokers offered higher commission rates to buyer brokers it resulted in a higher selling price, although only for small to medium-sized homes. *See Joachim Zietz & Bobby Newsome, Agency Representation and the Sale Price of Houses*, 24 J. REAL EST. RES. 165, 185 (2002) (finding that an increase in commission of one percent for small to medium-sized properties increased the sale price by an average of 2.9 percent or about \$3,819). Other data indicate, however, that buyers represented by buyer agents do not pay more for homes than those who are not represented. *See Harold W. Elder, et al, Buyer Brokers: Do They Make a Difference?, Their Influence on Selling Price and Search Duration*, 28 REAL EST. ECON. 337, 360-61 (2000); Christopher Curran & Joel Schrag, *Does it Matter Whom an Agent Serves? Evidence From Recent Changes in Real Estate Agency Law*, 43 J. L. & ECON. 265 (2000) (finding the use of buyer agents reduced buyer search time for buyers of high and low priced properties and led to significantly lower prices on high priced properties); Vivian Marino, *Buyer-Broker Transactions on Rise Across Nation*, CHI. TRIB., May 16, 1993, at 2R (A 1992 survey by U.S. Sprint reported that 232 relocating employees who hired buyers' brokers paid on average 91 percent of a home's list price, while those using traditional agents paid 96.5 percent of the list price).

<sup>74</sup> *See* WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 87-89; J.D. HOUSE, CONTEMPORARY ENTREPRENEURS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE AGENTS 5-6 (1977) (quoting a broker to say: "The customers' needs are taken into account. Of course, only up to a point. . . . If you looked at five or six houses and the decided on one and asked me if it was good, I'd be a fool not to say yes, even though I'd never buy it for myself.").

<sup>75</sup> MARJORIE B. GARBER, SEX AND REAL ESTATE: WHY WE LOVE HOUSES 14 (2000) recognizes many similarities between selecting a home and selecting a romantic partner, including the danger that buyers will act on infatuation.

<sup>76</sup> Then again, the agent probably does have an incentive to offer her assessment during the agent selection process for it may give her special credibility and the seller may disagree or contact her years later when there is justification

classic film *Miracle on Thirty-Fourth Street* – who placed consumers’ interests first – was exceptional in this respect. Hence, for most purchases, consumers make their choices without objective advice, often relying on biased salespeople for factual information and frequently settling for a merely satisfactory selection (“satisficing”<sup>77</sup>).

Where buyers desire unbiased advice they can pay for it directly by consulting impartial advisors, like *Consumer Reports*, but only a small minority subscribe to such services. Many wealthy shoppers have long paid personal shopping consultants for unbiased advice rather than relying on the free personal shoppers paid by and loyal to their stores.<sup>78</sup> Now that travel agents are paid directly by air travelers rather than by airlines,<sup>79</sup> they have a greater incentive to find air travelers the best deal. Similarly, doctors are less likely to be biased in recommending drugs for patients if the doctors are paid by patients rather than by drug companies.<sup>80</sup>

Why are there so few examples of unbiased selection assistants? One would expect that consumers would prefer to pay market niche experts directly for unbiased advice rather than paying indirectly for biased salespeople. Yet for lower-and moderately-priced items, administrative costs make this impractical. And even if the Internet alleviates this difficulty,<sup>81</sup> shoppers appear to strongly prefer the illusion of free service – an entitlement reinforced in the dot.com explosion in the late 1990s<sup>82</sup> – even if it is harmful in the long term.<sup>83</sup>

for a sale. Meanwhile, the loss would be the possibility of a commission, not one already in hand.

<sup>77</sup> Herbert Simon coined this term for settling for a merely satisfactory option, rather than investing extra effort to find a superior choice. See Herbert A. Simon, *A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice*, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1955). Also, the Internet is beginning to change this. See Mark S. Nadel, *The Consumer Product Selection Process in an Internet Age: Obstacles to Maximum Effectiveness and Policy Options*, 14 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 183 (2000) revised version available at [www.ssrn.com/abstract=247818](http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=247818) (hereinafter Nadel, *Selection Process*).

<sup>78</sup> Some examples of the free shoppers provided by stores is discussed in Amy Kover, *An Answer to the Harried Life: Personal Shoppers*, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, §3, at 6.

<sup>79</sup> See *supra* notes 28-29 and accompanying text. Independent insurance agents might be next to go this route.

<sup>80</sup> There is some concern, however, that some doctors are unreasonably influenced by gifts and attention they receive from drug companies or their own partial ownership of some medical equipment. See Troyen A. Brennan et al, *Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of Interest*, 295 JAMA 429 (2006); Reed Abelson, *Whistle-Blower Suit Says Device Maker Generously Rewards Doctors*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at C1.

<sup>81</sup> For a discussion of the possible emergence of a new class of consumer product selection assistants See Nadel, *Selection Process*, *supra* note 77; PHILIP EVANS & THOMAS S. WURSTER, *BLOWN TO BITS: HOW THE NEW ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION TRANSFORMS STRATEGY* (1999).

<sup>82</sup> Because securities investors in the 1990s were willing to finance free Internet content to attract an audience, individuals became accustomed to free content, making it difficult for websites seeking to operate economically viable businesses by charging for the valuable information they provide. See Nadel, *Selection Process*, *supra* note 77, at 202-04; Michael E. Porter, *Strategy and the Internet*, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2001, at 63, 76-77.

<sup>83</sup> The most important example in the US may be the financing of political campaigns. Many voters oppose full and

## Application to broker fees

Most home buyers have accepted the pervasive myth that “as a buyer, you’re never paying a commission anyway,”<sup>84</sup> implying that any reduction in the buyer’s broker’s fee would accrue to the seller, thus reducing any incentive for buyers to negotiate over fees. The reason why buyers should care about the fees paid to their brokers, however, is that they are an avoidable cost ultimately paid by buyers, as easily illustrated by a simple example.

A seller willing to accept a bid of \$500,000 and to pay a six percent broker commission (\$30,000, which is typically split evenly between the seller’s and buyer’s brokers’ firms) is, therefore, willing to accept net proceeds of \$470,000. Since the seller’s broker’s firm has agreed to accept a net \$15,000 commission for its own services, the seller should accept a \$485,000 bid if there is no buyer’s broker to compensate.<sup>85</sup> If, however, a buyer’s broker’s firm must be paid \$15,000 by the seller, then the seller must demand \$15,000 more from the buyer to clear \$470,000. Thus, the commission to the buyer’s broker is an “avoidable cost,” which sellers fully shift to the buyer.<sup>86, 87</sup>

Against this background, one would expect home buyers to choose to pay a broker directly for unbiased advice. Until the 1990s, however, buyers were generally content to work

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adequate public funding of political campaigns, preferring to avoid the expected higher taxes. Yet reliance on private financing places tremendous pressure on candidates to meet with and please potential donors. Moreover, it is almost certain that the legislated expenditures resulting from the need to please potential donors, if not solely the earmarked “pork” expenditures, exceed the cost of public financing many times over. Until someone attempts to precisely quantify this latter cost to taxpayers, however, it will remain easier for voters to effectively ignore it.

<sup>84</sup> See David A. Patton, *The Best Way to...House Hunt: The Web Can Make Your Search for a New Home a Lot More Efficient*, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1999, at R43 (quoting U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray analyst, Jeff Evanson). See also homepage of DROdio Realty, <http://www.drodio.com> (informing buyers: “Learn how we can help you at no cost.”); <http://www.assist2sell.com/buyers.aspx> (“at no cost to you”). NAR Standard of Practice 12-2 permits realtors to represent their services as “free” or without cost if the potential for pay from another source is disclosed.

<sup>85</sup> Some important points regarding this situation are discussed further in section IX.D, *infra*. Cf. Blanche Evans, *Agents Can Win the Discount Game*, REALTY TIMES, Apr. 20, 2006 (instead of seeking rebates of the commission their broker collects, “buyers can come out just as well by asking for the same percentage off the cost of the home”).

<sup>86</sup> At least a few courts appear to understand this. See Matthew M. Collette, *Note, Sub-Agency in Residential Real Estate Brokerage: A Proposal to End the Struggle with Reality*, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 440-41 n.218 (1988). See also James R. Frew & G. Donald Jud, *Who Pays the Real Estate Broker’s Commission?*, in Jaffe, *supra* note 57, at 177; G. Donald Jud & James R. Frew, *Real Estate Brokers, Housing Prices, and the Demand for Housing*, 23 URB. STUD. 21 (1986) (finding that brokers produce higher selling prices and shift some of their fee to buyers). While the buyer’s broker’s fee appears to come solely from the buyer, the seller’s broker’s fee may come out of the buyer or seller’s pocket, depending on the elasticity of demand.

<sup>87</sup> Some might challenge the implication of this view – that buyers who can avoid or reduce the costs of buyer brokerage services deserve any resulting cost savings. After all, under this rationale shoppers should be able to deduct that share of the price attributable to compensation for salespeople from the price if they want to purchase without assistance. Yet, the administrative and other costs of monitoring make such discounting impractical, unless the entire store operates on a minimal service, quasi-wholesale basis, like retailers like Costco.

with agents paid by – and recognized by the law as subagents of – the listing agent’s firm,<sup>88</sup> with the latter using the MLS to make a blanket offer of subagency to the agent who found a buyer. And as subagents of the seller, agents working with buyers were duty-bound to pass on to sellers’ agents any secrets buyers shared with them about how high they would bid.<sup>89</sup> Still, circa 1980, more than 70 percent of buyers *and sellers* believed that the agent aiding the buyer was representing the buyer’s interests and thus some courts interpreted the common law of agency to that effect.<sup>90</sup> Yet when litigation led listing brokers to be held liable for the services of buyer brokers,<sup>91</sup> the industry quickly shifted to require agents to disclose who their primary client was (although such disclosures are surprisingly neglected today<sup>92</sup>). The concept of “buyer’s brokers,” which Bill Broadbent had introduced in the late 1970s, quickly gained attention, and it appears that today about 63 percent of buyers use some variety of agents who commit to work for buyers.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> See Collette, *supra* note 86, at 406-08.

<sup>89</sup> The law of agency then required the agent working with the buyer to serve the best interests of the seller, including reporting to the seller’s agent how high a buyer was willing to bid on a property! See WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 83; Ann Morales Olazabal, *Redefining Realtor Relationships and Responsibilities: The Failure of State Regulatory Responses*, 40 HARV. J. LEG. 65, 113-14 (2003). One mid-1980s survey, however, found that agents working with buyers only passed on the highest price buyers would pay about half the time and, furthermore, selling agents who knew the lowest price that sellers would accept passed this on to buyers half the time! See Royce de R. Barondes & V. Carols Slawson, Jr., *Examining Compliance with Fiduciary Duties: A Study of Real Estate Agents*, 84 OR. L. REV. 681, 693-94 (2005); FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 23-24 (finding that 66 percent of sellers surveyed indicated that brokers had told them how high they thought particular buyers would go).

<sup>90</sup> For example, the 1983 FTC report found that more than 70 percent of buyers (and sellers) thought that the broker working with the buyer was “representing” the buyer, FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 14, although state laws of sub-agency held otherwise. On the other hand, some state court decisions found that buyers were due common law agency duties of agents, See Barondes & Slawson, *supra* note 89, at 691-93 (discussing common law and other principles); Ronald Benton Brown, et al, *Real Estate Brokerage: Recent Changes in Relationships and a Proposed Cure*, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 25,35-36 (1995) referencing Roy T. Black, *Proposed Alternatives to Traditional Real Property Agency: Restructuring the Brokerage Relationship*, 22 REAL EST. L.J. 201, 205 (1994) (discussing the creation of “accidental agency” and referencing Hale v. Wolfsen, 276 Cal. App. 2d 285, 290-91 (1968) and Gray v. Fox, 151 Cal. App. 3d 482, 489 (1984)); Joseph M. Grohman, *A Reassessment of the Selling Real Estate Broker’s Agency Relationship with the Purchaser*, 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 560 (1987); FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 180-81.

<sup>91</sup> The trigger point litigation was probably the \$18.2 million loss by a Minnesota Real Estate broker. See Dismuke v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 92-8716, 1993 WL 327771 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 17, 1993); Bokusky v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 3-92 CIV 223, 1993 WL 515827 (D.Minn. Aug. 6, 1993). And other lawsuits followed. See Brown, et al, *supra* note 90, at 45-50.

<sup>92</sup> See NATIONAL ASSOC. OF REALTORS, 2005 PROFILE OF HOME BUYERS AND SELLERS \_\_ (2006) (2005 NAR Survey) (reporting that less than one third of buyers in 2005 were told by their agents at their first meeting who the agent represented); Kenneth R. Harney, *Agents Falling Short on Disclosure*, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2006, at F1.

<sup>93</sup> See 2005 NAR Survey, *supra* note 92, at 45. It remains important for consumers to understand who has fiduciary duties to whom. See Maureen F. Glasheen, *Real Estate Agents: Get Your Money’s Worth*, CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH, Feb. 1994, at 10.

When Broadbent introduced the buyer broker concept he expected that buyers would negotiate to set buyers' brokers' fees,<sup>94</sup> an arrangement many recognize as appropriate;<sup>95</sup> yet that practice did not catch on.<sup>96</sup> Most buyer brokers – exclusive or not – however, appear to prefer to rely on the fees offered by listing brokers, rather than to raise the topic directly with buyers.<sup>97</sup> Prohibitions against rebates also hinder the growth of flat or hourly fees in the dozen or so states that prohibit rebates.<sup>98</sup> Finally, buyer brokers targeted for adverse splits by traditional brokers<sup>99</sup> may fear that their clients will not be able to amortize their broker fee by rolling it into the mortgage.<sup>100</sup>

Some claim that the “seller pays” concept also satisfies the desire of buyers to avoid paying a fee when there is no sale – i.e., a contingent fee.<sup>101</sup> Yet despite the substantial danger of free riding,<sup>102</sup> most buyers’ brokers already defer collection of their fee until a sale has closed.<sup>103</sup>

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### *Agents may fail to show buyers some attractive options*

Leaving the payment of buyer brokers to sellers or their brokers can lead agents with

<sup>94</sup> See WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 9-10, 79, 89-95.

<sup>95</sup> This aspect of the fee-for-service model, advocated by Julie Garton-Good, is also supported by many others. *See, e.g.*, Brian Larson, *The End of MLS as We Know it*, (part 1 of 3-part article) INMAN NEWS, Aug. 15, 2006; WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 92; ROSS, *supra* note 45, at 291; Wachter, *supra* note 57, at 206; Yavas & Colwell, *supra* note 44, at 262; 1972 Forbes Cover Story, *supra* note 15, at 36 (quoting Williams Farnsworth, executive in the Beverly Hills office of Coldwell, Banker); Marcie Geffner, *Secret Rebates Point to Larger Commission Structure Problems*, INMAN NEWS, Mar. 21, 2006. Mark Bagnoli & Naveen Khanna, *Buyers’ and Sellers’ Agents in the Housing Market*, 4 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 147 (1991) concludes that society is better off if buyers’ agents are paid by sellers, but it ignores the bias that is introduced when the seller pays. Still, courts have not found it improper for an agent whose duty is to serve the buyer to be paid by the seller’s agent. *See* Brean v. North Campbell Professional Building, 548 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Az. 1976); Duffy v. Setchell, 347 N.E.2d 218, 221 (Ill. App. 1976).

<sup>96</sup> *See, e.g. supra* note 32, and accompanying text. The FTC’s circa 1980 survey found that non-traditional brokers typically charged a sale-price-based commission, although about a quarter charged a flat fee. (This figures include buyer and seller brokers). *See* FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 154. *But see infra* note 203 and accompany text.

<sup>97</sup> *See* Larson, *supra* note 95 (in an informal survey, less than a third of agents raised the issue with buyers); Robert J. Ringer, *Salt the Record*, REALTY TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006; Gillespie, *supra* note 105.

<sup>98</sup> *See* section VI, *infra*.

<sup>99</sup> Adverse splits are discussed *infra* note 177, and accompanying text.

<sup>100</sup> *See infra* section IX.C.

<sup>101</sup> The advantages of a contingent fee are independent of whether the fee is paid by the seller or buyer. *See* Knoll, *supra* note 33, at 260-61 (observing that brokers can better diversify the risk of no sale).

<sup>102</sup> *See supra* notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text.

<sup>103</sup> *See* Collette, *supra* note 86, at 441 (calling this a “carryback commission”).

buyers to withhold options from buyers, despite fiduciary duties, if 1) the co-op fee offered to the buyer's broker for a home is too low, 2) the seller appears to expect free assistance from the buyer's broker, or 3) the agent wants to discourage price competition. Most buyers are unaware of this situation.<sup>104</sup>

Home buyers may not realize that, like most salespeople, agents aiding buyers are apt to make a greater effort to sell those listings that offer them the highest fee. For example, agents are likely to favor MLS listings that offer commissions of more than the "going rate" commission in the locality, e.g., three percent,<sup>105</sup> while neglecting listings that offer less.<sup>106</sup> Recognizing this, many discount brokers representing sellers offer to pay buyer brokers the going rate in the market, limiting discounting to reductions in their own share of the commission.<sup>107</sup> Jim Gillespie, a real estate agent "coach" from Temecula, Calif., told *Money Magazine* that he advises agents to use the specter of boycotts to dissuade sellers from listing with discounters.<sup>108</sup>

Alexander Perriello, President and chief executive officer of Cendant Real Estate Franchise Group (the largest franchiser of residential and commercial real estate brokerage

<sup>104</sup> In the 1980s, most buyers believed that the agent working with them was trying to serve their best interests. See FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 183-84, 192 n.580, and that still appears to be the case.

<sup>105</sup> See Robert J. Bruss, *Realtor Says Raising the Commission Pays Off*, INMAN NEWS, July 17, 2006 (offering a four percent commission to the buyer's agent did the trick); Vizard, *supra* note 64 (quoting a Manhattan broker admitting that "Let's say I have 10 studios, one at 10 percent, one at 6, one at 4 and one at 2, . . . Which one do you think I'll show?"); Jim Gillespie, *Surveying Your Right to a Full Commission*, REALTY TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005; *infra* note 109, and accompanying text.

<sup>106</sup> See *Re/Max International v. Realty One*, 173 F.3d 995, 1010 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999); *Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors*, 1983-2 Trade Cas. ¶ 65,718, 1983 WL 2199 at \*3, \*5 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd 786 F.2d 1400 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1986); *Park v. El Paso Bd. of Realtors*, 764 F.2d 1053, 1059 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985); FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 12, 14, 39-40, 75; *Consumer Rep.* *supra* note 15, at 462; Rich, *supra* note 15 (reporting that when one homeowner's non-traditional broker only offered a two percent commission to buyers' brokers, many brokers tried to negotiate that to three percent, and when this effort failed, they stated that they would not show the home); Blanche Evans, *Buyer Wants to Know Why Broker is Showing Agency Listings Only*, REALTY TIMES, July 1, 2005; Robert J. Bruss, *Home Sale Goes South When Sellers List with Broker Friend*, INMAN NEWS, Aug. 15, 2005; Robert J. Bruss, *Adding Offspring to Real Estate Title May be Risky*, INMAN NEWS, June 27, 2005. This can also arise when traditional brokers discriminate against new entrants by offering them only an "adverse split" of the total commission. See *infra* note 178.

<sup>107</sup> See, e.g., See FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 154 (most lower-priced brokers split their commissions 50-50 with buyer agents, but many offer cooperating agents the going rate); Hagerty, *supra* note 25 (discussing Sharon Jebavy).

<sup>108</sup> See Jon Birger & Joan Caplin, *The 4½ % Solution*, MONEY, Oct. 2004, at 105. Such statements are likely to deter risk-averse buyers from using discount brokers. See Wachter, *supra* note 57, at 195, 204-05. The statements are also known to be made to sellers who have listed with non-traditional brokers in an effort to get them to switch brokers. See FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 156. Still, such statements risk triggering prosecutions for illegal boycotts, and so other coaches discourage such statements. See ROSS, *supra* note 45, at 48-49, 51-52.

offices in the world), explained at an October 25, 2005 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)/FTC workshop on real estate competition how buyers can be steered. Rather than offering the broker whose agent worked with the buyer only half the total commission, he might offer it as much as a five percent commission if he believed it was difficult to attract buyers in that market.<sup>109</sup> If Perriello was willing to give up an additional two percent of the selling price, then he could have reduced his asking price by two percent.<sup>110</sup> His experience in the industry, however, apparently leads him to believe it more effective to favor the financial interests of agents working with buyers rather than buyers themselves.<sup>111</sup>

Buyers could attempt to correct for the pressures leading agents to fail to show them attractive options by offering to make up the difference between the fee a seller offered and the going rate; yet most buyers appear unaware of the current fee mechanism. While agents working with buyers could raise the issue,<sup>112</sup> most appear reluctant to impose on buyers by requiring them to sign an agreement guaranteeing the broker a minimum fee upon a purchase.<sup>113</sup> In addition, arranging to amortize such payments currently adds a complication.<sup>114</sup>

Even if buyers' brokers are offered fees at the going rate, agents may also avoid showing buyers homes out of fear that the seller will require the agent to handle all the tasks ordinarily done by the seller's agent because the seller is not using a full service broker.<sup>115</sup> Agents could

<sup>109</sup> See DOJ/FTC Competition Policy and Real Estate Industry Oct. 25, 2005 Workshop Transcript, at 194-95. <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/comprealestate/051209transcript.pdf> (DOJ/FTC 2005 Workshop Transcript).

<sup>110</sup> See Ardell DellaLoggia, *Zero Commission*, SEATTLE'S RAIN CITY REAL ESTATE GUIDE, Mar. 23, 2006, at <http://www.raincityguide.com/2006/03/23/zero-commission/> at item 11 (Mar. 25, 2006) (sellers should offer enticements to buyers, not buyers' agents). The FTC found that non-traditional brokers often encourage sellers to split some of their savings on brokerage fees with buyers by reducing the selling price of their home.

<sup>111</sup> This includes offering buyer agents higher commissions, vacations, and other gifts. See FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 75; ROBERT IRWIN, TIPS AND TRAPS WHEN SELLING A HOME 176 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2004); Robert J. Bruss, *Sell My Home, Win Vacation, Electronics*, INMAN NEWS, Oct. 2, 2006; Elsa Brenner, *Enticing Buyers, and Brokers to Act*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, §11, at 13; Ilyce R. Glink, *Home Sellers Take Creative Approach to Buyer's Market*, INMAN NEWS, Mar. 22, 2006; Damon Darlin, *Location, Location, Location. Research, Research*, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005, at C1; Alisa Hagner, *Letter to the Editor*, INMAN NEWS, Mar. 24, 2006.

<sup>112</sup> See Pamela J. Young (letter to the editor), *Agent 'Breaches Duty' on Commission Split*, INMAN NEWS, June 27, 2005.

<sup>113</sup> See *supra* note 97. See generally Phoebe Chongchua, *Buyer Broker Agreement a Win-Win?*, REALTY TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004.

<sup>114</sup> If a buyer has agreed to pay a specific fee to the buyer's agent then the seller should be willing to add that fee to the price of the house and agree to pay it to the buyer's broker, and thus allow it to be amortized in the mortgage, but some sellers and their agents might resist this. Mortgage lenders also appear uncomfortable. See *infra* section IX.C.

<sup>115</sup> See Blanche Evans, *New Study with Implications for MLSs Shows Freeloaders Unwelcome*, REALTY TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006; Lewis, *supra* note 16, at 16-17; ERIC TYSON & RAY BROWN, *HOUSE SELLING FOR DUMMIES* 134 (2d ed. 2002); Paul Sigurdson, *Limited-Service Debate About Representation*, INMAN NEWS, May 11, 2005.

demand to be paid for any extra work for sellers, but most prefer to avoid the current awkwardness of such requests. Although not due to the traditional rate structure, traditional agents may also avoid homes represented by entities that threaten the stability of the traditional system (favoring cooperation over price competition<sup>116</sup>), as discussed further in VIII.A, below. Thus, traditional agents willing to offer rebates to customers (only from the broker's own share of the commission) feel pressure to act secretly out of fear of being shunned by their colleagues, if not fired by their broker!<sup>117</sup> Although such practices resemble a quasi-boycott, the lack of an explicit agreement has allowed them to avoid antitrust prosecutions.<sup>118</sup>

A 2005 *Wall Street Journal* editorial complains that such practices represent "a clear breach of the fiduciary duty of the agent to find the best home at the lowest price for clients."<sup>119</sup> Not only do the practices violate duties imposed by state laws of agency, but they conflict with the first principle of loyalty in the National Association of Realtors® (NAR's) "stringent, enforceable" code of ethics.<sup>120</sup> Yet, the *Journal* observes: "To our knowledge, neither the National Association of Realtors nor the state real estate commissions have ever sanctioned a real estate agent for this breach of ethics."<sup>121</sup>

Some claim that the effect of steering is minor. After all, 77 percent of buyers do

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<sup>116</sup> See GAO 2005 Rep., *supra* note 1, at 13; FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 40, 75, 184-85, 187 n.555.

<sup>117</sup> See Roberts, *supra* note 13; Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Brokerage Terminates Agent Who Founded Rebate Network*, INMAN NEWS, Mar. 9, 2006; Timothy J. Mullaney, *Real Estate Brokers Are Racing for Shelter*, BUS. WEEK, Apr. 10, 2006, at 75.

<sup>118</sup> Although group boycotts are violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act, N.W. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. V. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), mere conscious parallel conduct alone, is not enough, although inferences about group understandings may be drawn. See ES Development, Inc. v. RWM Enterprises, Inc., 939 F.2d 547, 555 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991); Park v. El Paso Bd. of Realtors, 764 F.2d 1053, 1060-61 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985); Michael K. Braswell & Stephen L. Poe, *The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry: A Proposal for Reform*, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 271, 319-20 (1992); Trombetta, *supra* note 18, at 147-48; Owen R. Phillips & Henry N. Butler, *The Law and Economics of Residential Real Estate Markets in Texas: Regulation and Antitrust Implications*, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 649 (1984).

<sup>119</sup> Editorial, *The Realtor Racket*, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2005, at A8. See also Fiduciary Duties Of A Real Estate Agent <http://www.realestatebuyersagents.com/duties.htm>.

<sup>120</sup> The first article of the National Association of Realtor Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice states that "When representing a buyer . . . as an agent REALTORS® pledge themselves to protect and promote the interests of their client. This obligation to the client is primary . . ." Article 1, effective January 1, 2005 <http://www.realtor.org/mempolweb.nsf/pages/printable2005Code>.

<sup>121</sup> editorial, *The Realtor Racket*, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2005, at A8. This may, however, may be due to a state's failure to authorize prosecutions of such anticompetitive actions. See ARELLO, Impact of Industry Members Serving on Real Estate Commissions on Boards, July 2006, [http://img.realtytimes.com/rtimages/article\\_20070628\\_blanche/\\$file/arelloposition.pdf](http://img.realtytimes.com/rtimages/article_20070628_blanche/$file/arelloposition.pdf) at Point 2.

research on the Internet even before working with a broker.<sup>122</sup> Yet there are at least four flaws in this response. First, about a quarter of home buyers do not use the Internet. Second, not all homes are easy to find online, particularly those not represented by traditional brokers.<sup>123</sup> Third, many who begin their research on the Internet are soon discouraged either by their inability to locate any of what they want or by the overwhelming level of data available. Both types may conclude that it is more cost effective to employ an agent with experience retrieving the relevant data to best meet their needs. Fourth, once they have hired a broker who is paid for providing full service, buyers with scarce free time are apt to forgo duplicating what their agent is already doing, although, admittedly, many individuals are inclined to continue to monitor homes online.

#### *Reducing buyers' incentive to negotiate*

By encouraging buyers to believe that it costs them nothing to use an broker,<sup>124</sup> the current fee arrangement deters most buyers from negotiating over their agent's broker's fee.<sup>125</sup> Hence, there is little pressure to reduce the fee paid to buyer brokers from half of the "going rate," e.g., half of six percent, which sellers and agents believe is necessary to avoid the chance that their listing will be neglected, as just discussed. Thus, most MLS listings offer buyers' brokers half the standard commission charged.<sup>126</sup> The situation is changing, however, due to the emergence of referral firms, like LendingTree and an increasing number of brokers who offer buyers a rebate from the commission paid by listing brokers, as discussed in more detail in section VI, below. As buyers discover that even "full service" buyer brokers are willing to rebate a portion of their commission, more are likely to demand lower fees.<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> See 2005 NAR Survey, *supra* note 92, at 29 (finding that 77 percent of home buyers use the Internet).

<sup>123</sup> See *infra* section VII.B.4.a.

<sup>124</sup> See *supra* note 84 and accompanying text.

<sup>125</sup> Many buyers assume that traditional broker rates are basically fixed and that the quality of service provided by lower-priced providers must be inferior. *See also infra* section VIII.

<sup>126</sup> FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 136-37 (finding that the "splits" offered to cooperating brokers by listing brokers are highly uniform within any local MLS market). The NAR handbook recommends that splits be designed to "encourage cooperation," as opposed to competition. *Id.* at 139. *Cf* note 340, *infra*.

<sup>127</sup> Pressure may also mount if more sellers list their homes with firms like Foxtons and Catalyst (which offer brokers for buyers only 1.0 and 1.5 percent commissions, respectively). *See* Jessica Sweeney, *Real Estate Discounters Gaining Traction*, INMAN NEWS, April 12, 2005 (Southern California-based Catalyst); Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Discount Pioneer Back in Business*, INMAN NEWS, May 2, 2005.

### *Unnecessary fees allocated to pay buyer brokers*

When listing brokers are asked to defend their commission requests, most explain that they “must” offer buyer’s brokers a co-op commission at the “going rate,” e.g., three percent, to avoid the harm discussed in III.C.1, above. Yet even those who acknowledge that the buyer may have no broker, generally only offer to reduce the total commission by one percent of the three they “needed” to offer. Certainly if sellers want the listing agent to handle tasks for which agent aiding the buyer is generally responsible then the listing broker is certainly entitled to some extra pay,<sup>128</sup> but not when the buyer has already hired an attorney or consultant to handle tasks for buyers or two percent of the sale price for the usually routine tasks described in section VII.B.2.

Those who buy homes without a broker’s help usually ask sellers to reduce the sale price by the amount that would have been paid to the buyer’s broker.<sup>129</sup> Sellers may desire to comply, but listing agreements usually give the listing broker the right to keep the full fee.<sup>130</sup> Since buyers who are real estate agents can avoid this problem, and the cost of becoming a licensed agent is so low,<sup>131</sup> this may be one reason why so many individuals have become real estate agents!<sup>132</sup>

## **4. Refusing Reductions to the Bundled Price for Those Desiring Much Less Service**

### **General justifications and their application to broker fees**

There are many reasons why sellers may require buyers to purchase products as part of a bundle rather than offering them on a stand alone basis at reasonable prices. When a seller has market power it may use bundling to capture a greater share of the surplus value created by an item or use it to increase the entry barriers to the industry.<sup>133</sup> This may even benefit society if it

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<sup>128</sup> See *infra* section VII.B.2. Cf. Evans, *supra* note 115 (suggesting that brokers charge fees for the services they provide to those their clients are buying from or selling to).

<sup>129</sup> Then again, as described above, current listing contracts often force listing brokers to pay brokers of buyer agents even when buyers thought that they had no agent. See *supra* text accompanying notes 6-8.

<sup>130</sup> Listing brokers may actually expect to work for three percent most of the time (where buyers have agents), but with the expectation that they will keep all six percent (or at least five) about 20 percent of the time.

<sup>131</sup> See *supra* note 7. Still, to collect fees, agents must become or work for a broker and incur other related fees.

<sup>132</sup> Obtaining a real estate license may be a wise investment for those expecting to buy homes on their own (and interested in helping out family and friends in the same boat). See Jim Gillespie, *Splitting Commissions*, REALTY TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006.

<sup>133</sup> See Barry Nalebuff, *Bundling as a Way to Leverage Monopoly*, [www.ssrn.com/abstract=586648](http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=586648); Barry

permits the production of offerings that would not be profitable to sell except as part of a bundle.

Sellers without market power may also have good reason to set a single price for a bundle and refuse to give discounts for subsets of the bundled items. First, it might be cheaper to produce only one popular bundle of basic features. As Nobel Prize winner William Vickery often observed, auto makers would not give a discount to a buyer who only drove during daylight and therefore requested a car without headlights, since it would actually be more expensive to provide one. Second, the bundle might represent a “loss leader” created primarily as a marketing device. Once a dinner or travel package special has attracted a customer’s attention, the firm offering it might want to shift the customer to a much more profitable option and thus be unwilling to modify the advertised bundle. Third, a service provider’s professional preference may be to handle only whole tasks. For example, many doctors and criminal lawyers may be uninterested in handling only a part of a case, preferring to manage the whole case or nothing.

None of these latter three conditions appear to apply directly to the real estate brokerage market. While there are probably economies of scope in providing a set of real estate services,<sup>134</sup> the tasks discussed in section VII appear relatively distinct and the costs of each appear to be easily avoidable, which is why at least some buyer and seller brokers are offering them à la carte. Meanwhile, most agents expect to cooperate with another agent on a purchase.

Nevertheless, traditional brokers, contending that the public expects an “agent” to provide some minimum set of services,<sup>135</sup> such as delivering offers, have successfully helped to pass laws in at least 17 states that require brokers to provide some minimum set of services.<sup>136</sup>

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Nalebuff, *Bundling as a Barrier to Entry*, 119 Q. J. ECON. 159 (2004); Timothy J. Brennan, Is Competition the Entry Barrier? Consumer and Total Welfare Benefits of Bundling (2005), <http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=944>. Such practices may enable the seller to distort competitive marketplaces and decrease the opportunity for others to compete in its monopoly market, leading the courts to look unfavorably on such bundling or tying. *See, e.g.* Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).

<sup>134</sup> It does not appear that there would be any more cost savings from bundling by real estate brokers than the FTC expected to see from “economies of packaging” in the funeral industry. *See* Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. 42260, 42298 (1982).

<sup>135</sup> *See, e.g.*, Wayne Thorburn, Public and Private Restraints to Alternative Business Models for Consumers, Oct. 25, 2005, <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/comprealestate/thorburn.pdf>.

<sup>136</sup> *See* ALA CODE § 34-27-84 (c); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24 § 2979; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.278; GA. CODE ANN. § 10-6A-4; 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 454/ 15-75; IND. CODE ANN. § 25-34.1-10-9.5 (b); IOWA CODE ANN. § 543B.56A; MO. ANN. STAT. § 339.780(7); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4735.62-65; OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 858-352, -353(A)(2), -354(B)(2); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 455.606a(a)(3); ?SC 40-57-145?; TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-13-404(3); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1101.557(b); UTAH CODE § 61-2-27(2)(a); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.2131(A)(2)(b),(c); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.86.030(1)(c); WIS. STAT. §§ 452.133(2)(am), (2)(d), (6).

Yet this prevents a seller from paying solely to engage a broker to place a listing on the local MLS<sup>137</sup> just as they now pay a newspaper for placing a classified ad and nothing more. If policy makers were truly concerned that consumers might be denied a service they expected, an effective disclosure and/or a waiver option would be the appropriate response to this, as noted by the DOJ, the FTC, and the *Wall Street Journal*,<sup>138</sup> among others, but only about five of the 17 states now permit sellers to waive state minimum service requirements.<sup>139</sup> If the laws were really intended to ensure that consumers received all the services that they expected, they would explicitly require listing brokers to support the widest dissemination of the seller's listing, and brokers engaged to show buyers homes to disclose all the homes meeting the buyer's search criteria. These are services that consumers are now often being denied, without their knowledge, and to their detriment!<sup>140</sup>

## Harms

*Bundling denies consumers the option of lower fees for limited service*

Although some home buyers and sellers want the entire bundle of services offered by traditional brokers, many others desire to save money by handling many tasks themselves, even if the lack of unbundled services forces them to go completely FSBO (around 15 percent do<sup>141</sup>)

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<sup>137</sup> See *infra* notes 148 & 221, and accompanying texts.

<sup>138</sup> See [http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/reworkshop\\_atrcomments.htm](http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/reworkshop_atrcomments.htm); editorial, *supra* note 119; editorial, *Justice v. Realtors*, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2005 at A20.

<sup>139</sup> See GA. CODE ANN. § 10-6A-4(a); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4735.621; OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 858-353(D), -354(F); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-13-404(3); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.2138.1. Other states permit waivers to be granted for some of the minimum services. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.278(2)(a)(5); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 455.606a(a)(12) (communicating oral offers); Glenn Roberts, Jr., *More States Plan Minimum-Service Real Estate Laws*, INMAN NEWS, Sept. 19, 2005; Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Law Would Allow Consumers to Opt Out of Real Estate Services*, INMAN NEWS, Dec. 13, 2005.

<sup>140</sup> The real need for these two requirements are discussed in sections III.C.1 and IV.B.2, *supra*, respectively.

<sup>141</sup> It appears that approximately 15 percent of sellers use the FSBO option. See Blanche Evans, *Houston Association Conducts First-time Survey of Local Buyers, Sellers*, REALTY TIMES, June 23, 2006 (reporting that more than 25 percent of sellers did not use a realtor); Thomas Grillo, *Should I Hire a Broker or Do it Myself?*, BOST. GLOBE, May 9, 2004, at H1 (reporting that a study of deeds found almost 25 percent were FSBOs); 2005 NAR Survey, *supra* note 92, at 59 (13 percent); Letter from Thomas Stevens, NAR to DOJ & FTC, Nov. 28, 2005, at 2 (18 percent based on a recent NAR survey) [http://www.realtor.org/gapublic.nsf/files/ftcdojcomp.pdf/\\$FILE/ftcdojcomp.pdf](http://www.realtor.org/gapublic.nsf/files/ftcdojcomp.pdf/$FILE/ftcdojcomp.pdf); TYSON & BROWN, *supra* note 115, at 87 (estimating 20 percent); Colby Sambrotto, slides for October DOJ/FTC Workshop, Oct. 2005 at 5, <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/comprealestate/sambrotto.pdf>. (FSBO Slides) (more than 20 percent - citing Realty Viewpoint finding). Furthermore, *Consumer Reports* found that almost all of the many who used the option would definitely or probably do it again. FSBO Slides, at 3 (finding that 94 percent of those using FSBO would do it again). Finally, Murray Consulting, Inc.'s 2005 Real Estate Consumer Service Model Survey found that 33 percent of sellers (up from 18 in 2002) were confident that they could sell their own homes. Jeremy Conaway, *What Role Will Associations Play in Addressing the Ultimate*

or to purchase without a broker (more than 20 percent do<sup>142</sup>). Even though such customers generally require substantially less time and effort from agents,<sup>143</sup> the current dominant, standard rate structure used by traditional brokers demands that consumers choose all or nothing. Those expecting to pay \$600,000 for a home will also expect to pay about \$18,000 (half of six percent) to a buyer's broker even if they only want 10 hours worth of assistance with paperwork and routine closing tasks. The situation is similar to that which occurred in the funeral industry in the 1970s, where "industry practice was to quote a package price based on a multiple of the cost of the casket, stating that 'this includes our full range of services.'"<sup>144</sup>

Traditional brokers claim that the small market share of "fee for service" or à la carte services<sup>145</sup> (which they claim are now widely available<sup>146</sup>), indicates little consumer demand, even though the low demand appears to be largely due to the anticompetitive, if not illegal, tactics of traditional brokers. In addition to the practices discussed in section VIII, the primary problem in this area for sellers has historically been their inability to place their listings in the relevant local MLS.<sup>147</sup> Yet since there are now brokers in most local markets willing to place

Question, Oct. 26, 2005, presentation at ICONN, San Francisco, <http://www.reconis.com/recon/docs/Industry%20Update%20for%20ICONN%2010.26.05.pdf> at 27. One Canadian study found that FSBO rates in Canada were more than twenty-six percent, and that was in a buyer's market. See Michael A. Goldberg & Peter J. Horwood, *The Costs of Buying and Selling Houses: Some Canadian Evidence*, in Jaffe, *supra* note 57, at 143, 147.

<sup>142</sup> See 2005 NAR Survey, *supra* note 92, at 39 (finding that 77 percent of home buyers purchase through an agent); Evans, *supra* note 141 (reporting that only fifty-seven percent of buyers used a realtor).

<sup>143</sup> See Jayne O'Donnell & Sue Kirchhoff, *Discounters Setting Sights on Traditional Real Estate Market*, USA TODAY, June 9, 2005, at 1B (one ZipRealty executive reports that letting home buyers review properties online leads them to eliminate half of those they would otherwise have visited with a traditional firm's agent); Kadlec, *supra* note 26 (reporting that, according to the California Assoc. of Realtors, consumers who use the Internet average spending less than two weeks looking at homes and visiting six homes, while those who don't spend more than seven weeks and look at fifteen homes [although this may partly because buyers are looking on their own for 14 months, see *infra* note 298, and partly due to an exceptional sellers' market]); Jeremy Conaway, Brokerage Design, Nov. 5, 2005, <http://www.reconis.com/recon/docs/Brokerage%20Design%20Bullets%20November%202005.pdf> at 2 ("Internet empowered consumers require about half as much effort when dealing with a real estate service provider.").

<sup>144</sup> See MITFORD, *supra* note 10, at 176. Many firms refused to reduce prices when consumers asked to forgo items. See Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. 42260, 42267 (1982), even though many in the business recognized that price reductions were justified. Id. at 42281-82. The FTC responded by requiring itemized pricing, id. at 42271, 42274-45, 42279. Most of the value of this rule was obliterated, however, by a June 1994 amendment to the rule, which permitted sellers to include a large minimum fee for overhead. MITFORD, *supra*, at 182-83, 198-99, 203.

<sup>145</sup> The market share of non-traditional brokers appears to be between two percent, see GAO 2005 Rep., *supra* note 1, at 12; Hagerty, *supra* note 25, and eighteen percent. See Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, *The Real-Estate-Broker Wars*, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2006, at D1 (reporting that a September 2005 survey by Real Trends found that 70 percent of sellers used traditional brokers and a 2006 NAR report reported 12 percent used no broker).

<sup>146</sup> See Lewis, *supra* note 16, at 5 (claiming tremendous competition). The emergence of the fee-for-service model is discussed *infra* sections IV.B.2 and VII. Services especially targeted to FSBOs are discussed in Perri Capell, *Mistakes to Avoid When Selling Your Own Home*, REALESTATEJOURNAL.COM, June 24, 2003, <http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/agentsandbrokers/20030624-capell.html>.

<sup>147</sup> See sections VII.A.2 and VIII.D, *infra*.

listings on their local MLSs for a nominal fee,<sup>148</sup> the obstacle has morphed into the need to be associated with a traditional broker. As discussed in section III.C.1, traditional agents aiding buyers often fail to inform their clients about listings handled by non-traditional brokers. Furthermore, some MLSs have refused to pass listings on to realtor.com if they do not include the “exclusive right to sell” agreements used by traditional brokers,<sup>149</sup> although only one MLS appears adamant about maintaining this policy in the wake of the FTC’s summer 2006 actions, beginning with the Austin, Texas MLS’s agreement to cease such discriminatory practices.<sup>150</sup> Still, as long as traditional brokers dominate local markets and provide inferior cooperation to non-traditional brokers, buyers and sellers who want to avoid being discriminated against by the dominant “old boys club” and the resulting harms<sup>151</sup> will feel compelled to forsake the limited fee options offered by non-traditional brokers.<sup>152</sup>

#### *Bundling Aids Brokers’ Selfish Efforts to Constrain Seller Marketing*

Sellers generally desire to reach as many bona fide potential buyers as possible, using all cost-effective media, including as many bona fide websites as possible.<sup>153</sup> Under the standard

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<sup>148</sup> See *New Flat-Fee Real Estate Company Offers Leads*, INMAN NEWS, Sept. 14, 2006,(discussing IHSRealty.com, which will list homes in MLSs in six states (and the other 44 through affiliates, plus other services) for as little as \$399) (hereinafter IHS); Darlin, *supra* note 5 (\$300 to \$800 in almost every community); <http://www.realestatebyownerinc.com/services.html> (\$199 for listing in Virginia/Maryland/DC MLS plus other services); Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Technology Fuels Flat-Fee Real Estate*, INMAN NEWS, May 25, 2005 (discussing Amerisellrealty.com, which offers MLS + website listings for \$260-\$500); Jeff Bailey, *Owners’ Web Gives Realtors Run for Money*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2006, at A1 (\$399); Carol Hazard, *Squeeeeezzzz Commissions Playing the Percentages*, RICHMOND TIMES, Aug. 1, 2005, at D14 (\$299); Andrea Jares, *Chipping Away at Commissions*, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 5, 2005, at F1 (as little as \$99); Linda Rawls, *A Cheaper Way to Sell*, PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 2002, at 1F (\$495); <http://www.fsboardadvertisingservice.com/flat-fee-mls-MLSMO.asp>.

<sup>149</sup> See James R. Hagerty, *Realtors Raise Pressure on Discounters*, Wall St. J., July 18, 2005, at A2 (reporting that MLS boards in Austin, Indianapolis, Cleveland, and Wilmington, N.C. refuse to pass on “exclusive agency” listings to realtor.com); Jessica Sweeney, *FTC Charges Austin Realtors with Restraining Competition*, INMAN NEWS, July 13, 2006 (ditto for Heartland, Kan., and Monmouth-Ocean, NJ).

<sup>150</sup> See Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Michigan MLS Braces for Fight with FTC Over Listings Rule*, INMAN NEWS, Sept. 29, 2006 (MLSs in New Jersey, Northern New England, Northeastern Wisconsin, and Austin have eliminated such discriminatory policies).

<sup>151</sup> See, e.g., the practices discussed *supra* section III. C.1; *infra* text accompanying note 178; section VIII.H. It appears that the only empirical data on this issue found that non-traditional brokers closed on less than 60 percent of their listings while traditional agents closed on about 88 percent. FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 152.

<sup>152</sup> Consumers may feel constrained until alternative brokers reach a tipping point, such as when a local FSBO database includes 30 percent of the homes for sale in a community. See Bailey, *supra* note 148. Again, this situation has significant similarities to funeral industry pricing. See *supra* note 144, and accompanying text.

<sup>153</sup> See ROSS, *supra* note 45, at 134, 244, 252; Bernice Ross, *Free Web Sites Can Maximize Real Estate Marketing*, INMAN NEWS, Mar. 3, 2006; FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 28. In fact, sellers’ desire for maximum exposure prior to the establishment of MLSs led them to prefer “open listings,” which offered the whole commission to the buyer’s broker. See FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 112.

price structure, however, sellers who desire an “association with a traditional broker” must sign a contract that grants their listing broker full control over their “listing,”<sup>154</sup> and some traditional brokers contend that this gives them “ownership” of the listing.<sup>155</sup> This leads many traditional brokers to compromise the interests of sellers<sup>156</sup> by limiting the dissemination of listings, particularly online, so as to enhance the listing’s value as bait for attracting new buyer clients.<sup>157</sup> Listing brokers want buyers to come to a website affiliated with their firm to see listings so that their firm will have the best chance to gain those buyers as clients even if they do not buy the particular listing that attracts them. If other entities post the same listings on their competing websites, buyers may make first contact with the listing firm’s competitors and be more inclined to employ one of them for aiding their home search.<sup>158</sup> In the same vein, brokers frequently withhold a listing from other brokers until their agents have had the chance to expose it to their own buyer clients (“pocketing” a listing<sup>159</sup>), so that they might collect both halves of the commission (“double-ending”),<sup>160</sup> even though such “in house” sales often deny sellers the chance to benefit from higher bids that might be offered by buyers represented by other brokers.

When in May 2003, the NAR adopted a policy that listing brokers be permitted to restrict

<sup>154</sup> See Thomas Kunz, President and chief executive officer of Century 21 Real Estate, DOJ/FTC 2005 Workshop Transcript *supra* note 109, at 127-28.

<sup>155</sup> In the words of NAR vice president Steve Cook, “the sellers don’t own their listings. The data did not exist before the broker.” See Clay Risen, *Realtors v. the Internet*, NEW REPUBLIC, May 2, 2005, at 14, 15; Glenn Roberts, Jr., *NAR Takes More Time to Review Listings Ownership Issues*, INMAN NEWS, Nov. 1, 2005.

<sup>156</sup> As one REMAX broker admitted “I believe that if a homeowner who was trying to sell his or her home knew how we [realtors] were protecting all the listings, he or she would be incensed.” Doug Palin, *Letters to the Editor*, INMAN NEWS.

<sup>157</sup> Similarly, Brokers see listings as their valuable assets. See TRULIA, THE TRUTH ABOUT REAL ESTATE SEARCH: OPTIMIZING THE ASSETS OF THE RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY ON THE INTERNET 4, 9 (Mar. 2006) [http://www.trulia.com/resources/Trulia-The\\_Truth\\_About\\_Real\\_Estate\\_Search\\_White\\_Paper.pdf](http://www.trulia.com/resources/Trulia-The_Truth_About_Real_Estate_Search_White_Paper.pdf). Listing brokers have long recognized that the primary value of an initial open house is to attract new buyer clients. See WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 44-52; Robert J. Bruss, *Is Open House Effective Way to Market Real Estate?*, INMAN NEWS, Dec. 29, 2005. About seven percent of buyers meet their agent at an open house. 2005 NAR Survey, *supra* note 92, at 41; *infra* note 270 and accompanying text.

<sup>158</sup> Thus, one realtor association sued to prevent a broker from selling home shoppers relevant pages from the MLS. See C. Christian Hill, *Gina Williams Outrages Brokers by Cutting Fees*, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1980, at 29.

<sup>159</sup> See FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 179; Carney, *supra* note 15, at 343, 352 n.22; Tracie Rozhon, *Agents Play Hide-and-Seek as the Market Quicksen*, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002 at D10; IRWIN, *supra* note 111, at 45, 61.

<sup>160</sup> See Glenn Roberts, Jr, *SoCal Real Estate Company Wants Both Sides of the Transaction*, INMAN NEWS, Oct. 4, 2005. Most MLSs, however, require members to submit their listings within 72 hours or some such period. See Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Real Estate Agents Face Fines for Not Sharing Listings Data*, INMAN NEWS, Oct. 14, 2005. Still, U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray analyst, Jeff Evanson said “in a hot market, most homes get sold before they reach the Web,” see Patton, *supra* note 84, at R43 (see also KIPLINGER STAFF, *supra* note 63, at 93).

the online republication of their listings by competing brokers,<sup>161</sup> the DOJ became concerned. Despite several rounds of NAR revisions, in September 2005 the DOJ brought suit against the NAR for its most recent version of the policy.<sup>162</sup> Among other things, the DOJ pointed out that the chairman of the NAR's working group on the rules admitted that refusing to share a listing with others "may not be in the seller['s] best interest,"<sup>163</sup> and that "he took comfort in the fact that the rule did not require brokers to disclose to clients that their listings would be withheld from some prospective purchasers . . .".<sup>164</sup> Independently, a California court also refused an MLS's request to issue an injunction to prevent a rival from publishing data included in its listing.<sup>165</sup>

The industry offers three defenses of its policy. First, it notes that MLSs were established and remain as a business-to-business resource for brokers to share information cooperatively<sup>166</sup> among themselves, not as a retail service for buyers and sellers. While this is historically accurate,<sup>167</sup> it does not justify denying sellers the chance to make their listings directly available to all home shoppers now that this is technologically practical, especially since a large number of buyers do not use brokers. One industry advocate complains that giving consumers direct access to the MLS would be like giving clothes shoppers direct access to designer showrooms.<sup>168</sup> Yet while it is impractical to modify designer showrooms to handle crowds of retail customers and the sellers do not want this, it is relatively easy to modify MLS databases to accommodate direct buyer access, and sellers would welcome and benefit from this.

Brokers should consider how technological change affected the airline reservation business. Airlines happily offer consumers the chance to discover ticket availability and make a

<sup>161</sup> See Patrick Barta & John R. Wilke, *Realtors' Limits on Web Listings Face a Federal Antitrust Inquiry*, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2003, at A1. Back in 2001, the NAR lobbied Congress to make it harder for non-members of the NAR to place MLS listings on their websites. See Patrick Barta, *Home Rules: Real-Estate Listings on the Web are Loosening the Grip Realtors Have Long Had on the Market*, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2001, at R12.

<sup>162</sup> See DOJ 2005 Amended Complaint, *supra* note 16, at ¶¶ 7, 34 and 39. For a timeline of the events that led to the lawsuit, see Glenn Roberts, Jr., *NAR Online Listing Policy: Two Years in the Making*, INMAN NEWS, Sept. 9, 2005, <http://www.inman.com/InmanNews.aspx?ID=47868>.

<sup>163</sup> DOJ 2005 Amended Complaint, *supra* note 16, at ¶ 7; *supra* note 156.

<sup>164</sup> See Jessica Swesey, *Brokers Lose Grip on Real Estate Listings Control*, INMAN NEWS, June 17, 2005.

<sup>165</sup> That is, the MLS was established to promote cooperation in place of competition. See *infra* note 340, and accompanying text. See also *supra* note 126, concerning cooperation in setting splits in the MLS.

<sup>166</sup> Thus, the California legislature defined the MLS as "a facility of cooperation of agents, operating through an intermediary which does not itself act as an agent, through which agents establish express or implied legal relationships with respect to listed properties." Cal. Civ. Code § 1087 (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added) cited in Collette, *supra* note 86, at 414. See generally, *id.* at 409-15.

<sup>167</sup> See Blanche Evans, *Are Minimum Service Rules a Disservice to Consumers?*, REALTY TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, [http://realtytimes.com/rtapages/20050308\\_disservice.htm](http://realtytimes.com/rtapages/20050308_disservice.htm).

direct purchase without the involvement of a travel agent. The airline-created Orbitz provides this. If the dominant airline reservation systems had been owned by traditional travel agents, however, they might well have acted like traditional real estate brokers, limiting consumer access to airline listings, forcing buyers to work with an agent, at least to make a reservation. Yet once technology makes it practical for sellers to provide buyers with direct access, dominant intermediaries who refuse to serve buyers' and sellers' best interests by offering such direct access, seriously risk being displaced by a new entrant that will offer such access.<sup>168</sup>

A second contention raised by one advocate for the brokerage industry is that listing brokers deserve the same rights as retailers like Neiman-Marcus: to enjoy the ancillary benefits of the traffic that "their" inventory attracts.<sup>169</sup> This position is somewhat analogous to the one taken by online auction site eBay when "aggregator" firms, like Bidder's Edge sought to attract buyers by offering a single aggregated list of all of the offerings in a product category (available from many, if not all, auction sites), including eBay.<sup>170</sup> eBay sued the aggregators to prevent them from using eBay's listings to attract shoppers interested in those listings to their sites rather than to eBay. Although eBay won a court victory, the court's holding focused on its concern that aggregators could cause harmful congestion to eBay's computers,<sup>171</sup> a concern that would not apply to MLS listings.<sup>172</sup> If buyers want one-stop access to an aggregated and easily searchable set of available homes of all kinds, then brokers could compete to offer that.<sup>173</sup> Home sellers do not grant brokers exclusive rights to their listing in order to allow them to affirmatively limit its dissemination to potential bona fide buyers.<sup>174</sup>

Finally, some industry supporters argue that since brokers compose the listings,

<sup>168</sup> See *infra* notes 253-256, and accompanying text, suggesting Google among other candidates for this service.

<sup>169</sup> See Blanche Evans, *The Threat of a Collapsing MLS System is Real*, REALTY TIMES, May 10, 2005; David Bank, *Microsoft Offers Home Buyers On-Line Site*, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1998, at B6 (quoting Laurie Janik, general counsel of the NAR, as stating "[d]o you think a broker wants consumers to come to a site that's made valuable as a result of his hard work and then be shuttled off to another escrow company or another mortgage broker? That's not in his best interest.").

<sup>170</sup> See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F.Supp.2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).

<sup>171</sup> *Id.* at 1067. See also Nadel, *Selection Process*, *supra* note 77, at 212-13.

<sup>172</sup> But see Janis Mara, *Craigslist to Oodle: Stop Using Our Classified Ads*, INMAN NEWS, Oct. 18, 2005. Meanwhile, Bay is now encouraging such dissemination. See Bob Tedeschi, *More Data for Online Shoppers, and Plenty of Pictures Too*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2006, at C6.

<sup>173</sup> See Nadel, *Selection Process*, *supra* note 77, at 216-17; Jessica Sweeney, *Home Search Goes Vertical*, INMAN NEWS, Apr. 4, 2006; see also *infra* notes 253-255 and accompanying text.

<sup>174</sup> Then again, listing agents could argue that this right is a second component of their fee. That is, absent this ancillary benefit, they would charge slightly higher commissions.

republication of listings is a violation of the broker's copyright.<sup>175</sup> Setting aside the fact that copyright law does not protect facts about a listing *per se*,<sup>176</sup> there is the more fundamental matter that brokers' fiduciary duty to sellers certainly prohibits them compromising their clients' interests like this.<sup>177</sup>

Listing brokers also injure the interests of sellers when they offer non-traditional brokers only "adverse splits," i.e., less than a 50-50 split or even nothing at all<sup>178</sup> or refuse to show homes to clients of non-traditional brokers.<sup>179</sup> Again, their fiduciary duties should not permit such tactics.

#### *Bundling Inhibits Price Competition on Individual Selling Services*

As reviewed in section VII, both selling and buying a home involve many relatively separate and distinct tasks and different agents will perform some better than others. Those best at negotiating when more than two parties are participating, might be below average in "staging" (decorating a home to sell well) or vice versa. The traditional rate structure, however, deters the emergence of specialized providers of these distinct services by requiring sellers to purchase the full bundle of services offered by traditional brokers. That is, sellers who feel compelled to use a traditional broker to avoid being shunned by other traditional agents will be forced to pay a full

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<sup>175</sup> See David Charron, et al, Strengthening the Foundation: The Real Estate Listing Content Copyright FAQ and An Updated Program to Administer, Secure and Enhance the Value of Real Estate Listing Content (April 2006) at [www.mris.com/news/papers/index.cfm](http://www.mris.com/news/papers/index.cfm); *Who Owns the Real Estate Data*, INMAN NEWS, Feb 21 & 22, 2005 (4 part series); Blanche Evans, *DOJ Doesn't Have a Case Says MLS Attorney*, REALTY TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006.

<sup>176</sup> See Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (facts are not subject to copyright, despite the effort required to compile them).

<sup>177</sup> See *supra* note 153, and accompanying text (sellers' interests); Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Real Estate Search Sites Hit Data Control Sore Spot*, INMAN NEWS, Jan. 23, 2006.

<sup>178</sup> See *Re/Max International v. Realty One*, 173 F.3d 995, 1000-01, 1003 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (defendants offered plaintiff's agents only a 70-30 or 75-25 split instead of the standard 50-50 split); *Park v. El Paso Bd. of Realtors*, 764 F.2d 1053, 1059 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985); *WILSON*, *supra* note 62, at 91-92; *FTC 1983 Report*, *supra* note 12, at 160; *Trombetta*, *supra* note 18, at 146-47; *Roberts*, *supra* note 107; Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Brokerage Heavyweight Protests Commission-Cutters*, INMAN NEWS, June 10, 2005; Glenn Roberts, Jr., *N.Y. Realtor Group Cautions Members on Rate Setting*, INMAN NEWS, Nov. 17, 2005; Jim Bourgoine, *Buyers Advantage*, Comment, Nov. 28, 2005 <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/rewcom/213405.htm>. The NAR handbook recommended that splits be designed to "encourage cooperation," as opposed to competition, *FTC 1983 Report*, *supra* note 12, at 139, and it permits brokers to send a letter to particular brokers to inform them that the broker will not pay them the split indicated in the MLS listing, but rather a specific alternative fee. But this cannot be retaliation. See Blanche Evans, *Industry Questions Adverse Splits*, REALTY TIMES, Feb. 24, 2003; NJ State ruling, <http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/acrobat/recadvisory051220.pdf>.(prohibiting adverse splits as retaliation); Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Real Estate Regulator Advises Fair Play in Discourter Commission Splits*, INMAN NEWS, Dec. 20, 2005. See also Valerie Cotsalas, *Brokers Who Represent Buyers*, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, §11, at 12 ("many listing agents offer no commission to buyer's agents.").

<sup>179</sup> See Damon Darlin, *The Last Stand of the 6-Percenters?*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2006, §3, at 1.

service fee. At that point, sellers will rarely find it advantageous to pay an additional fee to specialists unless the specialists charge less than the *incremental value* they add above and beyond what the traditional agent is already providing. This dramatically reduces the demand for individuals with expertise in only one task desired by a seller and who might well be able to provide a clearly superior level of service for that task at a lower, competitive price.

Many expected the Internet to drastically change the situation. By permitting home sellers to post a detailed description, including photos, of their home on a website easily available to home buyers, the Internet triggered predictions that the level of FSBOs would rise dramatically to as much as 40 percent of all homes sold.<sup>180</sup> In an effort to offer brokers an option for earning income from FSBOs rather than losing their business altogether, one highly respected real estate educator/broker wrote a book proposing that real estate agents transition into consultants, offering à la carte services for reasonable fees,<sup>181</sup> as discussed in detail in section VII, below. By early 2006, however, the NAR's fear of a great rise of FSBOs appeared to disappear.<sup>182</sup> Recently, traditional brokers have sought to protect their business model by raising entry barriers through the adoption of the minimum service requirements discussed above.<sup>183</sup> Those rules force brokers willing to place a listing in the MLS for a flat fee to either offer all of the required services – and raise their prices accordingly<sup>184</sup> – or go out of business.

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<sup>180</sup> Gomez Research predicted that, aided by the Internet, over 40 percent of homes would be sold FSBO. See Gerri Willis, *Minimizing the Stress of Selling Your Home*, SMARTMONEY.COM, Mar. 18, 2003, <http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/agentsandbrokers/20030318-smartmoney.html>; GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 17. See also Lynnket Browning, *The Sweet and the Sour of 'For Sale by Owner'*, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2004, §3 at 5 (in October 2003, the NAR predicted that 25 percent of home sales could soon be FSBOs); GARTON-GOOD, *supra* at xi (Gomez analyst estimates that the non-traditional segment of residential real estate brokerage could represent as much as 75 percent of total sales by 2005); John S. Baen & Randall S. Guttry, *The Coming Downsizing of Real Estate: Implications of Technology*, 3 J. REAL EST. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 1 (1997). But see *infra* note 182. For actual figures and more predictions, see *supra* note 141.

<sup>181</sup> GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7. See also 2003 NAR Report, *supra* note 3, at 39-41 (describing unbundled service offerings); Mollie Wasserman, *Is the Commission System Unfair?*, REALTY TIMES, June 8, 2000.

<sup>182</sup> The NAR now reports that FSBO rates recently peaked at 18 percent in 1997, before stabilizing at 13-14 percent. The all-time peak recorded by NAR was 20 percent in 1987. Press Release, Jan. 17, 2006, <http://www.realtor.org/PublicAffairsWeb.nsf/Pages/HmBuyerSellerSurvey06?OpenDocument>. These statistics, however, do not appear to count a listing as a FSBO if the sellers uses a broker to place a listing in the local MLS. For other estimates of current FSBO rates, see note 141 and accompanying text.

<sup>183</sup> See *supra* notes 136-139 and accompanying text.

<sup>184</sup> See Roberts, *Amerisell*, *supra* note 148. This may also greatly raise broker costs by exposing them to the high cost of litigation. See ROSS, *supra* note 45, at 37. See also Shelly Bucksot, *Real Estate Rumble*, June 2006 <http://www.angieslist.com/AngiesList/membermenu/publication/Stories/2006/rumble.asp>

## **5. Uniformity of Rates Irrespective of Expertise of Provider or Difficulty of Specific Task**

### **Generally and application to broker fees**

In most markets buyers have options ranging from higher-priced, higher quality to lower cost, lower quality. Prices also generally reflect the estimated difficulty of performing a task. In some cases, however, retailers or service providers choose to set a single price for all options offered. The additional revenues from charging more for some options might be offset by the administrative costs of a more complicated pricing mechanism. Hence, many cafeteria-style food “bars” charge a single price per pound for all choices and low-priced hair cutters generally do not charge more for best workers or less to those, like the author, with few hairs to cut.<sup>185</sup> Uniform prices may also emerge for services that are sufficiently routine that excellent quality can be provided with relatively little experience. This category may include the preparation of 1) uncontested divorces for childless couples with no significant assets or 2) federal income tax returns for single filers with solely payroll income, no dependents, and nothing else unusual.

Given the size of the fees paid to brokers, it would seem just as practical to price each broker’s services or the price of a project based on the brokers’ skill level and experience or the perceived difficulty of the task as it is for lawyers and accountants to do so.<sup>186</sup> Rates appear to vary based on a task’s difficulty in Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Mexico, and Belarus,<sup>187</sup> and in the 1970s at least some brokers set their fees based on how long the sale took.<sup>188</sup> Although levels vary among regions and somewhat from cold to hot markets,<sup>189</sup> “the shrewd, entrepreneurial,

<sup>185</sup> Differentiated prices do arise in these settings when higher prices make them administratively practical to offer, as for seats to sporting events, Broadway shows, most concerts, and at high-priced hair salons, where the price may include the tip necessary to ensure access to the stylist one wants on one’s next visit.

<sup>186</sup> See, e.g., Jim Gillespie, *Are You Really a Top Agent, or Just a Commodity?*, REALTY TIMES, Apr. 15, 2005.

<sup>187</sup> See Delcoure & Miller, *supra* note 26, at 29. See also Wachter, *supra* note 57, at 200 (finding considerable rate diversity among commercial real estate firms).

<sup>188</sup> See 1972 Forbes Cover Story, *supra* note 15, at 38 (discussing longtime DC realtor, Andrew Barr, who set his fee along a sliding scale: two percent for easy, six percent for difficult); G. Christian Hill, *As Home Prices Rise, More Sellers are Using Reduced Rate Agents*, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1979, at 1 (discussing Los Angeles agent Barney Feldman, who charged one percent for a listing if the home sold within one month, two percent if it sold within two months, and three percent if it sold in three or more months).

<sup>189</sup> See GAO 2005 Rep., *supra* note 1, at 9-10; FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 11 (“commission rates in all markets do tend to be roughly uniform from sale to sale.”). Some regions with lower-priced housing, like the South, have higher average commissions, e.g., 7 percent. See Baylis, *supra* note 3 (quoting Leonard V. Zumpano, director of the Alabama Real Estate Research and Education Center). Also, when the defense industry contracted in Southern California and a recession hit the Northeast around 1990, creating a severe buyer’s market, some sellers were offering real estate brokers commissions of eight to ten percent to successfully sell their homes. See Motoko Rich, *Nest Egg or One-Armed Bandit*, Sept. 15, 2005, at F1.

risk-taking broker willing to base commissions directly on his or her own estimate of the difficulty of selling a particular property appears to be absent from all geographic markets.”<sup>190</sup>

Given the substantial incremental financial and other value that superior agents can provide, one would expect superior negotiators and those with exceptionally detailed knowledge about a community to charge two, three, or more times more than novices. Nevertheless, U.S. residential brokerage firms do not advertise different rates for different agents based on their expertise the way other professional firms do.<sup>191</sup> This suggests that brokers are pricing their best agents too low or, more likely, their novice agents too high, to discourage price competition.

## Harms

Uniform rates hinder buyers’ chances to secure superior or lower-price services by offering to pay more or less than the standard fee. The fee framework encourages the most capable agents to seek those clients desiring higher-priced properties, even where the clients have no need for the agents’ special skills. After all, assisting a family seeking a multi-million dollar home, but requiring little assistance could pay an implicit fee of even \$10,000 per hour.<sup>192</sup> While there is normally nothing wrong with the highest bidder getting the services of the best agent,<sup>193</sup> here a family willing to pay \$600 per hour for an agent with special expertise about schools for children with special needs, may, if they are seeking a home priced at the median of the community, lose out to a buyer with no desire or intention to outbid them.<sup>194</sup> A similar problem would arise if the legal fees for a divorce were based on the size of a couple’s joint estate rather than on the quantity or complexity of the legal services desired.

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<sup>190</sup> FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 54

<sup>191</sup> See, e.g., *supra* note 189 and text accompanying n.19. This is not to deny that some new agents may charge less. See, e.g., *infra* note 270 and accompanying text.

<sup>192</sup> If the agent described in Hagerty, *supra* note 8, seeking half of the \$620,000 commission for aiding the buyer in finding the \$15.5 million property is successful and that broker spent only 30 hours helping the buyer choose the home (though no time for closing, etc.) (see GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 96; *infra* note 215, the fee would represent more than \$10,000 per hour). See also Hagerty, *supra* note 149 (reporting that a discount broker in Lancaster, PA, ran an ad estimating that traditional agents might earn \$1,000 an hour for selling a \$300,000 home).

<sup>193</sup> In fact, Norm Miller has found that most top agents work about 50-70 hours per week and tend to specialize in listings rather than selling. See Miller, *supra* note 23, at slide 8 and oral presentation.

<sup>194</sup> Levmore, *supra* note 4, at 507 recognized that the traditional uniform commission rate hindered the ability of those with more difficult needs to secure the desired agent’s attention.

## **6. Prohibition Against Rebates**

Although policymakers try to prohibit rebates that represent hidden kickbacks, which disguise conflicts of interest, agreements not to offer discounts are ordinarily *per se* violations of antitrust law.<sup>195</sup> Most of the state anti-rebate laws concerning broker fees<sup>196</sup> appear to have been designed to prohibit socially harmful payments.<sup>197</sup> Rebates by brokers, however, permit socially desirable price competition over broker fees.<sup>198</sup> Prohibiting them denies home buyers a chance to obtain a lower broker fee,<sup>199</sup> merely to protect the revenues of traditional brokers, who support it.<sup>200</sup>

Firms that offer such rebates aid buyers who do not realize that they can obtain reduced fees from their “free” brokers. These firms include retailers like Costco, which secure “affiliate” discounts for their members, and “lead generation” entities, like LendingTree and HomeGain, which negotiate a “referral fee” of as much as 45 percent of the buyer agent’s broker’s fee and then seek to attract buyers by offering them a share of that referral fee as a rebate.<sup>201</sup> An increasing number of brokers are also voluntarily offering rebates of a portion of the commission

<sup>195</sup> See Sherman Act, section 1. *Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales*, 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curium).

<sup>196</sup> Three states expressly prohibit rebates. See ALA. CODE § 34-27-36(a)(12); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3062(a)(4)(Supp. 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-35-21(j)(2000), Miss. Reg. 50.025.001 (IV)(A)(5), PHH Real Estate Services Corp. v. Mississippi Real Estate Comm’n, unpublished fed. Dist. Ct. (S.D. Miss. 1997). Six or seven others base their prohibitions against rebates on laws prohibiting the sharing of real estate commissions with anyone but a licensed agent. See ALASKA STAT. §08.88.401(d)(1)(Michie 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1446 (A) & (B)(West 2000); NJ STAT. REV. ANN. §45:15-17(k)(West 1995 & Supp. 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-23-11.1(l); OK. STAT. ANN. 59 § 858-312(21)(West Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT. §696.290(1)(West 2003); Tenn. Real Est. Comm. 1260-2-.33(2) (cf: TENN. CODE. ANN. § 62-13-102). Missouri bases it on a statute prohibiting inducements. See MO. REV. STAT. 339-100(2)(13). Finally, Iowa prohibits rebates when the consumer uses two different brokers. See IOWA CODE § 543B.60A(3)(b) (West Supp. 2003). (Amended 2005 by House File 882). New Hampshire has declined to enforce N.H. REV. STAT ANN. §331-A:26(XXIV).

<sup>197</sup> See Mariwyn Evans, *Consumer Rebates*, REALTOR MAGAZINE, Jan. 1, 2006, <http://www.realtor.org/rmoprint.nsf/pages/lawjan06> (referencing Sandy Taraszki, executive director of the Worldwide Employee Relocation Coalition).

<sup>198</sup> See DOJ/FTC 2005 Workshop Transcript *supra* note 109, at 157-59 (Lending Tree attorney Philip Henderson).

<sup>199</sup> As noted above, the DOJ, FTC, and editorial board of the *Wall Street Journal* are among the many who have expressed their strong opposition to such anti-competitive prohibitions. See *supra* note 138.

<sup>200</sup> Although the NAR takes no official position on anti-rebate laws, the laws appear to result from NAR state affiliates, and the NAR’s general counsel published an April 22, 2005 memo that observes that even anti-competitive state laws are generally exempt from the federal antitrust laws. See Blanche Evans, *Steel Magnolia v. The Men in Black*, REALTY TIMES, Apr. 26, 2005.

<sup>201</sup> LendingTree offers buyers gift cards from Home Depot or American Express of up to thousands of dollars, based on a home’s sale price. See James R. Hagerty, *It Pays to Negotiate Your Agent’s Commission*, REALESTATE JOURNAL.COM, June 22, 2004, <http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/agentsandbrokers/20040622-hagerty.html>. See also [realestate.com](http://realestate.com).

that listing brokers pay them, particularly when asked to match a competitor.

Meanwhile, a number of firms are offering substantially larger rebates based on business models that substantially reduce their costs of serving buyers. Seattle-based Redfin, Chicago-based BuySide Realty, and Mid-Atlantic-based IHS Realty, all offer buyers rebates of about 67% or more of the commissions they receive from listing brokers, where not illegal, although all leave it to buyers to drive themselves around to identify the home they want to purchase.<sup>202</sup> Buyer brokers who set flat fees or hourly rates agree to rebate any additional amount paid by the seller.

## **7. A Fee-for-Service, à la Carte Rate Structure**

Instead of the traditional rate structure, with its serious drawbacks and lack of economic justification, consumers would be substantially better off if residential brokers used fee structures similar to those used by professionals in other advisory/consulting service fields, such as law, and accounting. Some brokers already bill for their services at hourly rates based on their expertise or at flat fees for a specific task or bundle of tasks.<sup>203</sup> In fact, unbundled services have been supported by commentators and offered by some brokers since at least as early as the 1970s.<sup>204</sup> Agents could also be offered bonuses in the form of a share of the incremental value

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<sup>202</sup> See, e.g., James R. Hagerty, *Real Estate Brokers Step Up Rebates*, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2006, at D1; Jessica Sweeney, *Internet Stock Brokerage Pioneers Enter Online Real Estate*, INMAN NEWS, Apr. 6, 2006; IHS, *supra* note 148. ZipRealty, one of the first in this niche, in California, offers a 20 percent rebate of its share of any commission it receives while providing full service. See, e.g., James R. Hagerty, *Fat Rebates are the Key to this Agent's Success*, REALESTATEJOURNAL.COM, July 12, 2004, <http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/agentsandbrokers/20040712-hagerty.html>.

<sup>203</sup> See, e.g. IHS, *supra* note 148; Bailey, *supra* note 148 (discussing multiple firm); Hazard, *supra* note 148 (Help-U-Sell offers many options with a minimum of about \$2500); Ryan & Associates Realty, Fees for Services, [http://www.sfproperties.net/bin/web/real\\_estate/AR72746/ACTIVATE\\_FRAMES/ABOUT/San+Francisco/1158077484.html](http://www.sfproperties.net/bin/web/real_estate/AR72746/ACTIVATE_FRAMES/ABOUT/San+Francisco/1158077484.html) (Ryan); Jares, *supra* note 148 (Netoffer.com offers a la carte pricing starting at \$99 and negotiations for \$150 per hour); Rawls, *supra* note 148 (Gallery of Homes charged \$349 for contract negotiations, \$149 for contract preparation, and \$249 for attending the closing); Stephen J. Dubner & Steven D. Levitt, *Endangered Species*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006 §6 (Magazine), at 24 (Cary and Barbara Chubin charge \$750 for an MLS listing, \$50 per hour for showing the home, and \$250 for negotiations and closing); [www.RealEstateCafe.com](http://www.RealEstateCafe.com) (\$100/hour for buyers).

<sup>204</sup> See BORIS W. BECKER, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE 106-07 (1972); 1972 Forbes Cover Story, *supra* note 15, at 36 (Jackson O. Wells, VP in the Beverly Hills office of Coldwell Banker advocated a fee for service model); Hill, *supra* note 188 (Hal Firestone, President of the non-traditional Home Sellers Center). See also William C. Erxleben, *In Search of Price and Service Competition in Residential Real Estate Brokerage: Breaking the Cartel*, 56 WASH. L. REV. 179, 208-11 (1980-81); Crockett, *supra* note 18, at 224; Braswell & Poe, *supra* note 118, at 327-29 (separate fees for separate services, commission only for finding a buyer); John E. Featherston, *The Future – It's Not Just a Job, It's an Adventure*, NAT'L RELOCATION & REAL ESTATE, Mar./Apr. (#2), 1997, at 80, 81 (quoting John Tuccillo, NAR's chief economist, "the next major revolution in real estate will be the spread of fee-based services"); G. Donald Jud & Stephen Roulac, *The Future of the Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry*,

they generated.

A good model for this approach was presented in 2001 by highly respected educator/broker Julie Garton-Good<sup>205</sup> in *Real Estate à la Carte: Selecting the Services You Need, Paying What They're Worth*. That book offered brokers a strategy for responding to predictions that FSBOs could grow to as much as 40 percent of the market<sup>206</sup> by offering services to FSBO sellers. And its relevance should grow as the Internet continues to spawn services likely to lead large numbers of home buyers and sellers to handle some of the tasks involved in home purchases and sales themselves and to seek corresponding fee reductions. In 2006, six years after Garton-Good had formed the National Association of Real Estate Consultants (NAREC),<sup>207</sup> the American Real Estate Broker Alliance (AREBA) was formed to promote flat-fee, limited service options.

## **For Sellers**

In addition to the many sellers who will prefer full service, even FSBO sellers are likely to find it cost effective to use real estate professionals for at least some tasks involved in selling a home:<sup>208</sup>

1. Full service (does not really belong on this list of tasks, but . . .)
2. Listing the home in the local MLS
3. Making an offer to finishing closing
4. Setting both an optimal selling price and an optimal time to sell

<sup>205</sup> REAL ESTATE ISSUES 22, 26-29 (2001); Maylone, *supra* note 59 (practices in early 1980s). Some consider it inevitable that flat fees for itemized services will gradually replace the traditional bundling of all services in a package for a fee based on a percentage-of-sales-price commission. See WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 26, 210; Glen Justice, *Lobbying to Sell Your House*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2006, at C1 (reporting that Dave Liniger, chairman and co-founder of Re/Max expects à la carte models to continue to rise as part of the evolution of the industry).

<sup>206</sup> The NAR twice included Garton-Good on their annual list of twenty-five most influential people in the industry. See Blanche Evans, *Julie Garton-Good: A Profile of Personal Courage*, REALTY TIMES, April 20, 2005.

<sup>207</sup> See *supra* note 180. Although the NAR states that it no longer expects growth in FSBOs, see *supra* note 182, others disagree. One real estate brokerage consulting firm has observed that FutureNet Realty Technologies has developed and will soon be marketing the first “listing to close” technology enabled process, and that Zillow.com may become a platform for FSBOs. See Jeremy Conaway, A Fresh Approach for 2006, Dec. 12, 2005, <http://www.reconis.com/recon/docs/A%20Fresh%20Approach%20for%202006%2012-09-05.pdf> at 4; Walter S. Mossberg & Katherine Boehret, *A New Web Site for Real-Estate Voyeurs*, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2006, at D1.

<sup>208</sup> See Blanche Evans, *Fee-for-Service Organization Gains Momentum*, REALTY TIMES, June 17, 2004.

<sup>209</sup> For a more comprehensive list of the services that may be offered by real estate agents, see The Critical Role of the Realtor in the Real Estate Transaction, [http://www.orlrealtor.com/Files/PDF/Value\\_of\\_a\\_REALTOR.pdf](http://www.orlrealtor.com/Files/PDF/Value_of_a_REALTOR.pdf).

5. Advertising beyond the MLS, i.e., newspapers, online, alternative MLSs
6. Staging a home: interior decorating, cleaning, repairs, etc.
7. Visits by potential buyers, including open houses, and securing bona fide offers
8. Negotiations
9. Other services

Some agents justify their value to sellers by offering evidence that the seller can expect that the *net* sale price (after subtracting the broker fees) will be higher than the amount which the seller or any competitors would have obtained for the home.<sup>209</sup> Academic studies, however, have failed to find evidence of such net price increases.<sup>210</sup> On the other hand, there is no question that good listing brokers can 1) speed up the sale of a property (where desired), 2) permit sellers to avoid much of the time and grunt work involved in the sale, and 3) minimize the stress to sellers.

#### *Full Service*

Although the concept of “full service” is generally left conveniently vague by those who contend that their lower-priced competitors offer much less,<sup>211</sup> it presumably includes all of the major tasks described in this section (VII.A) and in the many books on selling one’s home.<sup>212</sup> On the other hand, it rarely includes the costs of extensive staging, (e.g., major renovations, landscaping) or extraordinary marketing efforts.<sup>213</sup> Interestingly, one Dallas firm asks customers to specify which of 25 distinct services they desire and then places the “job” out for auction to

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<sup>209</sup> See Ross, *supra* note 45, at 169-79, 194; 2005 NAR Survey, *supra* note 92, at 68 (noting that the median selling price of a home represented by a broker was \$230,000 while it was only \$198,000 for a home sold directly by an owner, and claiming that the broker added \$18,200 in net value (\$32,000 – (6 percent of \$230,000))).

<sup>210</sup> See Miller, *supra* note 23, at slide 12 (stating that there is no solid academic evidence showing that agents can secure higher prices than FSBOs, except on their own homes); Frew & Jud, *supra* note 86, at 185 (finding that the use of a listing broker raised home prices by 2.2 to 3.1 percent although the commissions were 6 percent); Jud & Frew, *supra* note 86; Leonard V. Zumpano, et al, *Buying a House and the Decision to Use a Real Estate Broker*, 13 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 169 (1996) (finding that the real estate broker has no appreciable, independent influence on selling price).

<sup>211</sup> See Miller, *supra* note 23, at slide 9 and oral presentation. Vagueness may also allow brokers to omit important, expected services. See *supra* note 140 and accompanying text. See also *infra* note 355 and accompanying texts.

<sup>212</sup> See, e.g., WILLIAM EFFROS, *HOW TO SELL YOUR HOME IN 5 DAYS* (1998); GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7; ILYCE R. GLINK, *50 SIMPLE STEPS YOU CAN TAKE TO SELL YOUR HOME FASTER AND FOR MORE MONEY IN ANY MARKET* (2003); IRWIN, *supra* note 111; PIPER NICHOLE, *THE FOR SALE BY OWNER HANDBOOK* (2005); TYSON & BROWN, *supra* note 115; JEFF WUORIO ET AL, *THE COMPLETE IDIOT’S GUIDE TO SELLING YOUR HOME* (2005).

<sup>213</sup> Extensive staging is discussed *infra* section VII.A.6. Extraordinary marketing could include extensive full motion video tours and color photo ads in local and regional publications.

the broker offering the lowest commission.<sup>214</sup> Providing full service appears to require real estate agents to spend an average of about 40 hours per sale, although that figure can vary widely based on the state of the market and a client's personality.<sup>215</sup>

A sampling of non-traditional brokers finds that they offer "full service" at flat prices that vary from about \$2,500 to \$4,500.<sup>216</sup> Yet if these figures reflect the fewer hours required for sales during the sellers' market that persisted through mid-2005, one would expect them to rise during a more balanced period or in a buyer's market, where more time is required to sell a home. On the other hand, much of the extra time involved might simply be time spent waiting, during which agents could be handling other properties or working on other tasks.

### *Only an MLS Listing*

Because about 86 percent of home buyers work with an agent at some point during their search,<sup>217</sup> and agents generally rely on the approximately 1,000 local MLSs<sup>218</sup> as their primary sources of available homes, listing a home in the relevant local MLS appears essential to obtaining the highest purchase price. Even those home shoppers who do not use brokers are likely to consult the NAR's [realtors.com](#) – with its two million listings<sup>219</sup> – or at least one of the

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<sup>214</sup> See Jares, *supra* note 148 (Dallas's Realty Baron). Other sites also use auctions, see Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Bidding for Real Estate Commissions*, INMAN NEWS, Mar. 14, 2005.

<sup>215</sup> Julie Garton-Good's 2000 survey of 100 experts estimated that it takes an average of about 83 hours to sell a home. GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 96. On the other hand, 1982 and 2002 surveys by the California Assn. of Realtors (CAR) found that the time required to serve sellers has dropped from about 40 hours to about 20 hours. See BARRY, *supra* note 23, at 60-61. See also Ryan, *supra* note 203 (68-80 hours). The CAR figure, however, is probably due, at least in part, to consumer use of the Internet, see *supra* note 143, and a very hot market. See also Larry A. Whited, *Close and Consolidate: The New Reality of Real Estate*, INMAN NEWS, Mar. 1, 2006 (40 hours).

<sup>216</sup> See *Real Estate Company Refers Flat-Fee Listings to Realtor Network*, INMAN NEWS, Feb. 9, 2006; (\$2,500 by Progressive Homesellers, which refers sellers to agents at brokerages such as Coldwell Banker, Century 21, and Prudential); James Caverly, *Broker Converts Her Business into a Flat-Fee Franchise*, REALESTATEJOURNAL.COM, May 30, 2006, <http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/agentsandbrokers/20060530-caverly.html> (Assist-2-Sell charges \$2,995); Elbert David, *Flat-fee Brokers Compete for Sales*, DES MOINES REGISTER, Apr. 23, 2005, at 1 (Equisave charges \$3295 and Next Generations charges \$4490, although neither posts the listing in the MLS); Gomes, *supra* note 229 (\$3500); Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Home Sellers Test Alternative Realty Shops*, INMAN NEWS, Feb. 23, 2005 (SellSmart Real Estate, based in San Diego, offers listings as low as \$2,950 plus \$1,000 for each \$100,000 a home's price exceeds \$300,000); Rawls, *supra* note 148 (\$2995); Hazard, *supra* note 148 (Help-U-Sell offers many options with a minimum of about \$2950 (but excludes showing home). One licensed agent in Northern Virginia with eighteen years of experience was offering "full service" for \$1299 on [craigslist.com](#) in February 2006.

<sup>217</sup> The 2003 National Association of Realtors Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers, summary of buyers at 4.

<sup>218</sup> See DOJ 2005 Amended Complaint, *supra* note 16, at ¶ 13. These 1,000 include all major metropolitan areas, except New York City. Approximately 900 MLSs are affiliated with the NAR, and by 2003 more than 800 were posting on [realtor.com](#). See GAO 2005 Rep., *supra* note 1, at 6; 2003 NAR Report, *supra* note 3, at 18.

<sup>219</sup> See GAO 2005 Rep., *supra* note 1, at 18.

other websites that are populated from local MLSs, like those at WallStreetJournal.com or aol.com.<sup>220</sup> Thus, placing a listing in the local MLS appears to be the à la carte offering most desired by sellers.

Brokers in some localities offer to post an MLS listing for as little as \$99, although \$400 appears to be more typical for this Listing Entry Only (LEO) service.<sup>221</sup> Some believe that fixed-price access to MLSs is inevitable,<sup>222</sup> and it certainly appears comparable to placing a “for sale” real estate ad in a local newspaper. The NAR and its supporters, however, are adamant in refusing to permit the MLS to be treated as a public utility,<sup>223</sup> which would facilitate price competition.

As discussed in section III.C.1, above, listings in the MLS are generally much less valuable if they do not offer the buyer’s broker a commission at the “going rate.” Still, where the local MLS passes all its listings on to realtor.com and other such websites,<sup>224</sup> the listing can attract buyers without brokers. If MLSs continue to be operated to favor brokers over consumers,<sup>225</sup> then a new entity, like Google, may displace the current, NAR-affiliates with a more inclusive MLS.<sup>226</sup>

#### *Closing – Handling Everything After a Buyer Has Been Selected*

One generally hires a listing broker primarily to find a buyer,<sup>227</sup> but with so many tasks involved in completing a sale even after a seller accepts an offer, hiring a real estate professional (whether broker, lawyer, or other) is probably cost efficient.<sup>228</sup> Assist-2-Sell franchisees

<sup>220</sup> See Bernice Ross, *Simple Strategies for Online Real Estate Exposure*, INMAN NEWS, Feb. 24, 2006. Then again, some listings are not passed on the realtor.com et al, see *supra* note 149.

<sup>221</sup> See *supra* note 148. The charge appears to vary based on what changes sellers can make to a listing, the fees that agents must pay to access the MLS, the costs of operating MLSs, and the volume of users in each particular market.

<sup>222</sup> See, e.g., Braswell & Poe, *supra* note 118, at 328; Yavas & Colwell, *supra* note 44, at 271.

<sup>223</sup> See Thomas M. Stevens, *MLS: The Essential Difference*, INMAN NEWS, Sept. 5, 2006; Evans, *supra* notes 167 & 169. See also *supra* note 136; *infra* section VIII.D.

<sup>224</sup> Some MLSs have refused to pass exclusive agency listings on to realtor.com et al. See *supra* note 149.

<sup>225</sup> See *infra* section VIII.D.

<sup>226</sup> See *infra* notes 253-256 and accompanying text.

<sup>227</sup> See Robert J. Bruss, *Fix-up Home Seller Shouldn’t Expect Top Dollar*, INMAN NEWS, Feb. 21, 2006 (once you’ve found a buyer “you don’t need a professional agent.”); Gillespie, *supra* note 132. But see ROSS, *supra* note 45, at 277, 291, 294 (“Any experienced agent knows that 80 to 90 percent of the work occurs in closing the transaction, especially in resolving appraisal problems, title problems, credit reports, inspections,... [there is a] misconception that the agent earns their [sic.] money primarily for marketing the property . . .”).

<sup>228</sup> See GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 91-93; ROSS, *supra* note 227.

typically offer to handle closing for about \$2,000 to \$2,500,<sup>229</sup> Redfin charges \$2,000 and also places the listing in the local MLS, and others charge even less.<sup>230</sup> Garton-Good estimated a median time-frame of ten hours for the negotiating between a FSBO and a qualified buyer and monitoring the sale to a successful sale and, she suggests a fee of \$150 per hour capped at \$1500.<sup>231</sup>

### *Setting an Optimal Asking Price & When to Sell*

To obtain the best price for their home, sellers usually need to set an appropriate initial asking price, although much depends on whether they are in a sellers' or a buyers' market.<sup>232</sup> In a hot or sellers' market – where sellers asking a reasonable price for a typical home expect to receive multiple offers on the first weekend a home is listed – there would seem to be little need to pay a broker to predict the highest attainable price for a property.<sup>233</sup> Sellers could estimate their home's market value aided by an automated comparative market analysis (CMA),<sup>234,235</sup> or

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<sup>229</sup> See Andrew Gomes, *Selling Your Home Sans the High Fees*, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Oct. 9, 2005, at 1 (\$2495 for the paperwork only option). On its website Iowa-based DealYourOwn.com indicates that it charges \$1,000 for negotiations and closings. See *How Much Does This Cost?*, at <http://www.dealyourown.com/listproperty.asp>.

<sup>230</sup> See Darlin, *supra* note 179. One Wisconsin real estate lawyer charges \$600 for handling all of the legal issues involved for FSBO sellers, see Bailey, *supra* note 148; a Florida firm charges \$249 to attend the closing, see Rawls, *supra* note 148 (Gallery of Homes, Florida); a Texas agent charges \$1995 for full closing services, see Presentation of Aaron Farmer, Texas Discount Realty, Oct. 15, 2005, at slide 3, <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/recom/213243.htm>; another broker is willing to handle closing for a one percent commission. See Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Consumers Unzip Variety of Real Estate Businesses*, INMAN NEWS, Feb. 22, 2005.

<sup>231</sup> See Julie Garton-Good, *Consult and Grow Rich: Why Be a Real Estate Consultant?* 9 (2001?). See also Ryan, *supra* note 203 (estimating between 13 and 20 hours at \$100 per hour).

<sup>232</sup> A market is generally considered "balanced" if there are approximately equal numbers of buyers and sellers and the inventory of homes represents about six months of average monthly sales. If inventory is less than a six month supply of homes, it is considered a seller's market; more than a six month supply is considered a buyer's market. Standards are not precise. Compare Survey: *Home-Buyer Demand, Seller Supply Nearly Balanced*, INMAN NEWS, Apr. 6, 2006 to ROSS, *supra* note 45, at 236.

<sup>233</sup> Even defenders of full service agents concede this. See Kelly Sweeney, *Why Traditional Real Estate Brokerage is Alive and Well*, INMAN NEWS, Nov. 10, 2005.

<sup>234</sup> See Glenn Roberts, Jr., *New Company Serves Up Real Estate Reports for a Free*, INMAN NEWS, Jan. 25, 2006; Glenn Roberts, Jr., *New Home Valuation Site Rivals Zillow*, INMAN NEWS, Mar. 30, 2006 (RealestateABC); John M. Clapp, *A Semiparametric Method for Valuing Residential Locations: Application to Automated Valuation*, 27 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 303 (2003) (discussing an economic model that predicts lot values based on longitude and latitude); homesmartreports.com offers estimates for \$25; Blanche Evans, *Investor Annoyed at Online Valuation Service*, REALTY TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005.

<sup>235</sup> After identifying a few of the best matches, a CMA then adjusts the value of each of the comparables by subtracting an estimated value for significant features it has that the home being priced lacks, and adding the estimated value of features that the latter includes, but the comparable lacks. See TYSON & BROWN, *supra* note 115, at 169-77. Each comparable will produce an estimate and the estimates are averaged.

even CMAs from agents.<sup>236</sup> That price, or one a bit less, should attract all potential buyers and, if managed well, stimulate competitive bidding and lead to an excellent sale price.<sup>237</sup>

In a buyer's market, setting an appropriate asking price is more difficult and important.<sup>238</sup> A price too low will not necessarily be corrected by competitive bidding, and one too high has multiple drawbacks: First, it is likely to increase the time it takes to sell the home<sup>239</sup> Second, the longer the home remains unsold the more buyers are apt to suspect that there is a serious defect.<sup>240</sup> Third, an excessive price may discourage some buyers from even visiting the home.<sup>241</sup>

Thus, it may be useful to employ an expert and more sophisticated CMA to set the price.<sup>242</sup> Still, sellers must be on guard against agents trying to "buy a listing,"<sup>243</sup> by overestimating the home's fair market value. Listings are valued by brokers because they permit open houses and visits, which can serve as bait for attracting potential home buyer clients.<sup>244</sup>

<sup>236</sup> Many agents offer estimates to FSBO sellers because the agents know that many of the sellers will eventually hire brokers. See Robert J. Bruss, *How to Correctly List Your Home for Sale*, INMAN NEWS, Mar. 10, 2006.

<sup>237</sup> See Darlin, *supra* note 111. While some might consider it misleading to list a home at a price that is less than one would accept for it, the practice is not illegal and is widespread. See Robert J. Bruss, *Home Buyers Fall Victim to Listing Agent's Dirty Trick*, INMAN NEWS, Aug. 10, 2005. The hope is that the low price will attract the interest of more buyers and that competition will stimulate buyers to get carried away and exceed any pre-set maximums. See, e.g., Kimberly Blanton, *Going Once . . . in Echo of '90s Bust, Auction Set for 34 Unsold Luxury Condos in Hub*, BOST. GLOBE, Sept. 6, 2006, at A1. In fact a 2005 Wall St. J. Online/ Harris Poll found that almost twenty percent of home buyers exceeded their maximums. See Wall St. J. Personal Finance column in mid-Sept. <http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/09-16-2005/0004109184&EDATE=>.

<sup>238</sup> Then again, a small number of home sellers avoid the issue by selling their homes in an auction, see Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Real Estate Industry Sets Sights on the Auction Block*, INMAN NEWS, Aug. 14, 2006; Kimberly Blanton, *Sellers Literally Put Homes on the Block*, BOST. GLOBE, Mar. 14, 2006, at D1, although the buyers willing to pay most for a home might not participate.

<sup>239</sup> See Paul M. Anglin et al, *The Trade-off Between the Selling Price of Residential Properties and Time-on-the-Market: The Impact of Price Setting*, 26 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 95 (2003). Starting with a price too high also appears to lead to a reduced final sales price. See John R. Knight, *Listing Price, Time on Market, and Ultimate Selling Price: Causes and Effects of Listing Price Changes*, 30 REAL EST. ECON. 213 (2002).

<sup>240</sup> Buyers tend to devalue "stale" listings. See Curtis R. Taylor, *Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality*, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 555 (1999) (noting this effect when past prices are not observable, but that buyers' suspicions can be allayed if they are aware of higher initial price); GARBER, *supra* note 75, at 14. Thus, once a listing is perceived as stale, it may be wise to delist it and relist it later as a "fresh" listing. See IRWIN, *supra* note 111, at 7.

<sup>241</sup> See John Knight et al, *List Price Signaling and Buyer Behavior in the Housing Market*, 9 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 177 (1994).

<sup>242</sup> The process of estimating the value of the features that differ between the homes is probably as much art as science. See Barry G. Gilbertson, *Appraisal or Valuation: An Art or Science?*, REAL EST. ISSUES, Fall 2001, at 86; WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 122-30; Bernice Ross, *Real Estate Values Need Human Interpretation*, INMAN NEWS, Mar. 17, 2006. See also G. Donald Jud and Dan T. Winkler, *The Dynamics of Metropolitan Housing Prices*, 23 J. REAL EST. RES. 29 (2002) (predicting home price appreciation based on changes in population, real income, construction costs, stock market appreciation, and interest rates).

<sup>243</sup> See WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 126-28; FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 152 n.444.

<sup>244</sup> See *supra* note 157. Such agents might plan to advise a price reduction as soon as the seller became impatient,

Sellers should seek an expert who feels no pressure to give excessively high<sup>245</sup> or conservative assessments.<sup>246</sup> Garton-Good estimates that this might take an expert a few hours plus the time for a consultation,<sup>247</sup> although that might be low. Expert appraisals appear to be available for a fee on the order of \$350.<sup>248</sup> In volatile markets, sellers might also want an expert to reevaluate their asking price fairly frequently.<sup>249</sup>

#### *Advertising Beyond the MLS: Newspapers, Online, Etc.*

In addition to the dominant, traditional MLS, there are many other websites that can be used to reach potential buyers, often free of charge, like Craigslist, Google, Trulia,<sup>250</sup> and including those maintained especially for FSBO homes.<sup>251</sup> Moreover, listings online, with their capacity to include photos and extensive lists of features, if not video tours, at relatively lower costs, are gradually displacing printed classified ads in the local newspaper.<sup>252</sup> In response, however, many local newspapers are storing their real estate ads in databases that permit readers to search them as if they were MLSs. If local newspapers enhance those databases and listings,

but until then the agent could meet buyers seeking homes in that price range and use it to prime other buyers before showing them better priced homes. *See* TYSON & BROWN, *supra* note 115, at 192. *See also infra* section V.A.7.

<sup>245</sup> *See* Sarah Max, *Appraisal Fraud: Your Home at Risk*, CNN/Money, June 2, 2005 at [http://money.cnn.com/2005/05/23/real\\_estate/financing/appraisalfraud/index.htm](http://money.cnn.com/2005/05/23/real_estate/financing/appraisalfraud/index.htm) (reporting that the Appraisal Institute recently told Congress that appraisers are under increasing pressure from mortgage bankers and agents to confirm sale prices so that deals can go through); Blanche Evans, *October Research to Survey Appraisers About Pressured Home Values*, REALTY TIMES, Mar. 1, 2006.

<sup>246</sup> Some criticize current appraisers for banks of giving low appraisals. *See* Roy T. Black et al, *Behavioral Research in Real Estate: A Search for the Boundaries*, 6 J. REAL EST. PRAC. & EDUC. 85, 88-90 (2003); *supra* note 245. *But see* Ray Wilson, Basic Advice to Sellers: Appraiser, Yes! CMA, No!, 2001 available at <http://www.ired.com/buymyself/agency/cma-no.htm>.

<sup>247</sup> *See* GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 69-71, 129.

<sup>248</sup> *See* IRWIN, *supra* note 111, at 36 (REPs with either an MAI or SREA designation).

<sup>249</sup> This is one of the many valuable consulting services that has been offered by the RealEstateCafe.com. *See also* <http://www.realnegotiate.com/PriceAnalysisService.htm>.

<sup>250</sup> *See* Ross, *supra* note 153; James R. Hagerty & Kevin J. Delaney, *Google, Craigslist Expand into Real Estate*, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2006, at D1. There are also tools for automatically feeding such sites. *See* Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Classified Listings Tool Pumps Real Estate Ads to Many Sites*, INMAN NEWS, Apr. 7, 2006; Roger Noujeim, *Letter*, INMAN NEWS, Apr. 10, 2006. Also emerging are a new set of real estate-related blogs, such as Chicago's *yoChicago.com*. *See* Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Community Real Estate Sites Taking Off*, INMAN NEWS, Feb. 28, 2006.

<sup>251</sup> These include nationwide websites, like owners.com and foresalebyowner.com, *see* Patton, *supra* note 84; Sambrotto, *supra* note 141, at 4, and local websites, like fsbomadison.com and buyerowner.com, *see* Bailey, *supra* note 148; Rawls, *supra* note 148.

<sup>252</sup> *See*, Jessica Swesey, *Print Struggles for Share in Online Real Estate*, INMAN NEWS, June 5, 2006; COLBY ATWOOD ET AL, 2006 UPDATE: ONLINE REAL ESTATE ADVERTISING (Borrell Associates, July 2006) at 3-4 (reporting that at the end of 2005, the Internet became the most-used method of selling a home and that Borrell predicts that Internet real estate advertising will surpass newspapers in terms of advertising market share by 2010). Then again, newspapers can enhance their classified ad listings by using easily searchable online databases and partnering with

they could maintain quasi-MLSSs, open to all sellers for a non-discriminatory fee<sup>253</sup> and available for free, advertiser-supported searching by buyers.<sup>254</sup> Alternatively, Craigslist, Google, or future versions of zillow, or the like might well dominate this market niche,<sup>255</sup> particularly if economies of scale favor a single, national database.<sup>256</sup> The Orbitz airline website offers a variation on this model.

Some sellers might want an agent conversant in the flirty and seductive terminology of real estate to prepare a verbal description of their homes,<sup>257</sup> and most would likely want experts to take photographs and produce video tours, as well posting these, floor plans, and other relevant data on a website,<sup>258</sup> although top quality outcomes might cost thousands of dollars.

### *Staging a Home: Interior Decorating, Cleaning & Repairs*

One doesn't get a second chance to make a first impression, so it is important to prepare a home to highlight its strengths, including its superficial "curb appeal," while not discouraging any suitable buyer.<sup>259</sup> Suggestions are available free on television shows about staging, including A&E's *Sell This House* and HGTV's *Designed to Sell*,<sup>260</sup> as well as books, magazines, web pages, and from visiting other homes.<sup>261</sup> Still, some sellers might find it profitable to

others. See Jessica Sweeney, *Fragmented Ad Market Opens New Possibilities*, INMAN NEWS, June 6, 2006.

<sup>253</sup> See Jessica Sweeney, *Next Generation of Real Estate Classifieds*, INMAN NEWS, June 7, 2006. The Tribune Company recently acquired forsalebyowner.com. Cf. *supra* note 222.

<sup>254</sup> Local brokers might threaten retaliation, but it is not clear that their clients would be willing to support any efforts they made to withhold real estate ads from the local newspaper.

<sup>255</sup> See Hagerty & Delaney, *supra* note 250; Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Move Inc. Leader Sees 'Ferocious' Battle for Real Estate Consumers*, INMAN NEWS, May 23, 2006; Blanche Evans, *RE/MAX's Website Adds Another Giant to Lead Generation Resources*, REALTY TIMES, Apr. 12, 2006; Bob Tedeschi, *Providing Free Real Estate Listings from a Broader Market*, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2006, at C6 (discussing Move.com); Glenn Roberts, Jr., *MLS Ballot Initiative is 'Ill Conceived,' Says Realtor Lawyer*, INMAN NEWS, Dec. 22, 2005; Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Industry Think-Tank Deliberates MLS Future*, INMAN NEWS, May 4, 2006; Brendan King, *What a National Real Estate MLS Might Look Like*, INMAN NEWS, April 24, 2006.

<sup>256</sup> For one traditional-broker-centric view of this see Brendan King, *What a National Real Estate MLS Might Look Like*, INMAN NEWS, Apr. 24, 2006.

<sup>257</sup> Other sellers might handle this themselves. See GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 66-69, 74-75; Blanche Evans, *Create an Incredible Feature Sheet for Your Listings*, REALTY TIMES, July 5, 2005.

<sup>258</sup> See Ryan, *supra* note 203 (estimating cost of photography and preparing brochures, flyers, and website at \$500).

<sup>259</sup> For example, one expert warns that "prospective buyers will overlook many things, but a dirty house is not one of them." See GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 61.

<sup>260</sup> See Teresa Wiltz, *TV's Hot Properties: Real Estate Reality Shows*, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2005, at C01; J.N. Sbranti, *Creating Appeal: In Languid Market, Houses Must be Set Apart from the Rest*, MODESTO BEE, Aug. 4, 2006, at D1.

<sup>261</sup> See, e.g., TYSON & BROWN, *supra* note 115, at 150-55; ROSS, *supra* note 45, at 156-60; KIPLINGER STAFF, *supra* note 63, at 288-94; GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 64-65; Vivian Marino, *Sold at First Sight*, N.Y. TIMES, July

consult one of the half-million real estate professionals and interior decorators who have been trained in the concept of “staging.”<sup>262</sup> This includes, at a minimum, the “3 Cs:” cleanliness, clutter reduction, and color, and may also involve landscaping, wall papering, and filling a home with rented furniture.<sup>263</sup> Expert stagers charge fees of \$30 to \$150 per hour or more and require an average of about three hours;<sup>264</sup> although elaborate stagings can run far more.<sup>265</sup> Sellers might even offer experts most of any price increase obtained after staging expenses paid by the expert.

#### *Visits by Potential Buyers, Open Houses, and Other Contacts*

Many experts believe that a seller’s presence at an open house may inhibit a buyer’s ability to fantasize about a home<sup>266</sup> or ask important questions, and it can be dangerous for a seller to show a home alone to a stranger.<sup>267</sup> Therefore, sellers might want to use agents to handle this. Meanwhile, agents may well be willing to handle at least one open house at minimal charge, given that data indicate that open houses may be more effective for generating new buyer clients for brokers<sup>268</sup> the purchasers of the home opened.<sup>269</sup> In fact, the chance to gain new clients led one agent to accept a fee of only \$1 to sell one \$2.7 million home, and one expert

30, 2006, §11 at 1; Andrew LePage, *Staging the Sale*, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 19, 2006, at D1.

<sup>262</sup> See BARB SCHWARZ, HOME STAGING (2006). West Coast realtor Barb Schwarz is credited with inventing staging in 1972. See <http://www.stagedhomes.com/public/history.php>; Julie Janovsky, *Staging Smarts in a Competitive Market*, NEWSDAY, May 31, 2006, at C12. See also Marino, *supra* note 261. Most professional providers are members of the International Association of Home Staging Professionals ([www.iahsp.com](http://www.iahsp.com)) or the Interior Arrangement Design Association ([www.interiorarrangement.org](http://www.interiorarrangement.org)). See Marino, *supra* note 260.

<sup>263</sup> See SCHWARZ, *supra* note 262, at 16; Janovsky, *supra* note 262. Efforts to seduce buyers can also include ensuring an attractive scent in the home, although this can backfire. Even when sellers do not want to make major repairs, cost estimates can aid a buyer during negotiations in case a buyer overestimates the cost. See Dian Hymer, *What Work Should be Put into a House for Sale?*, INMAN NEWS, Mar. 6, 2006.

<sup>264</sup> See Marino, *supra* note 260 (reporting that an average homeowner can expect to spend around \$1,500, that a base consultation offering suggestions runs \$150 to \$300, and that fees can be upward of \$100,000).

<sup>265</sup> For example, one decorating firm that offers to glamorize a development explains that “we write a script, just like for a movie” to give the home a personality, and its charges can approach 20-30 percent of the home’s selling price. See GARBER, *supra* note 75, at 21 & n.29, citing Ruth Simon, *Hit the Prospect at Every Emotional Level*, FORBES, Jan. 9, 1989, at 310. See also Janis Mara, *New Real Estate Staging Tactic: Happy Family*, INMAN NEWS, June 7, 2006.

<sup>266</sup> See GARBER, *supra* note 75, at 9-10.

<sup>267</sup> See GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 82. Some brokers even suggest that showings be limited to buyers who have been pre-approved for a sufficient loan to purchase the home. See Blanche Evans, *Should You Show Your Listing to Buyers Who Aren’t Preapproved?*, REALTY TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005.

<sup>268</sup> See Hagerty, *supra* note 7; *supra* note 157.

<sup>269</sup> Data indicate that not even one percent of home owners found their home through an open house. See 2005 NAR Survey, *supra* note 92, at 29. But see Ardell DellaLoggia, *Should You Have an Open House*, Rain City Guide, Apr. 3, 2006, at <http://www.raincityguide.com/2006/04/03/should-you-have-an-open-house/> (challenging this claim). Also, 87 percent of buyers found open houses to be very or somewhat useful. Id. at 31.

suggested that listing brokers consider cutting their fee to the seller every time that marketing the seller's home brings them a new buyer client.<sup>270</sup> In buyer markets it may be desirable to employ agents to follow-up with all visitors who appeared to be interested<sup>271</sup> and to handle all calls from buyers.<sup>272</sup>

### *Negotiations*

Even sellers who are skilled negotiators may want an established agent or brokerage firm to aid in negotiations because of their special access to timely data, such as the most recent offers (accepted and rejected), the number of sellers preparing to place their homes on the market and the state of mind of current buyers and sellers. They may also be able to discover any relevant data about a buyer, such as time, financial, and other constraints and how much they love the home. In addition, buyers and agents aiding them are likely to view agents as more credible than an individual seller who will often soon exit the area. Good agents will also know the local customs, twists, and intricacies of bidding, including the use of exploding bids in competitive bidding,<sup>273</sup> and dividing closing costs. In fact, a buyer uncertain between two homes may well favor the one associated with a more highly respected agent. In other instances, a reputable local lawyer specializing in residential real estate transactions may be sufficient,<sup>274</sup> particularly since a broker's interests may differ from those of the seller.<sup>275</sup> When the seller is either a couple preparing to divorce or simply one with very different goals, employing an agent with some skill in therapy may pay large dividends.<sup>276</sup>

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<sup>270</sup> See Hagerty, *supra* note 7 (\$1 fee); DellaLoggia, *supra* note 110 (fee discounts rewards).

<sup>271</sup> See GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 83. Sellers might also want agents to confirm that buyers are qualified to purchase the home.

<sup>272</sup> Since it appears that many such calls fail to provide a call back number or any message at all, using an agent with 800 call capture technology may be wise. See ROSS, *supra* note 45, at 77-82, 80, 246 (stating that over 90 percent of leads are lost because the agent answering the phone does not obtain the caller's phone number).

<sup>273</sup> See *supra* note 237 and accompanying text.

<sup>274</sup> Some commentator suggests that the real estate agents should unbundle their services into representation (negotiation) and the provision of information. See Thomas J. Miceli, Katherine A. Pancak & C.F. Sirmans, *Restructuring Agency Relationships in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry: An Economic Analysis*, 20 J. REAL EST. RES. 31 (2000).

<sup>275</sup> See text following note 42, *supra*.

<sup>276</sup> See GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 201-02.

### *Other Services*

A few other less commonly available services might also be sought by home sellers. Those happy with their present location but simply desiring a somewhat different layout can already view the proliferation of “home makeover” television shows<sup>277</sup> and related material as well as advice about which improvements are likely to be recouped when the home is sold.<sup>278</sup> Still, hiring an expert – knowledgeable about local contractors and the likelihood of recovery of investments in different upgrades – to address one’s own personal issues most quickly and effectively is likely to be a good investment. Sellers may also want to consider leasing their home with an option to buy or turning it into a rental unit.<sup>279</sup> An hourly fee or flat fee for such an assessment would appear most appropriate.

### **For Buyers**

While many buyers may want to handle some of the tasks involved in buying a home themselves, most will want an expert’s help them with at least some of the following:<sup>280</sup>

1. Full service (does not really belong on this list of tasks, but . . .)
2. Handling closing – everything after the seller has agreed to sell to the buyer
3. Formulating a search profile
4. Visiting Homes: what’s available, retrieving the most suitable, modifying one’s criteria
5. Negotiations
6. Securing a mortgage & referrals for closing and other services

Real estate professionals may provide home shoppers with value in many ways. While academic research has found little evidence that buyers gain any benefit in terms of lower home prices by

<sup>277</sup> See *supra* note 260.

<sup>278</sup> See TYSON & BROWN, *supra* note 115, at 155; GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 205-07; IRWIN, *supra* note 111, at 18-21; Sal Alfano, 2004 *Cost v. Value Report*, Remodeling, Nov. 1, 2004, <http://www.remodeling.hw.net/industry-news.asp?articleID=79166&sectionID=173> www.remodelingmagazine.com; Wells Fargo’s Home Improvement Calculator, available at [http://www.wellsfargo.com/per/home\\_equity/tools/home\\_improve.jhtml](http://www.wellsfargo.com/per/home_equity/tools/home_improve.jhtml).

<sup>279</sup> See IRWIN, *supra* note 111, at 119-33.

<sup>280</sup> For a more comprehensive list of services, see *supra* note 208.

hiring “buyers’ agents,”<sup>281</sup> good agents can provide tremendous value by speeding up the search, enabling buyers to focus their scarce free time on other projects (quantifiable as their opportunity cost), and helping the buyers to find a better fit for their needs and desires.

### *Full Service*

Buyers who desire full service – which appears to require about 40 hours,<sup>282</sup> at least for buyers who do a lot of looking first on their own<sup>283</sup> – may employ full service brokers, paid indirectly by the listing broker or seller. Increasingly, however, as discussed in VI, above, buyers aided by the bargaining power of third parties, can get rebates from the commissions that listing brokers offer to buyer brokers. Home shoppers armed with knowledge of this practice can demand a discount, e.g., one percent rebate, directly from a buyer broker to match the “referral fee” the broker would otherwise pay. A few brokers, like the Real Estate Cafe, will serve buyers for \$100/hour or a flat fee plus \$100/hour for time beyond a set amount.<sup>284</sup>

### *Drafting a Purchase Agreement and Handling the Deal through Closing*

Many buyers who feel competent to find a home on their own<sup>285</sup> still desire the assistance of a real estate expert for handling the many tasks involved in closing the deal.<sup>286</sup> Using an agent to draft and deliver a purchase agreement may be particularly important in a sellers’ market, when speed and credibility may be critical.<sup>287</sup> One survey estimated that making an offer took about two hours and troubleshooting a purchase to closing requires about 10 more.<sup>288</sup> As

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<sup>281</sup> See Zietz & Newsome, *supra* note 73, at 186 (segregated data based on the size of the home found that “a typical buyer of a small to mid-sized property that is not represented by a buyer’s agent is likely to pay about 2 percent more for a property”); Elder, et al, *supra* note 73, at 360-61 (finding no evidence that buyer agents are able to negotiate lower purchase prices, but finding that they appear to be more effective at reducing search time, although noting that their value may be less than their cost to the buyer, if the buyer must pay that cost); Roy T. Black & Hugh O. Nourse, *The Effects of Different Brokerage Modes on Closing Costs and House Prices*, 10 J. REAL EST. RES. 87 (1995) (finding no evidence that use of a broker with a fiduciary duty to the buyer reduces the buyer’s purchase price).

<sup>282</sup> See GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 142-43 (69 hours) circa 2000. On the other hand, 1982 and 2002 surveys by the California Assn. of Realtors found that the time required to serve buyers has dropped from about 30 hours to about 20 hours. See BARRY, *supra* note 23, at 60-61.

<sup>283</sup> See *infra* note 298.

<sup>284</sup> See RealEstateCafe.com.

<sup>285</sup> Only about one-third of buyers say they first learned about the house they purchased from an agent. See 2005 NAR Survey, *supra* note 92, at 29.

<sup>286</sup> Id. at 39 [2005 NAR Survey, *supra* note 92] See *supra* section VII.A.3.

<sup>287</sup> In fact, it appears that more than 70 percent of buyers want help presenting an offer. See Bill Wendel survey.

<sup>288</sup> See GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 138-43. About two or three more hours may be required for handling an

mentioned in VI, above, some firms are offering rebates of up to 75 percent of the commissions they receive from listing brokers for buyers who find a home themselves, and only want help with the rest.<sup>289</sup>

### *Assistance Formulating a Search Profile*

All home shoppers must use some criteria to narrow the set of available homes to those of most interest. Ideally they would construct a “search profile” that gave appropriate “weight” to each factor they most desired or abhorred and enabled them to rate each home, but that is rarely, if ever, practical.<sup>290</sup> In fact, there are many home buyer books and most real estate broker websites offer checklists of features to consider, but there are good reasons why shoppers may want to pay experts to help them hone their search profiles. To begin, many buyers may find agents better than books or websites at helping them to compute how high a mortgage they will both qualify for and be comfortable with.<sup>291</sup> Agents can also counsel buyers to give less weight to factors that former buyers came to realize that they had overrated when shopping, and which contributes to the common real estate industry credo “buyers are liars.”<sup>292</sup> Their experience can also help them advise buyers about relative values and tradeoffs among features.<sup>293</sup>

Furthermore, while it is not unreasonable to want to fall in love with a home and a lack of such feeling may be cause for concern,<sup>294</sup> experienced agents can help buyers avoid purchases based on mere infatuation<sup>295</sup> or other apparent errors. An experienced and perceptive observer of

offer. Id. at 134-38. The 1983 FTC study found that agents spent an average of 1.75 hours closing the sale and 2.75 hours in post sale follow-up. FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 27 n.12. *But see* ROSS, *supra* note 227.

<sup>289</sup> Redfin cut its costs by automating the paperwork of making a bid and then rebates to the buyer two-thirds of the commission allocated to the buyer’s broker. *See* Damon Darlin, 2 *Web Sites Push Further Into Services Real Estate Agents Offer*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2006, at C3.

<sup>290</sup> *See* Nadel, *Selection Process*, *supra* note 77, at 246-61.

<sup>291</sup> *See* WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 106-08. An agent may be particularly helpful if they understand the impact of the federal alternative minimum tax (AMT) on income and on the possibility that Congress will soon transform the current mortgage deduction to a more limited tax credit. *See* Roger Lowenstein, *Who Needs the Mortgage Interest Deduction*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, §6 (Magazine) at 78.

<sup>292</sup> *See* WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 119; GARBER, *supra* note 75, at 7-8; Swartz, *supra* note 50; Teri Karush Rogers, *My Broker, My Therapist*, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006, §11 at 1; Alison Rogers, *Buyers are Liars*, INMAN NEWS, July 7, 2006; Letters, *Buyers Aren’t Liars, They Just Don’t Know What They Want*, INMAN NEWS, July 10, 2006.

<sup>293</sup> Buyer agents can use a buyer market analysis (BMA) to try to quantify the price of different attributes of a home. *See* WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 128-30.

<sup>294</sup> *See* GARBER, *supra* note 75, at 25-47. One commentator observes that “[p]eople don’t buy logically. They buy emotionally.” Tom Hopkins, *How to Master the Art of Listing and Selling Real Estate* 6 (1991), *cited in* WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 132.

<sup>295</sup> *See* GARBER, *supra* note 75, at 26-27.

home shoppers, familiar with patterns of reactions and their likely causes may be able to clarify tastes over multiple visits.<sup>296</sup> One survey suggests that this process may take about eight hours,<sup>297</sup> and perceptive experts in this area might be worth \$500 per hour or more for consultations.

### *Identifying the Homes to Visit*

While home shoppers are visiting more homes on their own,<sup>298</sup> agents can often offer valuable assistance in at least two ways: 1) sharing data about all available homes, including those not yet listed and 2) having efficient tools for retrieving homes that best meet a buyer's search profile. One survey estimated that buyers require about 25 hours of visiting before finding the one they will buy,<sup>299</sup> but as just noted, many now handle much of this themselves and online.

### **Identifying the full domain of available homes**

While home shoppers may be able to identify available homes by consulting the listings in local newspapers and on relevant websites,<sup>300</sup> as well as material from new builders<sup>301</sup> (whose homes represent about 20 percent of annual home sales), compiling an aggregated list like this may be quite time consuming. It may well become available in the near future,<sup>302</sup> but until then, local agents may be worthwhile due to their presumed familiarity with all of the relevant forums. Even after aggregate lists are available, agents will still be valued for their early knowledge about homes about to be listed, particularly agents who monitor local news about divorces,

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<sup>296</sup> See WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 130-32.

<sup>297</sup> See GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 107-12.

<sup>298</sup> In fact, a survey by Reconis found that home buyers generally begin their search with about 14 months of looking before contacting an agent. See John E. Ansbach, Jan. 26, 2006 powerpoint presentation at 32. [www.reconis.com/recon/docs/Generations%20201%20Broker%20Training\\_Client%20Edition%201.26.06.pdf](http://www.reconis.com/recon/docs/Generations%20201%20Broker%20Training_Client%20Edition%201.26.06.pdf)

<sup>299</sup> See GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 121-26. See also Patton, *supra* note 84, at R43 (reporting that, circa 1999, agents typically spent 40 to 60 percent of their time finding homes for buyers to consider).

<sup>300</sup> See *supra* notes 250 & 251, and accompanying text.

<sup>301</sup> Some homebuilders list their new properties in the MLS databases; others rely primarily on ads in print publications and the Internet. The national website homebuilder.com includes many new home developments and local sites, like newhomesguide.com for the Washington, DC Metropolitan area, can also be important sources.

<sup>302</sup> See *supra* notes 253-256 and accompanying text. They may even include listings of rental units since a rental might, surprisingly, make sense in many circumstances. See Motoko Rich & David Leonhardt, *In the Long Run, Sleep at Home and Invest in the Stock Market*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2005, at A1; Motoko Rich, *Betting on Rent Over Mortgages*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at F1.

retirements, and relocations, and are even willing to contact owners of homes that may be ideal for a buyer even though they are not for sale.<sup>303</sup>

### **Efficiently identifying the most suitable choices**

Those new to an area are apt to desire information about neighborhoods – the quality of schools, crime rates, high home appreciation rates, etc. – before they consider individual homes. While much data relevant to these matters is now available online,<sup>304</sup> a real estate professional can aggregate that data into a useable form,<sup>305</sup> particularly less quantitative future trends, like changing demographics; plans for new retailers and roads; reasons to expect a school district to change (e.g., budget issues or a new superintendent), and traffic congestion.

Agents specializing in a few small communities may be especially valuable if they have compiled community data (from public sources, gossip, and all credible sources) into searchable databases.<sup>306</sup> Although most agents duck questions about ethnicity and religious faiths,<sup>307</sup> better informed ones can help buyers find the community that they seek.<sup>308</sup> The most valuable agents

<sup>303</sup> See, e.g., Swartz, *supra* note 50; Brian Larson, *An Alternative to Interbroker Compensation*, INMAN NEWS, Aug. 16, 2006 (agent in St. Paul, MN). Aggressive agents may even cold call homeowners whose homes are not on the market. See WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 112; Swartz, *supra*; Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Real Estate for Sale – or Not*, INMAN NEWS, Aug. 18, 2006. One agent was even able to obtain an apartment from someone who had just purchased it a month earlier, albeit at a \$1.9 million mark up! See Dennis Hevesi, *The Art of Marketing Rooms at the Top*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1998, §2, at 1; Motoko Rich, *All's Fair in Love and Listings*, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2004, at F1.

<sup>304</sup> For example, [www.greatschools.net](http://www.greatschools.net) provides information about schools, and local media may supplement the statistics tabulated by national media. See also Alain Pinel Offers School, Community Info with Real Estate Searches, INMAN NEWS, May 22, 2006; 2005 Challenge Index, WASH. POST, Dec. 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/education/special/5/index.html>. New websites are permitting browsing with a map as the MLS interface. See Glenn Roberts, Jr., *Real Estate Agent Puts MLS Listings on Google Earth*, INMAN NEWS, April 28, 2006 and providing user-friendly access to an integrated data set. See Sridnar Pappu, If Houses Could Talk, N.Y. TIMES, (Key Magazine Fall 2006), Sept. 10, 2006, at 108 (discussing propertyshark.com).

<sup>305</sup> See, e.g., Max Kummerow & Joëlle Chan Lun, *Information and Communication Technology in the Real Estate Industry: Productivity, Industry Structure and Market Efficiency*, 29 TELECOMM. POL'Y 173, 187 (2005). Even after finding the best websites for data, it may take significant practice to search the sites effectively. Moreover, agents may have tools unavailable to individuals. See Matt Carter, *Software Helps Convince Consumers They Can't Do it All*, INMAN NEWS, Sept. 19, 2006.

<sup>306</sup> See Swartz, *supra* note 50. This is beyond the current practice of brokers who now only aggregate data from different MLSs into a single, more easily searched internal database. See Sharon Simonson, *Regional MLS Merger at Hand*, Silicon Valley/San Jose Bus. J., Jan. 8, 2006, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10771336/from/RL.4/>.

<sup>307</sup> Because HUD has strict rules against steering buyers based on race or ethnicity, 24 C.F.R. §100.70(a), most agents try to avoid the risk of even false charges of discrimination by refusing to reveal even factual information about the racial or religious character of a neighborhood.

<sup>308</sup> In fact, the Fair Housing Act regulations actually permit agents to accommodate client requests to view homes in locales of a specific ethnic group, see [http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD\\_resources\\_buyers\\_agent](http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD_resources_buyers_agent) (discussing a letter from HUD, Assist. Sec. for Fair Housing, Elizabeth Julian, to Jill

may even know which streets include friendly police officers, potential babysitters, or pediatricians, or, on the other hand, convicted sex offenders or those known for the loud, wild parties. New mapping software is also likely to permit agents to allow buyers to set maximum distances from key locations, such as a train station or job site, possibly in both miles and driving time (during rush hour). Employing an agent with an exceptional database of this kind of data might well be worth even \$500 plus per hour.

### *Negotiations*

Buyers can generally gain the same benefits from agents as sellers may, as discussed in VII.A.8, above, particularly access to the most timely data and possibly discover any time, financial, and other constraints faced by the seller,<sup>309</sup> as well as a true measure of how long a home has been on the market.<sup>310</sup> An expert can also help one confirm that a low price is a bona fide bargain<sup>311</sup> and that waiving an inspection to compete with another bidder<sup>312</sup> is reasonable given a builder's reputation. A broker's reputation can give the buyer's bid added credibility. Negotiations for sellers appears to require about five to six hours, on average.<sup>313</sup>

### *Securing a Mortgage & Referrals for Closing and Other Services*

With the proliferation of new mortgage products,<sup>314</sup> buyers may seek a real estate agent's help identifying the best mortgage deal, as well as pre-approval (which permits a buyer to make a quick, solid bid<sup>315</sup>) particularly since the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA §8) forbids kickbacks to brokers making referrals.<sup>316</sup> One study estimated eight hours

Levine, Oct. 2, 1996), or with significant diversity.

<sup>309</sup> Buyers can often easily discover what a seller paid for a home online. This data is increasingly available free from the state or local entities that maintain tax assessment records, deed registries, etc. see [http://sdatcert3.resiusa.org/rp\\_rewrite/](http://sdatcert3.resiusa.org/rp_rewrite/), or entities, like zillow.com, that attempt to aggregate it.

<sup>310</sup> MLS data can mislead. See Glenn Roberts, Jr., *MLSs Attack For-Sale Home 'Relisting' Practices*, INMAN NEWS, Sept. 21, 2006; Kimberly Blanton, *Home Won't Sell? Some Cancel and Relist*, BOST. GLOBE, July 22, 2005, at A1.

<sup>311</sup> See Jayson Blair, *Apartment Hunt Goes Virtual: Buying a Place Sight Unseen, Other Than Online*, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2000, at B1 ("A computer can't tell you that this is a . . . listing . . . that is going to last 20 minutes.").

<sup>312</sup> See GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 190-91.

<sup>313</sup> See GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 134-38 (8 hours) minus two hours for making an offer. See *supra* note 288.

<sup>314</sup> See ALLEN J. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, EXOTIC OR TOXIC?: AN EXAMINATION OF THE NON-TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET FOR CONSUMERS AND LENDERS (2006) [http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Exotic\\_Toxic\\_Mortgage\\_Report0506.pdf](http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Exotic_Toxic_Mortgage_Report0506.pdf).

<sup>315</sup> See GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 112-13.

<sup>316</sup> See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.; 24 C.F.R. §§ 3500 et seq.; But see Jack Guttentag, *Why RESPA Has Failed to Prevent Real Estate Kickbacks*, INMAN NEWS, Feb. 13, 2006.

for this task.<sup>317</sup> Buyers often greatly value recommendations from agents about the best title insurers, attorneys, engineering and termite inspectors, etc., as well as about other local service providers.<sup>318</sup> Instead of charging nothing for this advice, hoping to earn good will that might yield future business, brokers might charge for it or a bundle of related services.<sup>319</sup>

## **8. Why Has the Standard Rate Structure (and Rate Levels) Remained Dominant?**

If the à la carte rate structure discussed above is so beneficial to consumers, why isn't it more popular?<sup>320</sup> This is similar to the question underlying the 1983 FTC Report: why isn't there more price competition among local real estate brokers? This section attempts to update and enhance the FTC Report, reviewing the many tactics that traditional real estate brokers have used to maintain their existing rate structure and price levels despite the emergence of new entities offering significantly lower-priced, non-traditionally structured, real estate services.

### **Brokers Recognize the Enormous Cost of a Price War & the Power of the NAR**

Three conditions indicate that the commissions traditional real estate brokers now charge often greatly exceed fees that they would charge if there was price competition in the market. First, many former employees of traditional brokers are now willing to provide full-service for flat fees of less than \$5,000.<sup>321</sup> Second, traditional brokers are willing to provide full service for the sale of a \$150,000 home for their half of a \$9,000 (six percent) fee, and the costs to agents of handling the sale of homes priced at multiples of that level appear be very similar although the commissions they now charge are multiples of that \$9,000.<sup>322</sup> Third, brokers in other nations now charge much lower fees for providing similar services.<sup>323</sup> The commissions paid on the

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<sup>317</sup> See GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 112-21. See also FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 27 n.12 (3.5 hours).

<sup>318</sup> 2003 NAR Report, *supra* note 3, at 30; Heather Timmons, *Shaking Up Real Estate, on Both Sides of the Ocean*, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2003, §3 at 4 (the sales staff provides referrals to whatever clients need). They may also advise buyers on home warranty plans, zoning issues, tax assessment issues, financing improvements or refinancing a mortgage. See GARTON-GOOD, *supra* note 7, at 199, 203-04, 207-14. One pair of brokers even attempts to act as matchmakers. See Alison Gregor, *The Perfect Match*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2006, §11, at 1. Then again, much of this information is now available free of charge (advertiser supported) online. See <http://www.angieslist.com/AngiesList>.

<sup>319</sup> See, e.g., Stefan Swanepoel, et al, Real Estate Confronts Bundled Services 2005, available at [www.realsure.com](http://www.realsure.com).

<sup>320</sup> The market share of non-traditional brokers is only between two and eighteen percent. See *supra* note 145.

<sup>321</sup> See *supra* note 216.

<sup>322</sup> See text accompanying notes 5-8 and 62-71 *supra*.

<sup>323</sup> Residential agents in other developed nations like England, Ireland, Australia, etc., charge only two to three percent commissions. See Miller, *supra* note 23, at slide 3; Delcoure & Miller, *supra* note 26, at 16-17, 37.

purchase and sale of the highest-priced homes are particularly vulnerable. Vigorous price competition could very possibly reduce total revenues for brokers precipitously, by \$30 billion or more annually.<sup>324</sup> This gives traditional brokers a strong interest in resisting this result. As an agent for a large, national, traditional brokerage firm explained in a September 2006 email to a friend who had just listed her home with a flat rate broker:<sup>325</sup>

I love you guys but why would I want to sell your property? Most full-service agents in \_\_\_\_ County want to remain full-service agents and I am one of them. Why would any full-service agent want to help a flat rate broker? None of us do. We don't want to become flat rate agents and if flat-rate agents become successful then we would all have to become flat-rate agents. They have a VERY small % of the business out there. We want to keep it that way. If I can avoid showing Help U Sell properties or Assist to Sell properties I also will not show them. When you list with a full-service agency then you have the co-operation of most of the agents in \_\_\_\_ County. A 3% commission with a bonus is not enough incentive to put a nail in the coffin of our industry...

With about 1.3 million members,<sup>326</sup> the NAR is the largest trade association in the nation.<sup>327</sup> Its members' presence in every voting district of every state legislature and large campaign contributions make it one of the most powerful lobbyists in the nation,<sup>328</sup> and led one state official to note "virtually no proposed legislation relating to real estate has a chance of passage unless it is approved by the state association of realtors."<sup>329</sup>

### **Historically Rates Were Fixed and then Recommended Rates Prevailed**

In 1950, the NAR's code of ethics stated that "every Realtor . . . should maintain the standard rates of commission adopted by the board and no business should be solicited at lower

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<sup>324</sup> See *supra* note 26. Brokers recognize that lowering their fees would not likely increase demand for their services, but would primarily reduce their revenues, possibly a lot. See FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 40.

<sup>325</sup> On file with the author.

<sup>326</sup> See *supra* note 23.

<sup>327</sup> See Glenn Roberts, Jr., *A Leading Lobbyist for a Powerful Lobby*, INMAN NEWS, Nov. 2, 2004 (first in a five part series); Justice, *supra* note 203.

<sup>328</sup> See Justice, *supra* note 203 (the association spends about \$94 million annually); Center for Responsive Politics, Top Industries Giving to Congress 2006 Cycle, available at <http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/mems.asp> (finding that the real estate industry's contributions of \$19.9 million placed them third out of 50 industries listed); FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at Vol. II, App. C, at 5-7; Virginia Gray, On the Political Power of the ® in Realtors ®: The Lobbying Resources of Full-Service Real Estate Brokers, in American Antitrust Institute Real Estate Project: Symposium on Competition in the Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry, Nov. 8, 2005; Roberts, *supra* note 327; David E. Rosenbaum, *In a Test of Lobbying Muscle, Realtors Prevail*, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, §1 at 14.

<sup>329</sup> FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 98.

rates.”<sup>330</sup> Although, a 1950 Supreme Court decision found the brokers guilty of price-fixing in violation of antitrust laws, this holding did not end such price fixing. Many brokers argued, rather, that the federal antitrust laws only applied to Washington, D.C. brokers in that case, and not to brokers in the states.<sup>331</sup> It wasn’t until 1971 that the NAR officially adopted a policy of “hands off” regarding commission rates.<sup>332</sup> Furthermore, the DOJ had to bring antitrust actions to end “suggested fee” schedules,<sup>333</sup> which, the FTC noted, continued to have a lingering effect.

### **State Real Estate Commissions Protect Traditional Business Models**

Most regulation of real estate brokerage is a result of state law and state real estate commissions created by state legislatures. Although the laws and commissions are presumed to be intended to protect consumers, a 2006 Consumer Federation of America (CFA) survey of real estate regulatory agencies in 47 of the 50 states found that more than 70 percent of commissioners were real estate brokers or salespeople.<sup>334</sup> Given the presence of real estate agents in every state legislative district and the availability of state affiliates of the NAR to manage industry lobbying and campaign contributions, it is not surprising that states have generally protected traditional brokers from entrants with new business models. Many state bodies enforce prohibitions against rebates to home buyers and many require sellers to purchase a minimum bundle of services that many sellers do not desire.<sup>335</sup> The California Department of Real Estate tried to prohibit unlicensed firms from offering sellers the opportunity to describe,

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<sup>330</sup> U.S. v. Nat'l Assn of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 488, 494-95 (1950). Realtors justified this as necessary to protect the public against excessive rates. *See* US v. NAREB, 84 F.Supp. 802, 803 (D.D.C. 1949), rev'd, 339 U.S. 485 (1950).

<sup>331</sup> *See* Norman G. Miller & Peter J. Shedd, *Do Antitrust Laws Apply to the Real Estate Brokerage Industry?*, 17 AMER. BUS. L.J. 313 (1979). It wasn’t until McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232 (1980) that that issue was laid to rest. *See also* BECKER, *supra* note 204, at 104-06 (discussing real estate broker textbooks).

<sup>332</sup> The NAR issued its “Fourteen Points” multiple listing policy statement. *See* FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 133-35 n. 354.

<sup>333</sup> *See* FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 195-99 (offering a short history of fee schedules and listing DOJ cases). *See also* Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 228 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1974); BARRY, *supra* note 23, at 46-49; United States v. Foley 598 F.2d 1323 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1979) (finding explicit price fixing).

<sup>334</sup> *See* PATRICK WOODALL & STEPHEN BROBECK, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, STATE REAL ESTATE REGULATION: INDUSTRY DOMINANCE AND ITS CONSUMER COSTS 4 (2006) [http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFA\\_Real\\_Estate\\_Commissioner\\_Report.pdf](http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFA_Real_Estate_Commissioner_Report.pdf). This is similar to the environment the FTC found for state regulators in the funeral industry. *See* Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. 42260, 42289 (1982). The Association of Real Estate License Law Officials (ARELLO) responds that a majority of occupational licensing boards are generally from the industry, *See* ARELLO, *supra* note 121, although this does not dispute widespread “regulatory capture.”

<sup>335</sup> *See supra* sections IV.B.1 and VI.

i.e., “list,” their homes on the firms’ websites.<sup>336</sup> When an Internet-based firm attempted to introduce an efficiency-enhancing MLS-like database for New York City, New York State acted to revoke the firm’s real estate license.<sup>337</sup> An Oklahoma State commission fined a broker for accurately warning home buyers that traditional agents, with a legal duty to serve sellers, cannot offer buyers the “full” representation provided by an agent hired solely to work for the buyer.<sup>338</sup>

### **MLS Access Rules and Local Boards Can Discipline Non-Traditional Brokers**

One way that traditional brokers have discouraged entry by brokers with business models that threatened to introduce price competition is to limit their ability to use the critically important MLSs.<sup>339</sup> In fact, an explicit purpose of establishing MLSs in the 1920s was to “replace[] the old spirit of competition for one of cooperation...”<sup>340</sup> Local real estate boards have not been hesitant to alter rules governing the use of the local MLS so as to frustrate those who ignore the “social norm” against price competition.<sup>341</sup> For example, as noted above, the MLS rules in Austin and other locales, denied brokers offering certain lower-priced, limited service options the chance to place their listings on realtor.com, although that should be ending.<sup>342</sup> Also as noted, the NAR’s restrictions on the display of MLS listings online triggered a 2005 DOJ

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<sup>336</sup> The California state body contended that such a marketing service represented the practice of real estate brokerage, requiring state licensing. *See ForSalebyOwner.com v. Zinnemann*, 347 F.Supp.2d 868, 871-72 (E.D. Cal. 2004). The judge, however, threw out the state’s case, after noting that the state permitted “newspapers of general circulation” to post real estate ads online without a real estate license. *Id.* at 877-79. A similar New Hampshire law is also being challenged. *See Glen Roberts, Jr., FSBO Web Site Seeks to Overturn N.H. Real Estate Law*, INMAN NEWS, June 14, 2006.

<sup>337</sup> *See Lala Wang, How Can Internet and Other New Business Models Affect Competition?*, presented at the AAI, Nov. 8, 2005, at 8-9, <http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/464h.pdf>. *See also New York Real Estate Under Microscope*, INMAN NEWS, Oct. 3, 2005.

<sup>338</sup> *See Snider v. Oklahoma Real Estate Comm’n*, 987 P.2d 1204, 1209 ¶17 (Sup. Ct. Okla 1999).

<sup>339</sup> *See Braswell & Poe, supra* note 118, at 307-11. The NAR has long taken a protectionist position of its members’ interests. *See Elizabeth Lesly, The Stupidity of Free-Market Chic ... in Real Estate*, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1990, at 34, and the NAR’s Internet use policies are only the latest efforts to deter price competition. *See* DOJ 2005 Amended Complaint, *supra* note 16, at ¶ 42.

<sup>340</sup> *See, e.g.*, FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 111 (citing H. Nightingale, California Real Estate April 1924, at 12). *See also* *Id.* at 114-16.

<sup>341</sup> *See, e.g.*, Lawrence Minard, *Real Estate*, FORBES, Sept. 4, 1978, at 43, 44 [ck]. One article suggested that traditional agents may have adopted a “social norm” against price competition, *see* Hsieh & Moretti, *supra* note 24, at 1086 n.16, and it could be based on their need for long-term self preservation. As the FTC observed, “a stigma still seems to attach to competition in commission rates.” FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 15, 167 n.495, 201. Those who ignore this social norm are subject to different forms of retaliation, such as steering. *See* FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 160-62. Brokers also handle MLS grievances themselves. *See* Hagerty, *supra* note 7.

<sup>342</sup> *See supra* note 149. *But see supra* note 150 and accompanying text. Tom Early, a long-time member of the NAR, states that he faced such discrimination by his Ohio real estate board when he chose to become an exclusive buyer’s agent. Comment at AAI workshop, Nov. 8, 2005.

antitrust lawsuit.<sup>343</sup>

Courts have found a number of MLS rules to be anticompetitive constraints.<sup>344</sup> For example, when the Austin Board of Realtors® amended its MLS rules in 2000 to frustrate eRealty's efforts to use the Internet to provide its clients with more efficient access to relevant listings, a court granted a preliminary injunction against the rule.<sup>345</sup> In addition, the FTC acted to prevent that same board from a different form of discrimination in 2006.<sup>346</sup> Still, by requiring listings to include the fee offered to the buyer's broker, the MLS facilitates the practices discussed in III.C.1 where agents working with buyers may intentionally fail to inform a client of an attractive offering, because other listings will yield the agent a much higher commission. Of course, the power of traditional brokers to use the MLS to discriminate against non-traditional firms will disappear if Google or others offer an MLS-like online, easily-searchable database that displaces current MLSs or MLSs change to compete with Google et al.<sup>347</sup>

### **Consumers are Ignorant of the Many Options That They Could Reasonably Demand**

Around 1980, undoubtedly due to the long history of fixed rates in the industry (as just discussed in section B, above), about half of all sellers believed that commission rates were fixed and non-negotiable and that the fixing was done either by law or by "the Board of Realtors."<sup>348</sup> And the 1996 Kiplinger's "Guide to Buying & Selling a Home" stated that commissions run typically at 6 to 7 percent and that "[a]s a practical matter, you won't get very far negotiating a

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<sup>343</sup> See *supra* note 162, at accompanying text.

<sup>344</sup> Courts have recognized that MLS rules may not impose unnecessary anticompetitive constraints on competition, such as excessive fees on users or rules that distort competition between the NAR and entities that compete with it. *See, e.g.*, Reifert v. So. Cental Wisconsin MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 323 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006) (Wood, concurring); Thompson v. Metro. Multi-List, 934 F.2d 1566, 1582 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991); Pope v. Mississippi Real Estate Comm'n, 872 F.2d 127 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989); Wells Real Estate, Inc., v. Greater Lowell Bd. Of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 815 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1368 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980); Buyer's Corner Realty v. No. Kentucky Ass'n of Realtors, et al, 410 F.Supp.2d 574 (E.D. Ky. 2006); Venture Resources Group, Inc. v. Greater New Jersey Regional Multiple Listing Service, Inc., 1996-1 Trade Cases ¶ 71,397, 1995 WL 866841, at \*2-4 (D.N.J. 1995) and cases cited therein; O'Riordan v. Long Island Bd. Of Realtors, 707 F. Supp. 111, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). *See generally*, Robert D. Butters, *Let Brokers Put Their Data Wherever They See Fit*, INMAN NEWS, May 26, 2006.

<sup>345</sup> See Austin Board of Realtors v. E-Realty, Inc., 2000 WL 34239114 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2000).

<sup>346</sup> See *supra* note 150, and accompanying text.

<sup>347</sup> See *supra* notes 253-256 and accompanying text.

<sup>348</sup> FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 66-69. Furthermore, 85 percent of the sellers were quoted a commission rate of either 6 or 7 percent by the broker they used and ultimately, 78 percent paid either 6 or 7 percent. *Id.* at 45-53. The FTC's survey found that only 35 percent of sellers were aware of discount brokers, only 12 percent contacted them, and only 2.6 percent listed their homes with one. *Id.* at 151.

lower rate unless you have special circumstances that make your property more economical to sell than others.”<sup>349</sup> In 2006, a columnist for *Inman Real Estate News* continues to recommend that sellers not try to negotiate a listing broker’s commission before signing a contract.<sup>350</sup>

Against this background and recognizing how infrequently most people buy or sell homes, it is not surprising that many may be unaware of the availability of lower-priced, non-traditional brokers.<sup>351</sup> Still, increased marketing by Internet-based realty firms and articles in the *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, and other major media, have raised public awareness that lower prices are available.<sup>352</sup> Yet, traditional brokers have responded effectively, as discussed next.

### **Traditional Brokers Have Successfully Portrayed Discount Brokers as Inferior**

To defend themselves against lower priced new entrants, traditional brokers have heralded the old adage: “you get what you pay for.”<sup>353</sup> They imply that brokers with lower prices *must* be skimping on quality and/or services<sup>354</sup> compared to the “full service” offered by traditional brokers, although conveniently they fail to define full service.<sup>355</sup> Although there is a

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<sup>349</sup> See KIPLINGER STAFF, *supra* note 63, at 316.

<sup>350</sup> See Robert J. Bruss, *Don’t Negotiate Listing Agent’s Commission Up Front*, INMAN NEWS, May 24, 2006.

<sup>351</sup> See Bruce Owen, *Kickbacks, Price Fixing, and Efficiency in Residential Real Estate Markets*, 29 STAN. L. REV. 931, 935 (1977).

<sup>352</sup> See Glenn Roberts, Jr. & Janis Mara, *Hot Market Fuels Fire for Lower Commissions*, INMAN NEWS, Apr. 12, 2005 (observing that “consumers are increasingly aware that fees paid for real estate agents are negotiable. ‘We (in the industry) all knew they were, but the public didn’t know they were.’” (quoting owner-broker Matt Williams)).

<sup>353</sup> See Kelly A. Spors, *What You Need to Know About Commission Rates*, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Sept. 20, 2004 (quoting Steve Cook, a spokesperson for the NAR: “Most people want a full-service agency to help them. In the end, you get what you pay for.”); Gomes, *supra* note 229 (reporting a Coldwell Banker ad stating “What’s that saying – you get what you pay for?”); Donald Bruce & Rudy Santore, *A Note on Optimal Real Estate Commissions*, Sept. 2004 (unpublished manuscript on file with author) at 10 (“a home seller does not necessarily prefer a lower rate to a higher one since agents exert less effort at lower rates”); Hill, *supra* note 188 (quoting NAR General Counsel, William North, that “you get what you pay for”).

<sup>354</sup> Irwin warns to beware of agents who offer to accept a lower commission; they may fail to disclose that they expect to do less work, e.g., merely list the property in the MLS. IRWIN, *supra* note 111, at 52. The FTC circa 1980 survey found that 22 percent of sellers rejected non-traditional agents because they provided less service, although most of them offered “full service.” FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 154, 164. *See also* FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 41-42, 142 (disparagement of non-traditional brokers is neither new nor ineffective). The FTC’s survey found that 83 percent of non-traditional brokers indicated that they had experienced lost or cancelled listings due to disparagement. Id. at 159. Article 15 [then Article 23] of the Realtors’ Code of Ethics discourages such actions against other realtors, but apparently not against non-traditional agents. Id. at 41.

<sup>355</sup> See Miller, *supra* note 23, at slide 9 and oral presentation. The main response to the observation that residential real estate agents in other developed nations like England, Ireland, Australia, etc., charge only two to three percent commissions is that brokers in these countries do not offer full service. Miller’s research, however, finds that the only significant difference between the services provided and costs incurred is that agents in the U.S. generally find

simple refutation to this insinuation, few buyers or sellers hear it, because there is no entity with the funding and mandate to effectively counter the NAR's marketing. If there was, it could point out that if a listing broker who charges \$18,000 on a \$300,000 home can afford to provide full service, then a broker charging *only* a 4.5 percent commission on a \$1 million home (\$45,000) can too. Yet when media firms criticize protectionist tactics of traditional brokers or praise new firms, vocal brokers accuse the media of being misinformed and biased.<sup>356</sup>

Yet because the purchase or sale of a home is such a major transaction to most home buyers' and sellers', merely planting seeds of doubt about the quality of non-traditional brokers is often enough for traditional firms to scare buyers and sellers from using such new entrants and sticking with traditional brokers. This has led some to strongly recommend that policymakers act to permit national banks, with their trustworthy reputations, to enter the real estate brokerage market in the hopes that they will embrace disruptive, non-traditional, lower-priced business models.<sup>357</sup> Other trusted national brands that might fill this niche, include Yahoo, Google, or other firms with a reputation for low prices, but quality goods, like Costco and Walmart.<sup>358</sup>

### **Social Norms and Large Gains Discourage Consumer Haggling Over Broker Rates**

Many consumers are also uncomfortable attempting to negotiate a fee lower than the standard commission advertised by a broker, particularly when they work with agents who are friends, or at least acquaintances.<sup>359</sup> Consumers understand that in some markets haggling or negotiating is the norm: the purchase of a car, particularly a used car, a home, and the salary at a new job.<sup>360</sup> In other markets, including those providing accounting and legal services, and real

it necessary to protect themselves against lawsuits by buying liability insurance. Id. at slide 3 and oral presentation.

<sup>356</sup> See Blanche Evans, *Are Banks, Newspapers Behind Recent Real Estate Industry Rants?*, REALTY TIMES, June 21, 2006; Blanche Evans, *Rotten Media Spin on Realtors Begins Anew*, REALTY TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005; Blanche Evans, *Vitriolic Washington Post Attack Confirms Conspiracy of Disinformation*, REALTY TIMES, May 19, 2005.

<sup>357</sup> See Hahn et al, *supra* note 14, at 110-11; White, *supra* note 27, at 28-29; Comments of Robert Litan, AAI presentation, Washington, DC, Nov. 8, 2005. See also Harrison K. Bishop, *Note, Expanded Powers Under Glba: The Great Turf War of the New Millennium: Can Banks Engage in Real Estate Brokerage and Management Activities?*, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 391, 397-401 (2002); Barta, *supra* note 7; Sichelman, *supra* note 7.

<sup>358</sup> See *supra* notes 253-256 and accompanying text.

<sup>359</sup> See *Consumer Rep.* *supra* note 15, at 461-62 (noting that more than one third of survey respondents chose their agent because he or she was a relative, friend, or neighbor and quoting the president of the NAR as telling his agents to "get incensed [if someone asks to cut the commission]. Our rule is that we don't. You wouldn't do that to your doctor or lawyer, would you?").

<sup>360</sup> Vendors in some open air markets are actually insulted if consumers do not attempt to bargain with them over prices. See Eric Schmitt, *A Man Does Not Ask a Man About His Wife*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, § 4 at 7.

estate services, however, the reigning social norm is for consumers to rely on competition to force sellers to voluntarily offer lower, competitive rates. Many consumers feel that negotiating for a lower fee with an agent or broker may be insulting to the agent and make themselves appear cheap.<sup>361</sup> This is particularly true because the broker's fee is so small compared to the price of a home and many sellers are able to secure sale prices much greater than they had ever hoped for. Many feel so fortunate that they are willing to share their new found wealth with those who help them to collect it.<sup>362</sup> Then again, many consumers who do request lower rates are successful,<sup>363</sup> and increasing numbers appear to be seeking reductions.<sup>364</sup>

### **The General Need for Two Agents to Make a Deal Empowers Traditional Brokers to Hinder New Entrants**

In addition to motive, as discussed in VIII.A., traditional agents also have opportunity. One reason why it is so easy for traditional brokers to deter new entrants and price competition is that most real estate sales require agents to rely on other agents – what the FTC's 1983 Report recognized as “interdependence.”<sup>365</sup> In fact, the FTC hypothesized that the ability of brokers to steer their customers to homes associated with agents charging the going commission rate and split “is the most important factor explaining the general uniformity of commission rates in most local markets.”<sup>366</sup> And an agent generally needs other agents to cooperate with them in many ways, including timely responses to questions and requests for material, quick access to new listings or prices, and credibility concerning promises like “I'll be there in 45 minutes” or “The repair will be done by Monday.” In addition, agents aiding buyers also want a reasonable fee for their services; and sellers' brokers need agents to inform buyers about their homes.

Traditional agents have also had little reason to worry that their actions to frustrate non-traditional entrants would cause them harm. As the *Wall Street Journal* recognized, sanctions for breach of ethics due to such practices have been non-existent.<sup>367</sup> As for prosecutions under the

<sup>361</sup> See Ross, *supra* note 45, at 90 (encouraging agents to make it “look tawdry to ask for a discount”).

<sup>362</sup> The situation appears to resemble that of wealthy patrons who are happy to leave large tips. See *supra* note 60.

<sup>363</sup> See WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 99-100; *Consumer Rep.*, *supra* note 15, at 461 (about half the respondents in a 1990 *Consumer Reports* who made an effort to negotiate a lower price were successful).

<sup>364</sup> See Inman Commissions 2006, *supra* note 3, at 6, 45-46. Yet, this may be due to higher prices. See *supra* note 15.

<sup>365</sup> The FTC's 1983 report recognized that the tremendous interdependence among agents facilitated efforts to discourage price competition. FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 2, 11, 32-42.

<sup>366</sup> FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 12, 55.

<sup>367</sup> See *supra* note 121.

antitrust laws, absent concerted activity, courts have tolerated unilateral refusals to deal because such actions by those lacking monopoly power are not recognized as violating the antitrust laws.<sup>368</sup> And the biggest problem with prosecutions is that improper agent practices may be passive, subtle, and difficult to prove.<sup>369</sup> It can be difficult to prove that an agent intentionally failed to make or return a call until it was too late<sup>370</sup> over the defense that it was merely an unintended consequence of giving higher priority to other actions. Moreover, agents can frequently defend their neglect of one potential deal by contending that they did not view it as attractive as it might appear, for the reasons discussed above.<sup>371</sup>

## **9. Six Disclosures that Might Stimulate Price Competition**

To help offset the conditions discussed in section VIII (inhibiting the availability of non-traditional pricing structures), this article proposes that consumers be armed with six pieces of information. Home buyers should be given an estimate of the dollar amount of the fee that their broker expects to receive for serving them if a sale occurs. Buyers should also be told whether their broker's agent may refuse to inform them about homes that become available and that meet their criteria if they are not represented by traditional brokers. Buyers should also be advised that fees paid directly to a buyer broker can be treated as part of the sale price for mortgage purposes. Sellers should be informed that many buyers have no broker, that others have brokers who have agreed to receive less than the customary buyer's broker co-op fee, and that both groups of buyers expect to be able to translate this savings into a price discount. Sellers should also be told whether their broker will attempt to limit the dissemination of their listing by competing brokers. Moreover, buyers and sellers should learn all this information *before* they hire a broker.<sup>372</sup>

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<sup>368</sup> See *supra* note 118.

<sup>369</sup> See Wachter, *supra* note 57, at 195 ("Passive non-cooperation and disparagement may take subtle forms that either are difficult to police or are perfectly legal."). For example, one would generally expect agents to return the calls and fulfill the requests of "friends" and favored colleagues before others.

<sup>370</sup> Id. at 195, 204 ("The full rate firm may claim 'difficulty' in getting in touch with or arranging to view the discount broker's listings. . . . Full rate brokers may procrastinate in returning phone calls from discount brokers or in informing their listing customer of a potential buyer who is represented by a discount broker.").

<sup>371</sup> See *supra* notes 115-116, and accompanying text.

<sup>372</sup> See Braswell & Poe, *supra* note 118, at 293-94. Correcting home sellers' and buyers' misconception after they have contracted with or shared confidential information with their agent is too late. See Thomas A. Early, Competition Policy and the Real Estate Industry, presented at DOJ/FTC workshop, Oct. 25, 2005, at 2-3,

## **Home Buyers Should Know What Their Broker Will be Paid**

As observed above, many home buyers believe that the agents working with them cost them nothing.<sup>373</sup> Accordingly, they have no reason to consider hiring a broker willing to charge them a flat fee or an hourly rate that would often be less than what a traditional broker would cost. To enable such non-traditional brokers to compete effectively, buyers should be informed of the dollar amount their broker is likely to receive. Furthermore, to help buyers compare that fee to an hourly fee, they should also be told how their broker's fee would translate into an hourly rate. Although the time spent by an agent may vary widely and the estimate of 20 to 69 hours as the average<sup>374</sup> appears to be on the high side, agents should provide buyers with an estimate of their hourly rate based on their previous sales. They should also inform buyers of what that figure would be if the effort required only 10 hours (exceptionally short) or 100 hours (on the longer side). These figures should encourage buyers who chose to handle some of the tasks themselves to discuss a lower fee or an hourly rate with brokers.

## **Home Buyers Should Know Specifically What Services Their Broker Will Provide, in Particular Whether the Broker's Agent May Intentionally Overlook Some Homes**

As discussed in section III.C.1 most buyers relying on traditional agents assume that their agent is scouring the market and showing them all homes that meet their search criteria, regardless of the broker a seller is using. Buyers deserve to know what the “full service” promised them includes, particularly whether it may omit exposure to a significant set of homes. Buyers informed that they will not actually receive “full service” may well choose to demand a lower price or choose a different broker – one loyal to them, possibly an exclusive buyer’s broker.

If most buyers knew how traditional agents treat homes handled by non-traditional brokers, traditional agents might feel compelled to alter their policies and routinely inform buyers of all relevant options. This would make it easier for non-traditional brokers with different rate structures to represent sellers more successfully and make them more attractive to sellers. Alternatively, if buyer brokers explicitly lied to buyers about their practices, it should

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<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/rewcom/213172.pdf>.

<sup>373</sup> See *supra* notes 84-87, and accompanying text.

<sup>374</sup> See *supra* note 282, at 143.

make it that much easier for state consumer protection officials to prosecute them for clear violations of their fiduciary duty. It would also be likely to dramatically increase buyer demand for the independently operated MLSs – directly assessable by buyers – discussed above.<sup>375</sup>

### **Buyers Should Know that Mortgages Can Include Fees Paid Directly to Buyer Brokers**

In most cases, the fees charged by even non-traditional buyer brokers are paid out of the co-op fee offered by the listing broker or the seller. In some cases, however, listing brokers may want to see particular buyer brokers fail,<sup>376</sup> particularly those the broker has targeted with adverse split arrangements.<sup>377</sup> These listing brokers may refuse to adjust the purchase price to cover the buyer's broker's fee. This makes it more difficult to amortize that fee as part of the mortgage. That does not appear to be due to any formal rules deterring banks from granting buyers mortgages based on a total sale price that includes the fee paid directly to the buyer's broker rather than by the listing agent from the latter's commission received from the seller. Nevertheless, many lenders appear resistant to regarding a fee paid directly to the buyer's broker as part of the sale price, even if only out of ignorance.<sup>378</sup> This may occur because some written lending standards may not have been officially revised to recognize that agents working with buyers are no longer usually subagents of the seller.<sup>379</sup> Buyers and banks should be informed that these mortgages are available and accepted in the secondary markets.

### **Sellers Should Know that Some Buyers Forgo a Broker Seeking to Save Money**

As discussed in section III.C.1, above, even many lower-priced discount brokers tell sellers that using the MLS to attract agents working with buyers requires them to offer co-op fees to buyers' brokers at the prevailing rate, typically three percent.<sup>380</sup> Most sellers, however, do not realize that more than 20 percent of the time,<sup>381</sup> they will be negotiating with a buyer acting

<sup>375</sup> See *supra* notes 253-256 and accompanying text.

<sup>376</sup> Cf text accompanying note 325, *supra*.

<sup>377</sup> See *supra* note 178, and accompanying text.

<sup>378</sup> See WILSON, *supra* note 62, at 146-47; Marcie Geffner, *Home Sale Commission Financing Would Benefit All*, INMAN NEWS, July 21, 2006; Larson, *supra* note 303; {Letters to the Editor, *Industry Pros Weigh in on Splitting Commissions*, INMAN NEWS, Mar. 22, 2006; Letters to the Editor, *It's Up to the Secondary Market to Change Commission Structure*, INMAN NEWS, July 3, 2006.

<sup>379</sup> Conversation with Barry Miller, founder of Real Estate Buyer Agent Council, Aug. 26, 2006.

<sup>380</sup> See *supra* section III.C.1.

<sup>381</sup> See *supra* note 142.

without a broker. If that buyer insists on a three percent price discount (to reflect the avoided cost of a buyer's broker), however, the listing broker might refuse to release the seller from a listing contract that granted the broker a six percent commission, unless the contract spoke to that issue.

Giving sellers the chance to discuss this scenario before signing a listing contract should lead them to favor a broker willing to reduce the total commission due them to three percent in the absence of a buyer's broker.<sup>382</sup> In addition, where listing brokers have indicated that they will pay lower commissions or none at all to some brokers,<sup>383</sup> sellers should demand a corresponding reduction in the fee paid to the listing broker. This would permit sellers to reduce their home prices so that buyers could use that savings to provide additional compensation to their broker. The listing contract might also offer the listing broker an additional flat fee for handling the buyer's paperwork if the buyer needed assistance.<sup>384</sup>

### **Sellers Should Know that Buyers May Agree on Lower Fees with their Brokers**

Closely related to the previous point, increasing numbers of buyers are considering offers from brokers willing to represent them for significantly lower rates than are being offered in the MLS to cooperating (buyer) brokers. Sellers might also add a clause to their listing agreement to permit buyers to enjoy the rebate discounts that their brokers may offer, but which may be inadvertently prohibited.<sup>385</sup> The listing contract would permit the seller to honor any discount offered by the buyer's broker to the buyer by reducing the co-op fee it paid to the buyer's broker, the total commission, and the price of the home, by the same dollar amount to pass on that discount.

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<sup>382</sup> The FTC found that some non-traditional brokers varied their commissions so that the seller did not have to pay a buyer's agent's commission if the buyer had no agent. *See* FTC 1983 Report, *supra* note 12, at 171.

<sup>383</sup> *See supra* note 106.

<sup>384</sup> In 1994, the Consumer Federation of America suggested that sellers negotiate to reduce the commission they pay to brokers to between 2.5 and 4 percent (in areas with typical 6 percent rates) if there is no other agent involved in the transaction. *See* STEPHEN BROBECK, CHANGES IN REAL ESTATE AGENT REPRESENTATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 4 (1994). *See also* Vizard, *supra* note 64 (suggesting a 4 percent commission in that situation).

<sup>385</sup> *See supra* note 196.

## **Listing Brokers Should Disclose What Specific Services They Will Provide, and Whether They May Selfishly Seek to Limit Dissemination of Listing Information**

As discussed above, most sellers desire and expect their brokers to seek maximum exposure for their home<sup>386</sup> by encouraging their listing to be spread far and wide as part of full service. Accordingly, as part of a general disclosure of what specific services they will receive, sellers deserve a “listing exposure disclosure:”<sup>387</sup> to know if their broker intends to prevent competing brokers from displaying information about the seller’s home. Sellers who discover that traditional “full service” brokers may seek to limit dissemination of their listing are likely to choose other brokers who promise to seek maximum exposure to potential bona fide buyers.

### **Implementation**

To ensure that home buyers receive these six pieces of information, policymakers might expressly require disclosures; realistically, however, the political clout of traditional brokers makes this unlikely. Moreover, even if such disclosures could be mandated, there is the matter that brokers could satisfy these and other required disclosures by providing consumers with long, legalistic statements. Consumers asked to sign a pile of disclosures might feel overwhelmed and sign them based simply on assurances by their broker’s agent that all they meant was that the customer understood how the industry worked.

Therefore, the best option may be to seek a combination of efforts by consumer advocates, including *Consumer Reports*, media consumer reporters, and enlightened government agencies, like the DOJ and FTC, to provide the third, fourth and fifth types of information just reviewed and clear recommendations that home buyers demand the other three. After all, since home purchases and sales are likely to be consumers’ largest financial transactions, they should be willing to devote a few minutes to credible recommendation for how they could possibly save thousands of dollars when that information was provided by a credible source.<sup>388</sup>

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<sup>386</sup> See *supra* note 153, and accompanying text.

<sup>387</sup> This phrase was offered by Bill Wendel.

<sup>388</sup> If there were still “home economics” courses in secondary schools they could review the economics of buying a home. In their absence, however, consumer groups, including the nationwide network of government-supported housing counseling agencies, should help those writing math textbooks and math curricula to include information about home purchases and sales so that high school graduates will have a better appreciation for the economics of different real estate broker rate structures, including highlighting the six pieces of information mentioned here.

Some home sellers receiving enormous profits on the sale of their homes may feel embarrassed to begrudge their brokers a relatively small share of that windfall. Once the market cools off, however, buyers and sellers may become more focused on the irrationality of the current rate levels and structure. This might even represent a popular issue for challengers to incumbent state legislators to raise in their campaigns. It would also help if state departments of consumer protection and attorneys general made a greater effort to investigate and prosecute cases where agents working with buyers clearly violated their fiduciary duties to clients.<sup>389</sup>

## **10. Conclusion**

The traditional, straight percentage-of-sale-price residential real estate brokerage commission does not serve the interests of either home buyers or sellers. Fees are unrelated to the quantity or quality of service provided by brokers and their agents. The rate structure creates little incentive for agents to provide the value-added services of which many are capable, and also produces some serious harms to buyers and sellers. These harms include buyers not being alerted about available homes meeting their search criteria because the listing broker or seller has not offered an attractive fee to the buyer's broker; and providing sellers' agents little incentive to invest the effort to raise the net sale price of a home. The traditional commission rate structure has become structurally unsound and should be rebuilt.

The foundation of a new fee structure should have buyers' brokers setting their own fees or negotiating with buyers;<sup>390</sup> not relying on standard, default commissions set by sellers' brokers in the MLS. The traditional practice of sellers' brokers specifying the fees that buyers' brokers charge to the latter's own clients, should be recognized by appropriate governmental bodies as at least an attempt to fix market prices. Antitrust law simply does not permit one firm to attempt to set the price that its competitors charge for a competing service.

The situation today is very different from that of twenty years ago. At that time, sellers' brokers noted their co-op fee offer in their MLS listing because they were making an offer to the agents working with buyers to join the seller's broker in serving the interests of the seller. There was nothing anticompetitive about posting an offer seeking to engage a subagent. Today,

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<sup>389</sup> See *supra* note 121.

<sup>390</sup> See *supra* note 95.

however, most buyer brokers commit to serve buyers' interests, and their fiduciary duty is to buyers. There is no longer any reason to permit listing brokers to set the default prices that these competing buyers' brokers charge to serve their own customers.

The NAR claims that the elimination of interbroker compensation would destroy the MLS,<sup>391</sup> but that prediction is simply not true, as explained in detail by one lawyer who has long represented many MLSs.<sup>392</sup> The NAR's real fear about this approach, however, is understandable. The elimination of interbroker compensation would diminish the ability of traditional brokers to frustrate vigorous price competition, and thus likely lead to a dramatic fall in broker revenues.<sup>393</sup>

Therefore, policymakers eager to aid consumers and foster economic efficiency through competition should support this separation of fee setting. It would also eliminate the harm now caused to competition by state anti-rebate laws and disputes over which broker was entitled to the buyer broker fee as the "procuring cause" of the buyer's offer. Policymakers should also act to ensure that consumers have the same chance to amortize their broker costs as part of their mortgages, whether or not the seller agrees to include that fee in the sale price of the home.

Brokers should remain free to set their fees as percentage commissions, but for routine brokerage tasks, effective competition would almost certainly lead consumers to prefer brokers who set flat fees, hourly rates, or some combination of the two, as discussed in VII. Consumers will probably continue to prefer brokerage agreements that defer any payment until the relevant transaction was completed, but broker contracts should allow brokers to receive some reasonable minimum level of compensation in the event that the client terminates the relationship after receiving valuable service, but before a purchase or sale.<sup>394</sup>

Percentage-based fees should not disappear, but they should be used to motivate real estate agents to generate incremental value. Sellers should offer their brokers' agents (alone, without any splits with others) a substantial share, e.g., 20 to 50 percent, of any increase the agent can secure in the selling price above some agreed upon benchmark. In volatile markets, however, benchmarks should include variable elements pegged to the most recent sales of

<sup>391</sup> See, e.g., Stevens, *supra* note 223, and accompanying text.

<sup>392</sup> See Larson, *supra* note 95.

<sup>393</sup> See *supra* section VIII.A.

<sup>394</sup> Most broker agreements already grant the broker the right to a fee if the client later buys a home that the agent had shown to them or to a buyer the agent had negotiated with, at least for some reasonable period of time.

comparables or inventory levels. Buyers, meanwhile, once they selected a home, should offer their brokers' agents a substantial share of any price reduction the agent is able to secure. Both buyers and sellers might also offer bonuses for quick results to agents who met designated deadlines.

Reaching this result will be difficult, given the understandable resistance from traditional brokers to a reform that could cost them \$30 billion in annual revenues. Still, pressure from declining home prices could be a catalyst for change. Also, superior agents should recognize that the new environment would lead to a mass exodus of the least qualified agents. This would enable them to increase their billable time while spending less time prospecting for clients. In fact, one might expect that the best agents would earn higher incomes, while consumers would receive higher quality service at lower prices. Yet given NAR's strong effort in state legislatures to protect the traditional system, success will require effective work by consumer advocates. The consumer media and housing counseling agencies must prompt consumers to interview agents about the six matters discussed in detail in Section IX, which should ensure that they pay only competitive prices for only the valuable real estate brokerage services they need or desire.